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ABSTRACT
The thesis compares decision making in six suburban 
local councils in Sydney: Bankstown, Burwood, Ku-ring-gai,
Leichhardt, Liverpool, and North Sydney. Three types of political 
issues or decisions are distinguished: distributive decisions,
or ’doing favours’ (parochial or individual-oriented and particu­
laristic); regulative decisions (rule-bound and affecting larger 
categories of people through precedent), and redistributive 
decisions (affecting broad categories by redistribution of wealth).
Sydney suburban councils are basically administrative 
bodies. However, much of local politics involves disputes over 
what would normally be classed as administrative decisions; that 
is many local political issues are distributive. In the six councils, 
elections are often characterised by very localised personal support 
for candidates and by parochial or distributive issues rather than 
issues of policy. Local interest groups are mostly organised at 
the neighbourhood level and press parochial interests. Many aider- 
men pay more attention to individual constituency pressures than 
to council officials. In making decisions, aldermen are often 
highly susceptible to pressures from within their own ward. A 
description of actual decisions in the areas of planning admini­
stration and budgetary decision making shows that distributive 
issues are common-place, often in areas of administration that are 
intended to be regulative.
Distributive decision making tends to be found more in 
larger councils; in poorer areas where service needs are greatest; 
in areas undergoing rapid development (often the outer suburbs); 
and in councils with Labor Party control. There are some similarities
between these aspects of local politics and the politics of the 
American urban machine. The notion that the middle class adopt a 
’public-regarding’ ethos as distinct from a working class ’private- 
regarding' ethos has some relevance in accounting for the incidence 
of distributive politics, in the way it helps account for machine 
politics. Some explanation is also found in differences in local 
political cultures. These stem from peculiar local factors as well 
as from differences in social attitudes supposedly held by broad 
categories of the population.
It is concluded that while local councils are not an 
ideal form of government for making some types of administrative 
decisions, there is some value in enabling a degree of personal 
intervention in rule-bound administration, and in ensuring that 
very immediate and important parochial interests are properly re­
presented. There is great value in retaining a system of govern­
ment that permits the occasional expression of broader choices 
about important policy matters, through local elections and commu­
nity group activity.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
Decision making and politics in local government 
councils are in many ways qualitatively different from 
governmental processes at other levels and in other forms 
of government. This chapter aims to show this and also 
to outline the approach to be adopted in the study.
Whilst the discussion may be applicable to various systems 
of local government in different national and local 
settings, the remarks are confined largely to local councils 
in New South Wales and, more specifically, to suburban 
councils in Sydney.
Local government in New South Wales took a long time 
to become firmly established and, when it did, failed to 
achieve the status enjoyed by institutions of local 
government in the U.K. Early attempts by colonial 
administrations to institute a system of local self- 
government were often opposed by reluctant taxpayers and 
schemes for compulsory incorporation of areas failed."*"
Badly drafted legislation containing ’loopholes’ and the 
State government’s unwillingness to give initial financial 
or technical assistance contributed to an inauspicious 
beginning. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
most of the Sydney urban area and the country immediately 
surrounding i t , were incorporated under the provisions for 
voluntary local incorporation by means of petition. But 
it was not until 1906 that legislation provided for 
compulsory incorporation of all the populated areas of 
the State. A consolidating Act of 1919? now much amended, 
is the basis of the present system of local government.
1
2The functions delegated to local government were 
minimal and remain so„ Local roads and bridges, 
footpaths, drainage, street lighting, garbage removal, 
public health and building controls and parks and 
recreation still form the basis of council activities, 
although during the present century important additions 
have included public libraries, swimming pools, various 
minor ’welfare’ services and the administration of 
statutory town planning controls. State government 
retained police and education. Semi-independent ad hoc 
government authorities or statutory corporations were 
entrusted with the fire brigade, harbour construction and 
administration, water supply and sewerage disposal, 
electricity reticulation and the provision of public 
housing. Some of these functions were in part undertaken 
by local councils but various metropolitan—wide authorities 
(some with local government representation, but directly 
responsible to State parliament or a government minister) 
have fully taken most of them over.
The Labor Party in New South Wales tried on several, 
occasions to give local government broader responsibilities. 
These attempts were associated with proposals for the 
creation of larger local government areas in Sydney, or 
the creation of a single metropolitan government. These 
proposals largely failed, partly because of opposition from 
local government itself, fearful of a loss of autonomy and 
wary of the Labor Party’s political designs. Conservative 
parties often added their voices to this opposition and 
the New South Wales Legislative Council, with an anti—Labor
3majority for most of its life, consistently blocked such 
reforms« These pressures forced the post-19^ +1 Labor 
government to modify its proposals for the amalgamation 
of over sixty metropolitan councils into eight new areas. 
The Local Government (Areas) Act of 1948 finally created 
thirty nine councils in the metropolitan area, a structure 
that remains largely unchanged.
Table 1—1 Suburban Councils (Sydney), General Fund
Ordinary Expenditure: % total expenditure by
major categories of expenditure 1910—1969
1910 1920 1930 1939 1930 1939 1969
Administration 10.7 8.5 4.3 6.2 7 08 7.3 8.1
Public Works 1 5^.3 60.2 63 0 2 38.8 47.7 43.6 39.8
Public Health 2 11.6 13.7 12.2 14.9 23.9 24.0 21.4
Public Services 3 17.2 11.4 6.9 8.3 10.9 12.2 14.7
Council Property 3.2 2.9 1.1 1.9 2.6 3.6 3 0 8Other 4 3.1 1.3 10.3 9.9 7.1 7.1 10.3
1940, I960 and I97O figures not available
1 Includes contributions to Department of Main Roads.
2 Includes parks and reserves expenditure.
3 Comprises 2 street lighting, town planning, libraries,
fire prevention, pools and beaches, public markets, 
donations and 'Other1.
4 Includes interest paid on loans.
Source 2 Statistical. Register, New South Wales 2 
Local Government.
Table 1-1 shows the prominent place occupied by 
public works expenditure — roads, drains, footpaths, kerb 
and gutter and so on - in the overall expenditure of 
suburban councils. A tendency to spend less on these 
•essentials* in relation to the so-called 'luxuries* is 
evident from the table and has sometimes been opposed in 
local government circles. Local councils have traditionally 
been seen as the means of providing 'basic necessities'.
4As the major source of local government finance has always 
been the property rate, it has been argued that local, 
services should largely be for the direct benefit of 
property owners, or 1 services to property1, rather than 
amenities that benefit the community at large, or that 
sector of it that does not own property and does not pay 
rate s•
This narrow view of the functions of local government
is based on a particular conception of how local councils
should be run. Local government administration (with the
emphasis on ’administration1) has traditionally been
conceived of as a matter of providing a range of basic
services as cheaply and efficiently as possible. 'Good
government' and 'the public interest* are served by sound
management and balancing the budget. Property owners pool
their resources and elect a board of 'trustees’ to manage
certain common affairs. Bluett, the author of the standard
'practitioner's guide' on local government, first published
in the 1920's and now in its eighth edition, sees local
council administration in this lights
Tt must be kept in mind that the fundamental 
principle behind local government is that the 
community contributes to a common fund to 
purchase for itself the essential needs of 
civilised living. It elects from its numbers 
representatives to decide what money is required 
and how it will be spent.
That is the task.... ^
In this picture of local government the notion of an 
elected body in charge of council affairs occupies a 
somewhat ambivalent position. Local government in New 
South Wales was well behind the State government in calling 
for and attaining universal suffrage, although it has been
5far ahead of its counterparts in other Australian States
in this respect« Plural voting was abolished in 1906,
but a restricted property owning and occupancy franchise
was not abolished until 1926* It was not until 19^1 that
the removal of a six month residence qualification brought
the franchise into line with State and Federal electoral
law, with the exception that non-resident landowners
retained a vote« The 1926 and 19^-1 measures were the
work of Labor governments. A common argument used
against extending the franchise was expressed by
W.E.V. Robson in the Legislative Council, opposing the
1926 measure when he said ’the people who find the money.•.
should control, the election of the representatives in
4the council’. He also claimed that the councils were 
’purely administrative’. Mr Bavin (who was to become 
Premier in 1927) spoke against the same Bill and expanded 
on this arguments
(A council’s) primary duty is one of administration... 
However devoted a man may be to the abstract idea 
of universal suffrage, no one can say that that 
is the best method of obtaining the best men for 
the purpose of carrying out administrative work.
No man in his senses...would have men elected 
by universal suffrage to carry on the 
administration of a business. 5
The idea that running a local government body is little
different from running a business is closely linked with
the view that the major test of good local government is
the efficiency with which it is managed.
In this view there is no room for politics and,
in particular, party politics. Bluett sees party politics
as 'a negation of the purpose and spirit of local
6government *o Liberal Party member of the State
Legislative Assembly, Mr Mutton, expressed the view that —
ooothere is no room for party politics in local 
governmento One cannot have a political decision 
about a footpath, a drain or a building application. 
Council administers the law: parliament legislates« 7
His party colleague Mr McGinty (a former mayor of Willoughby),
extended his condemnation to 'pressure groups'. Decisions
should be made ’in accordance with the Local Governmentg
Act' and 'solely in the public interest*» Bluett says 
of party politics:
There is no surer way of cutting the heart out 
of local government and destroying its image as 
the people's own community government, coming as 
it does right to the doorstep of every home with 
benefit to all and favours to none. 9
The representative has no need of any pressure group, party
organisation or sectional interest to tell him how best to
act in the public interest. Deciding what is in the public
good is a matter of common sense, for the questions are
practical ones, not political ones. They are matters of
administration, not legislation; good management and
efficiency, not party doctrine»
The currency of these views is demonstrated by the
frequency they appear as slogans in local elections. In
particular they are used to attack Labor Party candidates,
(the Liberal Party espouses the anti—party doctrine as
official policy and does not contest local elections).
It is a common combination of campaign themes to find
candidates promising to combat party politics by offering
the alternative of 'business-like efficient modern
management*» Many of these candidates boast of their
7business or administrative experience. The ratepayer
whose criterion of good management is ’value for money’,
is attracted to these views, and non-party candidates
do have considerable success.
Legislators concerned with local government have
often taken the position that one of the most useful
functions local councils perform is to unburden the
parliament of minor matters of local interest. The
instigator of much of the very early legislation,
Governor Gipps, held this view, (although he was also of
the opinion that local government was to be valued as an
end in itself for the sake of democratic life).^ He
held fears that the newly elected Legislative Council for
the Colony would become bogged down in matters of parochial
detail and petty disputes unless local government were
instituted. As it turned out, much of the opposition to
wider incorporation of local areas came from members of
parliament who were reluctant to surrender their powers
of patronage in ’roads and bridges’ and other local matters.
The notion that parliament was concerned with higher and
finer things was expressed by Premier J. H. Carruthers in
1906, in an off-the-cuff response to an interjection on
the dangers of giving councils more power, during his
speech in support of the 1906 legislation for which he
was largely responsible:
Why should not Parliament surrender some of 
its powers? What do these powers consist in?
Now honourable members have to humiliate 
themselves by going to the public offices for 
every twopenny-halfpenny thing which ought to 
be attended to by some council. We are only
8giving up that which degrades Parliament, in 
order that we may uplift ourselves by having 
more time to legislate for the country. H
J. H. Carruthers may have believed that the institution
of local government was valuable as an end in itself,
but in his speeches he gave no indication of this, arguing
for stronger local government on the ground of
administrative convenience.
Other advocates have taken a more 'fundamentalist*
line, epitomised by the view expressed in a pamphlet
issued by the Local Government and Shires Association
of New South Waless 'The failure of Local Government will
mean the end of true Democracy'. In summary, their well
rehearsed arguments were that any system of government
'should give the maximum opportunities to participate,
and Local Government does just that'; ’power should at
all times remain with or as near as possible to the
people', i.e. with local government; local, government
provides a good training ground for citizenship and the
acceptance of responsibility for public affairs by members
of the community at large, and a good training ground
for public office-holders; and local government is the
best safeguard against excessive centralisation and
12bureaucratisation of government.
The firm adherence to the belief of an elected body 
in local government gives rise to an ambiguity in 
traditional views towards local government. Elections 
mean politics, but local government is administration. 
Similarly, the view of the representative as close to the
9'grass roots' and accessible to his electors, coupled with
the notion that the representative in a local council
provides a safeguard against excessive bureaucratisation,
are also somewhat at odds with the purported administrative
character of local government functions and roles. In
expressing an 'anti-bureaucratic' sentiment, advocates
of these views have a particular picture of bureaucracy-
in mind: inaccessible, remote and unresponsive to or
unfamiliar with local conditions. Liberal Party leader
in the New South Wales Parliament of 1948, V. E. Treatt ,
warned that the Labor Government's amalgamation proposals
of 1 9 ^ 7 - 8 'widened the gap between the ratepayer and the
alderman' and provided a 'happy hunting ground for the
13bureaucrat, the Socialist and the Communist’. At
the 1972 New South Wales Local Government Conference,
Prime Minister McMahon warned against proposals to
'abolish' local government and to replace councils with
'a series of arrogant and disinterested bureaucracies...
remote from the local problems of the citizen h i m s e l f 0
He conjured up a picture of the citizen trying to * obtain a
response from a remote bureaucrat about an offensive drain
14or an unsatisfactory garbage service'. This seems to
suggest that the role of the local elected representative 
is to 'iron out' the inefficiencies and possible injustices 
of bureaucratic administration. On the other hand, there 
is perhaps a dilemma in that while local councils are 
performing 'administrative* functions, the representative 
has direct and immediate access to the administrative
system, for the sole purpose of intervening in the normal
10
detached and ‘disinterested’ process that characterises 
the impartial bureaucratic approach to case by case 
administration. It is perhaps unfair to pick on 
Mr McMahon’s use of the term ’disinterested’, but the 
notion that there are cases in which special effort has 
to be made to find a way around the rules and ’cut the 
red tape*, in an individual case where the rules seem to 
do an injustice, is an important theme in this general 
view of the local representative’s role«
This problem is one that receives perennial attention 
in debates about the proper roles of the elected 
representative and the paid official in local councils.
The debate stems directly from the nature of a system of 
administration in which politicians are performing 
administrative functions. In fact, of course, we have 
seen that in the orthodox view of local government the 
representative should not be a ‘politician’« The 
structure of local council bodies, following the U.K. 
tradition, compounds the problem. The elected 
representatives (referred to in municipalities as aldermen), 
are directly responsible for all aspects of council 
business. There is no separate executive body exercising 
authority independently from the council. Although the 
mayor is termed the ’chief executive officer’, he is 
elected by the council annually and given little 
independent formal authority. The committee system, often 
much praised as the core of the U.K. system of local 
government, encourages aldermen to enter into detailed 
consideration of matters in discussions with the paid
11
officials. Bluett recommends that councils should make
ful.1 use of the system as it
, « «enables council, to, » „ensure that proper 
consideration is given to all matters, even 
of a minor nature 0 15
At the same time, he is quite adamant that
The staff never intrude in policy for this 
is the preserve and authority of the people’s 
elected representatives! nor, on the other hand, 
should members of the council stray into the 
field of administration. 16
The New South Wales Department of Local Government is
equally certain and seems to indicate that councils are
in need of reform in this matters
The popular conception of a council as a body 
which has to deal with every minor detail of,,, 
administration is obsolete.
The obvious solution is the creation of an 
efficient committee system,,, 17
It is not necessarily bad for aldermen to be concerned in
matters of ’detail', so long as the council itself can
•concentrate upon the framing ofc policy’. At the same
time the Department does recommend the greater use of powers
of delegation to paid officials (powers which were only
granted to councils by an amendment to the Act in 19^-5
and which they appear to have been reluctant to take
advantage of).
The Maud Committee on management of local, government
in the U.K. was concerned to a considerable extent with
these questions. It was accepted that the distinction
between ’policy’ and ’administrative detail’ was an
18extremely difficult one to draw. Guidelines and
’policies' can undergo alteration by being applied to
12
separate cases and new policies can emerge from
precedents set in case by case administration. Minor
matters of this nature often come to be charged with
political significance; policies generally come under
public scrutiny when they are applied and their
implications are understood. In many cases, it is
difficult to devise adequate rules or guidelines sufficient
to deal with separate cases and marginal cases have to
be decided. The Maud Committee nevertheless settled on
a division of decision making functions that followed the
traditional policy - administration distinction, although
it was rephrased. Elected representatives should
’exercise ultimate direction and control of affairs',
'take key decisions on the objectives of the authority',
and undertake periodic reviews of 'progress and performance
of services' . The 'day to day administration of services' ,
'decisions on case work' and the 'routine process of
inspection and control’, should be the functions of the
19paid officers. The committee expressed concern that
individual 'case work', whilst arousing the'vivid interest'
and the 'sympathy and compassion' of councillors, tended
to become the main focus of committee decisions, as this
could lead to 'decisions being taken in accordance with
the subjective opinions of the members present to the
20prejudice of a consistent approach'.
Maud's criticisms of local government in the U.K. 
would apply even more to metropolitan suburban councils 
in Sydney. The tendency to involve themselves in matters 
of 'administrative detail' is more marked because of the
13
smaller range of functions performed and the nature of 
these functions. The political attention devoted to 
matters of administration of services and application of 
rules and regulations stems in part from the relative 
infrequency of major policy decisions. This will 
become more evident in the course of the study. As to 
the effect of the sorts of decisions councils are concerned 
with on the way aldermen perform their roles, this is 
crucial in understanding local government decision making.
Local government, as Bluett so rightly said, comes
»right to the doorstep of every home». In 1968 JO.'J'/o
of total council income was raised by direct annual rate
21levies in Sydney's suburban councils. Only 3 came
from government grants. Levied in a lump sum, the rate 
has immediate impact on the individual property owner.
The impact of the services provided is similarly direct.
The state of the road, footpath or the kerb and gutter 
are immediately apparent and affect directly the 'amenity" 
enjoyed by separate properties. The great majority of 
services are highly 'location-specific' in that they are 
provided piecemeal to separate streets in the case of 
roadworks or to particular suburbs or neighbourhoods in 
the case of parks and recreation facilities, community 
halls and most other community facilities such as branch 
libraries or baby health centres. The impact of 
government regulations concerning building, health and 
town planning requirements is even more specific, as 
their provisions refer directly to separate parcels of 
land and directly affect what owners may do with their
l4
property, as well as its value, or the amenity it enjoys 
by virtue of the nature of development permitted in its 
immediate environment0 Building and health regulations 
are specified by Acts of Parliament and are rarely the 
subject of political dispute in themselves0 However, 
their administration and enforcement by councils is 
by no means always a purely routine matter. Planning 
regulations are drawn up by local councils in conjunction 
with the State Planning Authority, but even so the great 
majority of political conflicts in this area occur when 
councils implement them or exercise various discretionary 
powers within their ambit. These conflicts have their 
root in the specific development application, involving 
the developer himself and possibly immediate neighbours.
The interests involved once again are either individual 
property owners or relatively small numbers brought 
together by proximity in a specific street or locality.
The process of administering these regulations and 
implementing the details of providing services across 
the municipality is what much of local politics is all 
about. The property owner is concerned to defend the 
value of his property or enhance it. The occupant wishes 
to enjoy a particular standard of amenity in his area 
in the form of good roads, other sorts of council, services 
or the sort of land use he wants to see next door. This 
applies to occupants of industrial, commercial, and 
residential property alike, although disputes over 
residential amenity seem to have a character of their 
own, Expressions of political involvement by owner or
15
occupant tend to occur not when the council makes policy 
decisions such as how much to allocate to kerb and gutter 
construction, but when a decision is made as to whether 
kerb and gutter is to be provided to his particular street, 
past his front gatej not when the council formulates a 
zoning scheme for the municipality, but when a developer 
lodges an application to erect a multi-storey block of 
flats on the next door property.
To summarise the picture I have presented up to
this point, much of local politics is concerned with
pressures to obtain a favourable intervention in the
administrative process. At the same time there are
also occasions when broader and more far reaching issues
are the subject of local politics. Broad zoning policies,
the level of the rates, or the council's expenditure
priorities do become the subject of political conflict
and may involve the business community or sectors of it,
groups of residents, social or sporting clubs who are
major users of council services, and so on. However,
given the limited scope of local council functions and
powers, it is often the case that the issues affecting broad
categories of people are resolved elsewhere than at the 
22local level. Thus, real estate interests and business
groups seek to influence the content of local planning 
schemes to protect their interests by approaching the 
State Government or the State Planning Authority, treating 
the issue on a metropolitan, rather than a local, level. 
Major decisions about development at the urban fringe, 
sitings of major new industrial, undertakings, the location
16
of expressways, the installation of sewerage and water 
services are made by State Government or by semi­
government authorities. Local councils find themselves 
one amongst many government bodies and interest groups 
in the process of decision making over metropolitan 
development. The ‘external relations* of local councils 
are an important aspect of their activities, but the 
present study is confined to the local level.
The contention that the character of local politics 
can only be understood by relating political activity 
to the nature of the governmental activities local, 
councils are concerned with is the stepping—off point 
for the theoretical approach adopted in the present study. 
It is adapted from a scheme evolved by T. J. Lowi, in 
the context of understanding the great variety of 
political power relationships uncovered by a large number 
of case studies in American national policy making.
Lowi contends that there are three major categories of 
public policiesz distribution, regulation and 
redistribution. These different 'areas of policy* 
constitute 'real, arenas of power's
Each arena tends to develop its own 
characteristic political, structure, 
political process, elites and group 
relations. 23
The distributive arena is one in which decisions are 
made in response to demands from a highly disaggregated 
set of interests - individuals, groups and, very commonly, 
localities. None of them cares, in the short run, what 
any one else gets so long as they get their * slice of
17
the cake* , or the particular favour they have sought.
So long as there is enough to go around, ’supplicants’ 
do not necessarily confront one another or enter into 
direct competition, but rather jostle in the queue.
Each decision is an act of patronage and has no 
ramifications for future decisions beyond perpetuating 
an expectation that anyone with a ’deserving case’ or 
with sufficient political muscle can expect a favour 
themselves. The classic example is the dispensing of 
favours and patronage from the pork barrel, in a ’roads 
and bridges’ programme. In legislative bodies (where 
pork barrel decisions are typically taken), log-rolling 
alliances of common interests are typical of the 
distributive arena. Typical roles are the patron and 
the broker. Separate allocations are a matter only of 
a transaction between patron and client, with perhaps a 
broker involved. Conflict between patrons may be 
minimised by institutionalising the procedures for 
dividing the cake amongst them, as in congressional 
committees in the U.S., or more blatantly, as in the 
Philippines, where in the past the distribution of 
funds to specific local projects was the prerogative of 
congressmen, each of whom received an annual allocation 
of funds for this purpose, determined by seniority, formal
24positions in the party or Congress and so on.
Regulative policies also involve specific case by 
case treatment, but each case or political demand cannot 
be treated in complete isolation. Regulative policies 
treat all ’similar cases’ alike. They involve the
18
universal application of general rules or guidelines to 
individual cases, with primary regard to precedent.
Because such decisions involve ramifications beyond the 
separate case, the regulative arena is typified by 
conflict between broader groups than those involved in 
the distributive arena. The classic case is that area 
of government activity known as ’regulatory activities’, 
including such policies as restrictive trades practices 
legislation, land use zoning schemes and so on. They 
fall within the context of the ’rule of law’ which 
stresses universalism, the antithesis of the favouritism 
or particularism characteristic of much of the distributive 
arena.
Redistributive policies are even broader in impact and 
involve broader interests again. It is not just a matter 
of handing out benefits, as in distributive politics, 
but of taking them away from someone for the express 
purpose of giving them to someone else. Taxation and 
welfare policies are often redistributive. The groups 
involved are often broad classes and fundamental economic 
interests such as ’big business’ , ’the poor’ , and so 
on.
These distinctions do not correspond neatly with 
conventional distinctions between ’regulatory activities’ 
and other sorts of government activities involving the 
direct provision of services and spending of money.
While ’roads and bridges’ programmes are often of a pork 
barrel nature, pressures also generally exist to introduce 
some measure of ’planning’, or a ’rational ordering of
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priorities according to need1 in the process of programme-
determination. These pressures seek to place roads and
bridges decisions in the regulative arena, by setting
out a set of universal criteria, or policy guidelines,
for deciding on a programme» In theory, conflict over
programme decisions would then occur over the nature
of the criteria adopted, as groups deprived by the
application of the policies tried to right the situation»
Similarly, policies that are customarily referred to as
'regulatory* often become matters of distribution. The
rules and guidelines may be so vaguely defined that other
criteria are used in making decisions, criteria which
have nothing to do with the norms of precedent or
universality of rule—application, but which are the
criteria patrons use in distributing favours to clients.
Furthermore,pressures always exist for the rules to be
'bent' or ignored, from individuals or firms who will
benefit from a direct 'indulgence*. Once rules and
policies begin to be ignored — as for instance when
land—use regulations are ignored in approving planning
applications — then each case becomes a separate plea
for patronage. Lowi remarks that the distinction
between regulative and distributive policy arenas is more
a continuum than a sharp division. However, the basic
distinction is still crucial:
..»any rule, no matter how vague, begins to 
transform distributive into regulatory patterns»
For example, adding a vague and very mild anti­
discrimination provision to an education subsidy 
statute can turn established distributive patterns 
inside out» On the other hand, it should be added 
that very broad delegations of regulatory authority 
to an agency can lead in the long run to a decline 
into an all too stable and private politics» ^5
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It might be argued that no decision about allocating 
funds can be seen in isolation from the way money is 
raised , or divorced from considerations of alternative 
programmes or projects that those funds could have been 
allocated to, and that all such decisions must then be 
seen as redistributive ones. In principle, this is true. 
However, the distinctions I have drawn refer to the way 
groups involved in politics seek to attain their ends, 
that is to the way they define the issues themselves. 
Property developers may find it easier or less ’costly* 
to exert influence on a council to obtain an exemption 
from a regulation (an act of patronage and a distributive 
decision), than to try to alter the regulation itself 
(a regulative issue). Aspirants for formal office might 
find it politically advantageous to appeal to disadvantaged 
groups in the community rather than let others ’get away 
with* benefits obtained by a distributive (pork barrel) 
decision. They may even be able to do both at the same 
t ime .
Politics operates largely in the short-run and most 
groups who are able to exert influence are not concerned 
about the long-term consequences or ramifications of 
the benefits they obtain, unless challenged. Thus, 
whilst it is the case that no distribution can be made 
without an ultimate redistributive effect, it does not 
usually suit those who are gaining immediate tangible 
benefits to point this out. Those who have qualified 
to play the game as it is have little incentive to change 
the rules. Thus, stable systems of distributive politics
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can and do exist and broader implications (some would 
refer to them as 'the real issues1) often are ignored 
in the public political arena.
In a further elaboration of this scheme,
R. H. Salisbury tries to provide some general answers to 
the question of why an authority structure makes one 
sort of decision rather than another, given that no 
particular area of government activity is inherently 
found in one arena rather than another. Salisbury
focuses on two major characteristics of the political 
system - the structure of the 'demand pattern' and the 
structure of the decision making bodies. Both are 
characterised according to the degree of integration 
or fragmentation. A fragmented demand pattern is 
characteristic of pork barrel politics. Separate 
localities each seek an 'indulgence* and the interests 
involved are parochial. But common interests, in seeking 
a change in priorities, may produce an integration of 
demands, lessening the degree of fragmentation of 
political interest groups in the particular area of 
government activity concerned. This often occurs when 
relatively deprived groups, for whom an existing pattern 
of distributive politics is not satisfactory, voice 
demands. Thus, the way an issue is defined depends on 
the way individuals and groups perceive their interests 
and the type of organisations that exist to mobilise 
these interests.
The structure of decision making bodies also exerts 
some independent influence on the way issues are defined.
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A strong legislative body in which individual members are 
able to operate relatively free from party discipline 
provides one ideal setting for pork barrel decision making* 
The lack of centralised leadership and authority make the 
organisation of majorities behind major policy matters
27in the regulative or redistributive arenas very difficult*
On the other hand, a strong majority party system or a 
powerful executive arm can provide opportunities for 
such issues to be raised and resolved* In the present 
context of local government bodies there are particular 
structural characteristics and informal norms or 
conventions that exert influence on the way issues are 
defined. Some of these have been discussed above and 
some of their results noted.
The discussion of the proper role of local government 
as it is customarily conducted is based on the distinction 
between politics and administration or legislation 
and implementation. The new distinctions between 
different types of decision throw new light on this 
problem. I have already commented on the nature of 
local political issues. If this picture is accurate 
much, if not most, of local politics is concerned with 
the distributive arena* Councils do not make decisions 
of a major redistributive content, as other levels of 
government are the focus for such demands, if they are 
made at all. There is a sense in which local government 
is essentially a conservative institution. Local 
government performs functions delegated by Parliament 
and its powers are circumscribed by statute. The notion
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of 'non-decisions' has some relevance in this context.
Bachrach and Baratz have characterised 'non-decision making*
as 'the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision
2 8making to 'safe' issues*. It is a process by which
demands for change in the 'existing allocation of benefits
and privileges.... can be suffocated before they are 
29voiced'. Some issues simply never 'get off the ground*.
In delegating specific powers to local government, the
non-decisions have already been made before councils
begin to operate. If important aspects of the status quo
are questioned, then it will not be in the local arena
that the issue is decided. The rhetoric of local
government theory that stresses the 'apolitical' nature
of council functions is most strongly voiced in the
context of other conservative doctrines. My heavy
reliance on members of conservative parties in outlining
30this doctrine is no accident.
Whilst redistributive issues may not be common in 
local politics there is still some scope for disputes 
over resource allocation, which may become defined in 
some measure in redistributive terms. There are also 
on occasions important regulative issues in local politics. 
Even here though, councils are concerned to a large extent 
with enforcing regulative policies which have been decided 
elsewhere, as with building and health regulations and 
to some extent planning regulations. It is in the framing 
of planning regulations that councils find themselves 
facing regulative issues, but at the same time it is in 
the administrative process of development control - the
2k
case by case treatment of development applications - 
that the majority of issues arise and many of these are 
of a distributive nature. The case by case process of 
enforcement focuses political attention on the particular 
case and its special circumstances. As James C. Scott
sees it, ’influence at the enforcement stage... is.. .
31almost exclusively particularistic’. Favourable
government decisions can be achieved not just by combining 
with those of similar interests to obtain a particular 
enactment of legislation, but by making an individual 
approach to obtain a particularistic decision at the 
point of enforcement of existing legislation. This means 
ignoring the content of the rules and applying other 
criteria to the decision. In some cases this may 
involve corruption, and in all cases favouritism or 
patronage and what Lowi referred to as ’private 
politics’. This is what the distributive arena is all 
about. Indeed it becomes rather meaningless to talk of 
’enforcing legislation', as policies are not a feature 
of the distributive arena of politics, except insofar 
as the cumulative effects of discrete acts of patronage 
or the granting of favours may lead to an observable 
regularity in output. But this is not the meaning of the 
term ’policy' that I prefer to apply, as the notion
32contains some reference to intention as well as effect.
The major aim of the study is to identify those 
characteristics of local politics that help us understand 
why councils make decisions in one way rather than another,
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or why politics is conducted in one arena rather than 
others. I have indicated that the major focus of attention 
will be first the nature of political interests current 
in local politics and the means by which they are expressed, 
that is through what sorts of organisations or channels 
and in what sorts of issues, and second the structure of 
the decision making process of the council itself. It 
will become apparent that there is great variety in the 
issues of local politics from one area to another, in the 
way local political conflicts are resolved, in the sorts 
of organisations involved in local politics and so on.
Within the framework outlined in this chapter, I shall 
attempt to explain some of these differences. This will 
take the form of trying to associate the way decisions are 
made (illustrated by a series of case studies) with 
characteristics of the structure of political interests 
or demands and the structure of the decision making process 
on the council. I shall look respectively at political 
recruitment; the electoral process; interest group politics; 
the relations between aldermen and paid officials and the 
sorts of interests pursued by the professionals and 
bureaucrats; and the informal rules, procedures and groupings 
found in the council decision making process. In seeking 
to understand differences between the six councils I shall 
try and relate these features of local politics to various 
social and economic factors, to see whether they stem from 
differences in the social and economic context or 'environment* 
from one area to another. In order to 'set the scene 1 and 
provide the points of reference in attempting to point out
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some of these relationships, the next chapter is concerned 
with a brief description of the six areas.
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11 THE SIX MUNICIPALITIES
According to several criteria the six local government 
areas - Bankstown, Burwood, Ku-ring-gai, Leichhardt,
Liverpool and North Sydney - represent a fair ’ cross- 
section’ of the thirty five municipalities, shires and 
cities in the Sydney metropolitan area. The study was 
conceived as an exploratory one in the first instance 
and this diversity of types of areas was in order to obtain 
as much variety in the empirical material as possible.
This approach sacrificed the greater rigour in comparative 
analysis that could be achieved, for instance, by choosing 
areas that were alike in some respects but differed in 
others, in order to test the effect of these differences.
The criteria used in choosing the six areas were 
drawn from the data on social and economic background 
that form the subject of much of this chapter. At the 
same time, in making the final choice from amongst several 
alternatives, the local political situation was taken 
into account. Thus, Leichhardt was chosen because of 
important social and political changes associated with 
the upsurge of activity from local residents’ groups, a 
factor that distinguished Leichhardt from most other 
Labor controlled inner city areas. Observing political 
change is a good way of pinpointing characteristics of 
both the old and the new. North Sydney was chosen because 
of the speed of redevelopment occurring in residential 
and commercial areas. Ku-ring-gai was chosen from several 
high status residential areas because it had just experienced
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an election campaign in which a ratepayer's organisation 
campaigning for lower rates had won a majority. Thus, 
these councils were perhaps exceptional in that much more 
had been happening in them than was normally the case 
in local politics. Apart from anything else, the issues 
involved had intrinsic interest and importance that 
influenced the choice.
The location of the six councils in the metropolitan 
area is shown in Figure 11-1. They cover a range from 
'inner1 to 'outer' suburbs. These are shorthand terms 
for describing a variety of characteristics, associated 
with the age of the suburb, the form of settlement 
characteristic of the period of development, the sorts 
of development or redevelopment activities going on at 
the present stage of metropolitan growth and so on.
Table 11-1 shows population changes since 19^+7 > one 
indication of the pattern of development of each area. 
Leichhardt, Burwood and North Sydney declined in 
population up to 1966. Leichhardt's period of greatest 
growth was before the end of the 19th Century, and its 
1971 population was about the same as in 1900. Burwood's 
growth occurred from 1910-1930, while North Sydney 
experienced its greatest population expansion from 1900 to 
1920 and then in the 1930's following the opening of the 
Sydney Harbour Bridge linking it to the city.
you
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Figure II-l
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Table 11-1 Populations of the Six Municipalities,
1947 ~ I9 7Ii at each census
1947 1954 1961 1966 1971
M e t r o p o l i t a n  
R a n k  - 1971
B a n k stown 42646 102384 152251 160004 162310 1
Burwood 34307 31341 310 8 9 31846 32245 30
K u - r i n g - g a i 39874 52615 74821 86878 98435 9
LeichJhard t 702.56 64919 61951 59325 70540 * 16
L i v erpool 15232 26610 30874 68999 82270 14
N o r t h  Sydn e y 60379 56768 53024 51756 52920 23
 ^ B oundaries redrawn, and Glebe added , in 1968
Source: Commonwealth Census.
Suburan settlement in Ku-ring-gai followed the route 
of the railway line at a fairly steady rate from 1900 to 
1950, but in the fifties, growth accelerated. Bankstown 
followed a similar pattern, but expanded far more rapidly 
in the early 1950's. During the 1960's, Bankstown's 
population remained relatively stable, whilst Ku-ring-gai 
was still expanding as new subdivisions were developed.
By the i9 6 0 's the urban fringe had passed Bankstown and 
it was Liverpool that experienced rapid growth. This 
was due largely to the settlement of a large housing 
estate at Green Valley built by the Housing Commission 
for lower-income families.
Table 11-1 also shows the ranking of each area in 
terms of population size in 1971* The six show a fairly 
even spread and a great diversity in size. The effect 
of size on local politics is one factor that will be 
examined.
Sydney is divided quite sharply on geographic lines 
into high and low status residential areas. The northern
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suburbs (the ’north shore') and the inner suburbs are 
hillier and typographically more attractive. Those 
nearer the harbour offer the additional attraction of 
spectacular views. The western suburbs are flatter 
and hotter and are shared by industrial development.
Lower income people are priced out of the better suburbs 
and in recent years have found themselves unable to 
afford housing in formerly working class inner city 
suburbs, which have been settled by the middle class 
because of their convenience to the city and the 
attractiveness of nineteenth century terraced housing.
These differences in residential status are reflected 
in the socio-economic characteristics of the populations 
of the six areas. Table 11—2 shows two measures of 
socio-economic status based on type of employment and 
also shows the rank of each of the areas on a metropolitan- 
wide basis. This ranking is based on the use of five 
indices from 1966 census data on industry and occupation 
and they are those identified by Jones in a study of 
social structure in Melbourne as being amongst the best 
measures of social differentiation.^
The two measures shown in Table 11—2 are not 
necessarily on their own good indices of socio-economic 
status, but they do give an idea of the wide disparity 
in occupational backgrounds from the higher to the lower
status areas
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Table 11—2 Measures of Socio-economic Status, 1966
Rank ^
Ku—ring—gal 1 
North Sydney 7 
Burwood 22 
Bankstown 29 
Leichhardt 30 
Liverpool 34
Source: 1966 census
ja work—force 
manufac turing
19*7
21.1
35.1 
42.9 
41.3
43.1
jo work—force 
community and 
busine ss 
services
26.0
20.3
14.4 
6.3 
8.6 
7.1
The ranking Tor the thirty Live areas was arrived 
at by using 3 measures: $ total work—Torce in manufacturing
industries; $ total work—Torce in community and business 
services; $ male work—Torce in Tinance and property;
$ male work—Torce in commerce; and $ male work—Torce 
employer status. Each council was scored separately 
according to the rank attained Tor each measure and the 
scores added. The Tinal rank was derived Trom this total 
score. The highest possible was 3 x 35» or 175» the 
lowest 3* Ku—ring—gai scored 168 and Liverpool 19.
Each oT the areas is relatively homogeneous. Few 
oT Sydney's local government areas contain areas oT widely 
diTTerent wealth or status, reTlecting one oT the Tactors 
important in the Tinal determination oT the 1948 boundary
revisions: none oT the richer areas was willing to be
attached to poorer areas. In 1961 Congalton carried
out a survey oT Sydney residents' perception oT the status
oT diTTerent suburbs, backed up by a survey oT estate
agents' assessments, and identiTied the status attached to
each suburb on the basis oT respondents' rankings Trom
3one to seven. Table 11—3 uses data Trom this survey 
to show how suburbs within each oT the six municipalities 
were ranked: the ranks used are those Congalton arrived
at using all responses.
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Tab1e 11-3 Congalton's Status Rankings of Sydney1s
number of suburbs of each rank
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ku-ring-gai 3 11 2
North Sydney 5 5
Burwood 3 1
Bankstown 1 16 3
Liverpool 4 2
Leichhardt 6 2
The relative status of each of the areas follows 
the pattern exhibited in Table 11-2. The data also shows 
the relative homogeneity of each area. The information 
is rather old, but there is no reason to expect major 
differences over the past ten years, with one exception.
The late 1960's saw an influx of higher status residents 
into formerly working class inner city suburbs. In 
Leichhardt municipality, Balmain and Glebe underwent 
changes in physical appearance as well as social composition, 
with renovation by the new owners of 19th Century terraced 
houses. The same sort of process was beginning to spread 
to other suburbs, particularly Annandale. The 1966 census 
figures show Balmain and Glebe containing a higher 
proportion of higher status occupations amongst residents 
than other suburbs, although the difference was not very 
marked. Table 11-4 shows these differences, from ward 
to ward in the municipality. It is probable that these
differences became more marked after 1966.
3 6
Table 11-4 Leichhardt: Socio-economic Status by
Ward
Wards, 1966
Total in work- in finance and property
force & business and community
Glebe 7,854
service s
14.3
Balmain 6,560 13.3
Rozelle 5,138 11.1
Annandale 4,712 10.5
Lilyfield 5,989 10.4
Leichhardt 5,165 9.1
Total Municipality 11.5
Source: 1966 census, census collector’s district data.
Apart from socio-economic status, there are other
characteristics of the population that distinguish one area 
from another. Table 11—5 presents some data on age 
structure. Liverpool and Bankstown were areas predominantly 
inhabited by young families; Ku-ring-gai contained a 
large number of young families but was also a popular retirement 
area for the wealthy; Leichhardt, as expected with an old 
inner suburb, contained a fair proportion of old people, 
as did Burwood and North Sydney. North Sydney was 
characterised by 'low familism'.
Table 11—5 Ranking of six municipalities by age
characteristics of population
rfo population jo population
aged 0—15
4
aged 65+
1 ( 1) Liverpool 43.07 1 <[ 3) North Sydney 15.182 1 9 ) Bankstown 30.98 2 1( 4) Burwood 15.17
3 1Ü b Ku-ring—gai 28.96 3 1(16) Leichhardt 11.144 1:?°) Leichhardt 21.34 4 1[22) Ku-ring-gai 9.17
5 1[30) Burwood 17.81 5 132) Bankstown 4.68
6 <(36) North Sydney 13.08 6 1i36) Liverpool 2.85
Source: Commonwealth Census 1966 
frf Sydney—wide ranking
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Table 11-6 shows the proportion of non-British in each 
of the areas. Leichhardt had a high percentage and 
followed the pattern Jones noticed in Melbourne, where 
migrant communities concentrate in the inner suburbs.
In Leichhardt they were mostly Italians.
Table 11-6 jo non-British in the six municipalities
Bankstown 3*63 
Burwood 7*84 
Ku-ring-gai 1*99 
Leichhardt 12.11 
Liverpool 5*26 
North Sydney 4.87
Source: Commonwealth Census 1966
Business activities in the six areas differed 
considerably. Just as some features of social 
differentiation were the result of metropolitan-wide 
pressures, so industrial and commercial development were 
influenced in their location by the pattern of metropolitan­
wide development. Table 11-7 shows data on industrial 
activity in each of the areas. Large areas of Bankstown 
were set aside for industrial development and most of 
the factories were built in the 1950's and 1960's. In 
Liverpool on the .other hand industrial development did 
not occur during the 1960's at a pace fast enough to 
provide local jobs for the new residents. Leichhardt 
was a long established industrial area with several large 
concerns along the waterfront in Balmain and Rozelle. 
Throughout the municipality small and large factories 
intermingled with houses in a way typical of inner city 
areas. There were few factories in Ku-ring-gai. Most 
of these were very small in contrast to Liverpool.
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Table 11-7 Number of Factories and Persons Employed
in the Six Areas," 1 9 67/8
Total Factories
*
1 (2 ) Bankstown 1033
2 (7 ) Leichhardt 624
3 (1 7 ) North Sydney 312
4 (2Ö) Burwood 182
3 3° Ku-ring-gai 130
6 (3 1 ) Liverpool 148
* Sydney-wide rankings
Total persons employed
in factories
1
*
(2 ) Bankstown 34387
2 (7 Leichhardt 14690
3 (23) Liverpool 5187
4 (25) North Sydney 4071
3 (28) Burwood 2387
6 (3*0 Ku-ring-gai 797
Source: Bureau of Census and Statistics, Statistical Register
New South Wales, Factories
Table 11-8 shows the rate of development of shops, 
offices and factories in the six areas in the five year 
period up to 1971* Bearing in mind the different size of 
each area, the rate of industrial development in Bankstown 
is still outstanding. In Liverpool factory building was 
growing from year to year, but in Bankstown the annual 
rate was fairly steady. Factory building in Ku-ring-gai 
was negligible, whilst little new development occurred in
North Sydney 
new factory 
The area was
Table 11-8
. In contrast, Leichhardt was still experiencing
building, most of it in the form of redevelopment 
still a prime industrial location.
Value of Completed Buildings (excluding cost
of 1and): Shops, Offices and Factories,
1966/7 - 1970/71
$ ,000
Shops Offices Factories
Banks town 10,812 2,347 2 0 , 8 9 8Burwood **,537 380 1,123Ku-ring-gai 2,483 2 ,420 86
Leichhardt 3 ,088 797 4,713Liverpool 3,927 1,121 8,077
North Sydney 1,332 32,393 80 9
Source: Bureau of Census and Statistics
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Bankstown and Burwood were the location of major 
district shopping centres and new development occurred 
in both in the 1960’s. New shopping malls containing 
department stores, supermarkets and smaller shops, with 
large parking areas, were built in both centres.
Liverpool also experienced new shop development and a 
large shopping mall was completed in 1971/2, but is not 
shown in the figures in Table 11-8. Ku-ring-gai contained 
no single major shopping centre, although in Gordon on 
the Pacific Highway a department store was completed in 
the I960*s. There was a smaller centre at St. Ives and 
’neighbourhood* shopping centres in the newer suburbs 
developed since the 1950’s. Residents of Ku-ring-gai 
had to do much of their shopping outside the municipality. 
Attempts to develop a large shopping mall at St. Ives 
met with council opposition, an issue that will be 
described during the course of the study. The council 
was not, however, averse to some ’prestige* office 
building, particularly along the Pacific Highway. The 
most rapid and spectacular office development occurred 
in North Sydney, an extension of the office building 
1boonf* across the harbour bridge in the City central 
business district. The commercial centre of North Sydney 
by the end of the i960’s was almost entirely earmarked 
for multi-storey office development.
Table 11-9 shows residential development in the six 
areas, measured by the number of houses or units completed, 
in two five year periods from 1962. The expected pattern 
emerges, with single-family housing in the outer suburbs
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and flat development being prominent in the inner suburbs, 
particularly North Sydney. The difference between 
Liverpool and Bankstown with respect to flat development 
is interesting and as we shall see reflects the two 
councils’ attitudes towards this type of housing 
development.
Table 11-9 New Dwellings (houses and flats) Completed i
Six Municipalities 1962-66 and 1967-71
1962 -66 1967 -71
Houses Flat s Houses Flat s
Bankstown 4,044 340 4,109 375
Burwood 126 551 53 569
Ku-ring-gai 3,948 594 3,849 645
Leichhard t 64 710 86 1,489
LiverpooL 8,337 292 3,440 939
North Sydney 57 2,756 4l 4,584
Source: Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage
Board, Building Operations Annual
Statistics.
Bankstown’s policy of discouraging flat development, 
or at least of not encouraging it, is an example of the 
sort of influence a local council can have on development 
within its boundaries. For the most part the suburban 
differentiation in land use, tfype of resident and so on, 
has been due to complex factors over which local councils 
have little influence. Nevertheless, we shall see that 
many of the important regulative issues that arise at 
the local level are concerned with attempts to influence 
the course of development. They attempt either to 
prevent development of a particular kind - i.e. preserve 
and protect an existing environment or style of living - 
or to attract development of a particular kind. The 
best example of the first type is Ku-ring-gai council's
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insistence on the preservation of an existing quality of
residential environment. The result is a municipality
of 100,000 residents, predominantly higher status, living
in expensive single-family dwellings and travelling to
work. As a council publicity brochure put it, ’Ku-ring-gai
municipality is, and shall continue to be, synonymous
5with trees, gardens and open space’. The Mayor of 
1968 reflected majority opinion when he said ’...I will 
not allow industrialisation of any sort in this 
municipality’. The MLA for Northcotte electorate, 
which included some of the municipality, moved an 
adjournment motion in the Assembly on the dangers of 
flat development during which he described the 
municipality’s character:
Throughout its length and breadth, the 
elec torate ... presen ts a picture dominated 
by the single-family residence, set within 
adequate grounds and in streets with an 
abundance of trees and greenery. It is... 
comprised of dormitory suburbs of very 
appealing and distinctive character.
...The industrial undertaking is obviously 
alien.... So also, although to varying degrees, 
are the villa unit, the town house and the 
multi-storey flat or home unit building.
The council imposed rigid requirements on new
subdivisions for the dedication of public open space.
It restricted flat development largely to the Pacific
Highway. It rejected those few industrial development
applications it received. We shall see later other sorts
of disputes the council was involved in while pursuing
this ’protectionist’ policy.
In other municipalities there was less unanimity
of purpose and there were more conflicting pressures,
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particularly in areas undergoing redevelopment. These 
led to major local issues in North Sydney and Leichhardt 
over the preservation of a particular standard of 
residential amenity in the face of redevelopment. 
Leichhardt council notepaper carried a crest on which 
were depicted busy industrial scenes and port activities. 
The emblem dated from the time of the 1948 boundary 
revisions and was an indication of the image of the 
area held by past councils. In their view, Leichhardt 
was a place for the predominantly working class 
population to work as well as live. This view, expressed 
in several policy stands taken by Labor Party aldermen, 
was challenged by the new middle class residents who 
opposed further industrial development and sought to 
improve the amenity of the area as a residential area.
The Balmain Association, a group formed in the 1960’s 
to press this point of view, drawing its membership 
largely from middle class residents, depicted at the 
head of its notepaper a 19th century house in the 
architectural style that gave Balmain some of the 
distinctive aesthetic character they so much valued.
In North Sydney many aldermen believed that flat 
development was ’inevitable’, and the council’s planning 
policies were based on this premise. These policies 
aimed to control flat development and enforce certain 
standards rather than prohibit flats. However, this 
approach was challenged by local residents' groups 
representing people who wanted to live in the existing 
single-dwelling environment, where this remained.
. -
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Support for this challenge also came from some of the 
new flat dwellers concerned over street congestion, the 
protection of views from their multi—storey flat blocks 
and so on.
Opposition to flat development was a common theme in 
local politics in most of the six areas. It was expressed 
in Bankstown, where a prohibition on flat development 
existed until the mid 1960's. This prohibition was 
lifted, but in the face of considerable opposition, and 
the policies adopted by the council were aimed at imposing 
strict controls on flat development to achieve a 'high 
standard'• The influence a council can exert on 
development was well illustrated in the contrast between 
Bankstown and the neighbouring municipality of Canterbury. 
In Canterbury, flats were encouraged, and the municipality 
underwent a major transformation as streets of single­
dwellings were demolished and replaced piece—meal by 
three—storey blocks of home units, usually on the same 
pattern of subdivision. The hostility to flat development 
in Bankstown was an expression of a characteristic
Australian response to flat dwelling. A supplement
in the Sydney Morning Herald described Bankstown as
1 thirty square miles of magnificently typical Australian
suburbia* where 'the great Australian dream of one's
own house and block of land has, until now, thrived' ,
• . 8and where 'sport and local club reign over leisure time'.
Part of the reason for the wary acceptance by the 
council of flat development in the municipality was the 
adherence by some aldermen to a broad set of values that
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favoured the !growth* and 'progress' of the municipality 
and measured this by population growth, land values (and 
rateable values), job opportunities, retail turnover, 
business profit, and so on, Fears were expressed that 
strict controls on flat development would 'inhibit growth* 
and 'strangle* the shopping centre, Similarly, industrial 
development was welcomed as a sign of progress.
'Stagnation' was a sign of municipal failure.
These values were most clearly expressed in council
policy by Liverpool aldermen. Council publicity brochures
showed Liverpool in the centre of the map of the Sydney
region, with all roads converging on this 'growth point*.
Graphs of population growth soared impressively into the
future to illustrate Liverpool's potential for expansion.
One brochure proclaimed 'Liverpool is Lebensraum' and
9translated: 'Room for growth and expansion*.
Liverpool was the only council that consciously budgeted 
an annual amount for 'publicising the area', aimed at 
attracting development. The council fought to obtain 
releases of non-urban land for urban development, against 
opposition from the State Planning Authority. The 
Authority, a State government instrumentality with 
responsibility for metropolitan planning, published a 
'strategic plan* for the Sydney region, and pursued 
policies laid out in this plan that discouraged development 
in Liverpool for the time being. Aldermen protested 
strongly at this 'stagnation* and the inhibition to the 
municipality's 'natural, growth*. The council consistently 
supported applications from developers seeking re-zonings
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to permit development. Rather than frame or enforce
planning provisions to protect an existing environment,
aldermen sought to change those that inhibited
redevelopment and when possible on occasions ignored
them. Typical of this approach was the view expressed
by one alderman in a council debate:
Thank heavens for the developer. If it 
wasn’t for the developer Australians would 
still be living in bark humj^es and running 
around throwing boomerangs.
The issue that prompted this outburst involved the application 
of an industrial concern to expand into an area that was 
provisionally zoned for open space along the banks of the 
Georges River, near the centre of Liverpool. The council 
opposed the advice of its planner, after some argument, 
and granted approval for the development to proceed. It 
was argued that Liverpool would lose valuable jobs and 
rate income if the council refused the development 
application. The developer would be forced to go to 
an adjoining municipality. This competitive attitude 
was common as an expression of the ethos of municipal 
growth and expansion. On the whole, these views overrode 
party political divisions and found almost unanimous 
support amongst aldermen, even though in some issues a 
minority of council members did raise other conflicting 
values such as demands for open space, or a desire to 
protect or enhance an existing environment.
Councils in outer suburban areas can make choices 
about the policies they are to pursue to try and influence 
the type of development undertaken within their boundaries.
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Councils in inner suburban areas are faced with choices 
about redevelopment of ’aging1 areas, Burwood, as a 
suburb falling in between, faced neither of these pressures 
acutely. However, the council imposed blanket restrictions 
on flats over a large part of the municipality and chose 
to try and control flat development to ensure *good' 
development, particularly to encourage large scale 
comprehensive redevelopment rather than piece-meal flat 
building. This did have some effect on slowing down 
the rate of flat construction in comparison with
♦
neighbouring municipalities such as Ashfield and 
Canterbury, The council also tried to encourage 
comprehensive development in the shopping centre by 
purchasing land.
Social and economic pressures associated with urban 
development and redevelopment pose certain problems for 
individual councils and affect the formulation of planning 
policy. Pressures stemming from the local environment 
affect another kind of council activity: the wealth
of an area and the service needs or demands of its 
population influence council expenditures. Some 70% 
of council income normally comes from property rates 
levied on the unimproved capital value (UCV) of land.
There are no redistributive grants by government to aid 
poorer municipalities. Land valuations are undertaken 
by a State government instrumentality so councils are not 
able to pursue * fiscal zoning policies' as some municipalities 
in the United States do, overvaluing commercial property 
in relation to residential property. Councils must also
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levy a uniform general rate, although they may levy special 
local rates on a particular defined area within the 
municipality. All funds collected from this rate must 
be spent on facilities in that area. In all, the wealth 
of an area, expressed through property values, operates 
as a very direct constraint upon revenue raising and 
thus expenditures.
Table 11—10 ranks all of Sydney1s local government
areas according to UCV per capita in 1966 and compares
the overall socio-economic status rank for each
municipality used in Table 11—2. Because revaluations
are not undertaken simultaneously for each municipality,
the actual 1966 UCV figures are not comparable. Some
were several years out of date, although they still provided
the basis for fixing a rate. By means of interpolation,
a notional UCV was worked out for those municipalities
that were not revalued in I966 (see note to Table 11—10)0
The Table shows that generally speaking the poorest
lived municipalities with the lowest UCV per capita0~*"^
It would appear that property values were in some measure
related to levels of personal income. Thus, to raise
the same amount of municipal revenue based on a proportion
Of total UCV, householders in poorer areas must pay a
higher proportion of their income than those in richer
areas. This is borne out by Bentley1s analysis of consumer
12expenditure survey data in Sydney. The proportion of
income that is spent on rates tends to decrease as personal
income rises
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Table 11-10 Unimproved Capital Value of all Property, 
per capita, Sydney .MetropolitaA Councils,
196 6 , Related to Socio-economic Status (SES) 
Ranking.
SES (Table 11-2) $/Cap. SES (Table 11-2) $/Cap.
1 1{ 26 )
2 1{ 2)
3 1[33)
4 1 6 )
5 < l)6 1 *0
7 1 3 )8 1i 7 )
9 <[10)
10 112)
11 1 3 )
12 113)
13 128)
14 114
15 1\ 8)16 120)
17 1( 9)18 (18) 
Source :
City of Sydney 3934 19 <2! 1 Drummoyne 1804Woollahra 3311 20 1,22)1 BURW00D 1774
Botany 2621 21 1!17 1 Sutherland 1774Willoughby 2458 22 1(23)1 Rockdale 1733
KU—RING—GAT 2415 23 i 11 1 Hornsby 1677Lane Cove 2331 24 { 25 1 Parramatta 1673Mo sman 2263 25 113;) Ryde 1670
NORTH SYDNEY 2208 26 1l6>) Randwick 1505Warringah 2204 27 119)I Ashfield 1399Strathfield 2202 28 124;1 Canterbury 1368
Manly 2199 29 132;I Marrickville 1365
Baulkham Hills 2149 30 129;) BANKSTOWN 1276
Auburn 1996 31 I27)1 Holroyd 1261
Kogarah 1993 32 130;) LEICHHARDT 1106
Hunters Hill 1930 33 134!) LIVERPOOL 1032
C oncord 1889 34 1(35) Fairfield 1010
Waverley 1862 33 1(32) Blacktown 984
Hurstville 1834
New South Wales Statistical Register
The valuation figures given in the Statistical Register for 
each municipality had to be adjusted to make them comparable. 
Valuations of land in each municipality are made at up to 
five year intervals. Municipalities are revalued 
successively, not all together. The 1966 figures were 
arrived at by interpolating from the previous revaluation 
year on the basis of a constant rate of growth. This 
rate was determined for each council for the period up 
to the latest revaluation.
In fact, poor and rich municipalities did not raise the
same amount of revenue. Table 11-11 shows the per capita
rate income of each of the six municipalities in 1966 and
1969* Also shown is an Adjusted rate* for 1966. This 
represents the proportion of UCV (expressed as so many cents 
in the dollar in the way rates are expressed) that would 
have been levied had the UCV been as shown in Table 11-10
in 1966. The actual rate in the dollar that raised the 
per capita income shown in the Table differed from this 
adjusted figure. The poorer councils - Bankstown,
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Leichhardt and Liverpool - had to levy higher rates, but
13also got less income Tor their troubles. The poor
were paying more than the rich (in terms of proportion
of income), and getting less in return.
Table 11-11 'Adjusted* 1966 Rate, and Rate Income
per capita 1966» & 1969
Per capita 1966 'adjusted
rate income ($) rate in the $
1966 1969 (cents)
Bankstown 26.4 30.2 2.07
Burwood 26.5 31.2 1 . 4 9
Ku-ring-gai 36.2 37.9 1.50
Leichhardt 2 0 o l 28.3 1.82
Liverpool 20.5 27.6 1.99
North Sydney 30.0 41.3 1.36
1
Sources New South Wales Statistical Register
(Local Government)
N.B. Rate income as shown in the statistical register 
was adjusted. Some councils levied a separate 
garbage collection charge, others levied an 
omnibus rate that covered this service. To 
make the figures comparable income under the 
heading 'Sanitary and garbage charges' was 
added to rate income for all councils.
The effect on expenditures of differences in financial 
resources is shown in Table 11—12. The Table isolates 
two major categories of expenditure — public works and 
'amenities' (see note to Table). The councils with 
fewer resources spent less per capita on both public works 
and amenities, but the effect was most marked on the 
amenities category.
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Table 11-12 Expenditure per capita on public works
and ‘amenities " 1 9 6 8  "
Public Works ‘Amenities*
%/cap. $/cap.
Bankstown 13.7 4.7Burwood 1 1 . 8 6.9Ku-ring-gai 14.7 9.0Leichhardt 12.3 4.8Liverpool 1 2 . 0 4.0
North Sydney 14.5 6 . 6
Sources New South Wales Statistical Register
»Amenities* consists of expenditure listed in the Statistical 
Register under the following heads: Parkes and Reserves 5
Libraries; Baths and Beaches; Public Services 'Other* I 
Municipal Property. Public services 'Other1 covers Items 
such as baby health centres, senior citizen centres, 
welfare services of various types, etc.
So far X have not mentioned needs or demands for 
expenditure and services. It is not my purpose to unravel 
the factors that are important in understanding differences
l4in expenditure patterns from one council to another.
However, it does seem the case that needs and demands 
were a secondary factor compared to resources. Thus, 
one might expect outer suburbs to spend more on public 
works than inner suburbs, and in most cases the amount of 
construction work to be done in developing areas did present 
a major problem and an important need. But expenditures 
did not differ systematically between inner and outer 
suburbs. The greater needs were not met, because of lack 
of resources. At the same time, there is evidence that 
they were not met because councils chose to devote greater 
effort to providing amenities. During the 1960*s per 
capita expenditure on public works remained roughly constant 
in * real money terms*. For the rich councils, the same 
holds for expenditure on amenities. But per capita
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expenditure on amenities by the three poorer councils 
approximately doubled in *real money* terms during the 
1.960* s. This was where their efforts were concentrated. 
This can be seen as a response to a felt need, or an 
observed demand for these sorts of services. The 
poorer councils were in some respects just catching 
up. Even so, the constraint imposed by inadequate 
resources still left a significant imbalance in the 
amounts spent on these services by rich and poor councils.
FOOTNOTES
1. F. L. Jones, Dimensions of Urban Social Structure, 
(Canberra ANU Press, 1969)
2. See J. D. B. Miller, ‘Greater Sydney, 1892—1952*, 
Public Administration (Sydney), June 1954, P 122
3. A. A. Congalton, Status Rankings of Sydney Suburbs 
(Kensington, University of New South W a l e s , I 961]
4. Jones op. cit.
5« Ku—ring—gai 1.971? pamphlet distributed by the council 
with rate notices
6 . North Shore Times, 7 August 1968
7. NSWPD 1970, p 4073
8 » Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September 1970? Supplement 
on Bankstown
9# Liverpool, is Lebensraum, published by the Liverpool 
City Council on the occasion of the New South Wales 
Local Government Engineer*s Conference Week, I969
10. Liverpool Leader, 16 December 1970
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11. The correspondence of the rankings is close, with 
one or two notable exceptions. The City oT Sydney 
contains the CBDj Botany and Auburn both are largely 
industrial areas and contain a far greater proportion 
of industrial, development compared to population 
size than any other municipality. These are the 
only cases one would expect the influence of non— 
residential land to distort the picture. Hornsby 
might fall in the same category, except that in
this case per capita values are lower than would be 
expected, due possibly to the high proportion of 
non—urban land in the Shire.
12. Philip Bentley, 'The relationship between Local 
Government Tax Payments and Income', Typescript, 
Macquarie University, Sydney, 1971
13* Manning concludes from an analysis of all Sydney 
LGA*s that 'The lower the prosperity of an LGA * s 
people, the higher the rate, and the lower revenue 
a head*. I. G. Manning, An Economic Study of Some 
Location—Specific Services and Regulations in Sydney, 
Australian National University, Ph.D. thesis, 1972, 
p. 151
14. For an example of this sort of study, which
distinguishes between the effects of 'needs', 'demands', 
and 'resources', see H. Herman, C. S. Liebman,
T. R. Dye, Suburban Differences and Metropolitan 
Policies, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, .1963)
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Chapter 111 THE RECRUITMENT OF ALDERMEN
We can learn much about the sorts of interests 
involved in local politics and the way these interests 
are expressed by looking at the sorts of people who 
become aldermen, or stand for office, and the way they 
are chosen. The key concept that links these two points 
of interest is the notion of 'eligibility1 for office. 
Seligman explains it:
Two stages may be conveniently distinguished 
in the process of recruitment. Certification 
includes the social screening and the political 
channelling that results in eligibility for 
candidacy, whilst seiec tion includes the actual 
choice of candidates to represent parties....
Certification involves possessing or acquiring certain
attributes that make for eligibility. We can ask what
these are, how they are acquired, and who decides what
they should be. The choice of candidates may be made
by party organisations, but whether it is or not, each
candidate must still prove his eligibility at some
point, and ultimately at the polling booth, to individual
electors. It is not always the case that the critical
choice is made at this final stage. Political parties
preselect candidates for safe seats; established
political figures may 'nominate' their successors. In
a study of local government in California, Prewitt shows
how recruitment into local office is institutionalised
in similar ways, but identifies as well the sorts of
'apprenticeships' that candidates serve before they 
2come to stand. They belong to the 'right' community 
organisations, have some record in active community life,
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exhibit the ’right’ beliefs about voluntary service and 
'the public good', and so on. Elections merely 'reinforce' 
processes that run through local community political life 
as a whole. In the present context, we shall begin by 
looking briefly at the way aldermen come to stand for 
local office and then seek to identify those 
characteristics that make for eligibility in each council. 
This leads in to a discussion of local elections.
Some indication of the factors important in the 
initial decision of aldermen to stand for office is 
given in Tables 111-1 and 2. These present data from 
a questionnaire of aldermen, (See Appendix l)„ It is 
difficult to make quantitative comparisons between 
patterns of recruitment in separate councils when the 
number of aldermen is so small, so this data can only 
be taken as suggestive of such patterns. Table 111—1 
distinguishes between those who stated they were influenced 
in their decision to stand, and those who claimed they 
decided on their own. Amongst aldermen as a whole, the 
majority fell into the former category. Only a minority 
stated they were 'conscripted', that is disclaimed any 
initiative on their own part. Amongst individual councils 
this was most evident in Burwood, Table 111—2 shows what 
agents were important for those who stated they were 
influenced or induced to stand by others. Local community 
groups seem to have been of significance only in Bankstown, 
Ku—ring—gai and North Sydney, Perhaps the most notable 
feature was the importance of sitting aldermen in the
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recruitment process in Burwood, coupled with the influence 
of political parties.
Of those aldermen who mentioned the party as an 
influence none were Liberal Party members. This does 
not mean that in some areas membership of the Liberal 
Party was of no significance in establishing the 
eligibility of some candidates and helping them win 
elections, as we shall see. However, Table 111—3 does 
show that a relatively small proportion of aldermen 
were Liberal Party members. This might be expected 
from the fact that the Liberal Party as an organisation 
does not formally participate in local elections. But 
the Table does indicate a general feature of local 
government recruitment — the large proportion of 
successful aldermen who were non-party, whether Liberal 
or Labor, This distinguishes local political recruitment 
from recruitment to other levels of government.
Table 111-1 The Decision to Stand for Office
’Own Idea’ ’Asked to Stand' ’Combination'
Bankstown 2 2 5
Burwood 2 5 3
Ku-ring—gai 2 1 6
Leichhardt 4 1 4
Liverpool 5 3 2
North Sydney 6 1 3
TOTAL 21 13 23
Source: Questionnaire, Q, 3(a) ’When you first
considered you might stand for this council, 
was it — (a) your own idea, (b) were you 
asked to stand by some person or organisation, 
or (c) was it a combination of both?1.
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Table 111-2 Source s of inducement in the decision
to stand
Party Alderman Community Friend
Group
Bankstown 2 1 4 1
Burwood 3 5 1 1
K u —ring—gai 0 3 4 1
Leichhardt 2 2 0 1
Liverpool 2 2 l 0
North Sydney 1 1 3 2
Source: Questionnaire» Q. 3(b) *If .you have ticked
(b) or (c) above, would you say which of the 
following played a part in influencing your 
decision? (a) a political party, (b) a 
sitting or retiring alderman, (c) a local 
civic or community group, (d) a personal 
friend or friends, (e) other'®.
Table 111-3
(n 0B. Aldermen were given the 
ticking more than one)
Party membership of aldermen
option
ALP Lib , Other None
Banks town 2 2 0 5Burwood 4 2 0 4
Ku—ring—gai 0 1 2 6
Leichhardt 6 0 2 1
Liverpool 5 2 0 3North Sydney l 3 1 5
TOTAL 18 10 5 24
Source: Questionnaire *
It is often claimed that local political office is 
for many a stepping stone to higher office, and that for 
party members (ALP members in particular) it is a reward 
for faithful but undistinguished party service, or a 
consolation prize for those who fail to win higher office* 
These propositions tend to bely the suggestion made above 
that recruitment to local politics is in some respects 
a distinctive process* Table 111—4 shows that in all 
some three—fifths of aldermen either had serious ambitions,
or had been approached, about standing for elected office
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at higher levels of government. Nearly three-quarters
3of party members fell into this category. However, 
ambition or eligibility for higher office is not in 
itself necessarily an aspect of an alderman *s eligibility 
for local office. Establishing that aldermen have these 
ambitions is not to prove that they act differently in 
local politics from those who do not. They are likely 
to ensure that they establish and retain their eligibility 
for local office, as it is winning success at this level 
that helps them make their claim for higher office. 
Furthermore, we can not tell whether aldermens* ambitions 
preceded or resulted from their success in local politics. 
However, those who were 'approached to stand* possibly 
made their reputation by fulfilling their primary 
ambitions as local politicians, and were then considered 
eligible for higher office. ,
Table 111—4 Party Membership and Higher Political Office
*Considered Approached Neither Total 
Standing to Stand
ALP 7 5 5 17
Liberal 6 1 3 10
Other 4 0 1 5
Non-party 4 3 13 20
TOTAL 21 9 22 52
Respondents could reply they had both been 
'approached' and that they had * considered1•
Those who said 'yes *-’for both have been 
entered as having ’considered* only
Sources Questionnaire.
Table 111—5 shows the same data on aldermen and higher 
political office, but breaks it down for separate councils. 
The number of aldermen with political ambitions beyond 
the local level is noticeably higher in Burwood and
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Bankstown. In Burwood, five of the six aldermen who
were members of a political party had actually stood 
for State or Federal Parliament, and most of them had done 
so before they were elected as aldermen. In Bankstown, 
on the other hand, several of those who had stood for 
State or Federal, seats had stood as Independents, and 
had fought on local issues partly to further their 
local political .careers. In direct contrast to Burwood, 
aldermen in North Sydney showed far less ambition to 
proceed beyond the local level, and in Ku—ring—gai, a 
similar number showed no willingness, or had not been 
considered eligible. We shall see below that this 
does reflect some important differences in the sorts of 
local qualifications that seem to be important for 
gaining local office. It should be noted that in 
Liverpool and Leichhardt, both Labor councils, the 
number who stated having ambitions for higher office was 
low, and the largest category in each was of those whose 
political, horizons^ seem not to have extended beyond the 
local level.
Table 111—5 Local Aldermen and Higher Political Office
BA BU KU LE LI NS Total
Considered standing ■* 5 6 4 2 1 3 21
Asked to stand 1 2 0 3 3 0 9
Neither 2 2 5 4 4 5 22
TOTAL RESPONSES 8 10 9 9 8 8 52
* Respondent s could say they had both been »asked «
and had ’considerecf'. Those who said »yes* in 
both cases have been entered as having »considered* 
only
Source: Questionnaire
59
We would expect party members to have shown a greater 
ambition for higher office, and to have been considered 
eligible for such office, for party membership is both 
the primary channel and a primary qualification for 
these positions! the opportunities are greater, and the 
question is more relevant. As remarked, though, this 
does not necessarily indicate that as local politicians 
they exhibit important differences in other respects.
We shall see later that attaching a Party label to a 
local candidacy was not always sufficient to gain election 
even in 'safe* Labor areas for ALP candidates. The 
electorate at least looks for other qualifications in 
its elected aldermen. In one very important respect, 
party aldermen werq not notably distinguishable from 
non-party aldermen, and that was in the extent of their 
involvement in community activities. If there was any 
difference, it was that Labor Party aldermen were more 
active in local community organisations than non-party 
aldermen (Table 111—6). Involvement in community 
organisations was one of the most important ways in which 
aldermen established therir eligibility for local office.
In this regard, party members, and in particular Labor 
Party members, were more local in their orientations 
than other aldermen. Party members who became aldermen 
were not just party faithfuls being rewarded with a seat 
on the council, and if they sought to use local political 
office as a stepping stone to higher political office, 
their success at the local level did not depend on their
party membership alone
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Table 111—6 Party Membership and Local Group Activity
Very Fairly Not Total
Active Active Active
ALP 10 5 3 18
Liberal k 3 3 10Other 3 1 1 5
Non-party 7 9 8 2k
TOTAL 2k 18 15 57
Source: Questionnaire
While activity in local community organisations was
a common feature of aldermen in all councils, there were
important differences in the extent of group contacts by
aldermen and the kinds of groups and organisations they
belonged to. These in part reflected the different
sorts of organisations involved in local politics from
one area to another. Aldermen were asked to name those
groups they belonged to that had been involved in 'council 
affairs'* in some way, so the data on group activity or 
membership does not show their total network of group 
memberships, but only those that they considered were 
salient for them in their role as aldermen.
Table 111—7 Types of Groups and Organisations in 
which Local Aldermen were Involved
BA BU KU LE LI NS
Neighbourhood Groups etc. 3 0 1 0 1 6
Ratepayer*s Associations 0 0 2 0 0 1
Chambers of Commerce 3 0 0 1 5 2
Sporting Clubs 5 2 1 3 7 1
Youth Groups 2 1 3 3 0 2
Welfare Organisations 1 2 2 3 0 3
Community Service Groups 6 5 k 1 2 1
Other 2 0 2 1 1 1
TOTAL 22 10 15 12 16 17
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 9 10 * 9 9 10 ^ 10
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(/> Responses that were given in the form of listing 
separate organisations have been categorised 
according to the types of groups shown in the 
Table. The totals do not thus represent the 
total number of actual groups to which aldermen 
on the council belonged. This was necessary 
because several respondents did not name 
separate groups, but categorised them similar 
to the way I have. Groups of each type were 
found in all areas, except that there were no 
Ratepayer’s Associations in Bankstown or 
Leichhardt. Party organisations (national 
or local) are not included.
Source: Questionnaire.
Table 111—7 shows that Bankstown was outstanding in 
the range of groups in which a significant number of 
aldermen were active members, whilst Burwood and Leichhardt 
were at the other extreme. This would seem to indicate 
that extensive contacts with community organisations was not 
such an important aspect of establishing a candidate’s 
eligibility in these latter councils.
Those groups nearer the top of the list are more 
directly involved in local politics than those nearer the 
bottom. This will become evident when discussing interest 
group activity in Chapter V. Not only did aldermen in
Leichhardt and Burwood show less involvement in groups as 
a whole, their involvement was in more ’apolitical* types 
of groups, apart from their membership of political 
parties. On these two councils, as we saw in Table 111—2 
the influence of community groups in the decision to 
stand was negligible. In Burwood, we saw that aldermen 
were most likely to have been ; conscripted*, either by 
sitting aldermen or by political parties. We noted in 
Table 111—5 that aldermen showed a propensity to look 
beyond the local, level in their political careers. We
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can conclude that political recruitment in Burwood was 
a relatively closed and exclusive process in which purely 
local organisations were not important. Sitting aldermen
were important in •'nominating'* new candidates; many came 
from party organisations , and seemingly had few specifically 
local qualifications to distinguish them.
Burwood can be contrasted with North Sydney. There, 
local community groups were more important in influencing 
the decision of aldermen to stand, fewer aldermen had 
higher political ambitions, and they had more links with 
local community groups, particularly those that were 
closely involved in local politics, i.e. neighbourhood 
groups. Ku—ring—gai and Bankstown came closer to
North Sydney than Burwood in exhibiting these character­
istics.
Liverpool and Leichhardt were similar in so far as 
both contained a high proportion of A.LP members. In both, 
community groups were not important in influencing aldermen 
in their decision to stand. However, group membership and 
community activity were not irrelevant for candidates’ 
eligibility, either in the party pre-selection arena, or 
at the polls. This was true more for Liverpool than 
Leichhardt, as Table 111—7 indicated. In Liverpool,
ALP aldermen had close links with sporting clubs which 
were very active in local politics as major client—groups 
demanding and using council services. In Leichhardt, 
no such politically oriented group with which ALP members 
had contact was important. Aldermen seem to have been 
selected first and foremost as party politicians, although
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this does not mean that their concern was not focused 
largely on community affairs« Local party branches in 
Leichhardt were exceptional for their close involvement 
in municipal politics. More than in other areas, party 
membership brought people into direct contact with the 
major centres of local political power.
I have suggested that aldermen are in some ways a 
different kind of politician from office-holders at other 
levels of government. In particular, many rely primarily 
on community ties and special local qualifications in 
attaining and retaining local office. One important 
attribute that reinforces this view is place of residence. 
The great majority of aldermen not only lived in the 
municipality they held office in, but in the ward they 
represented. This is shown in Table 111—8.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  • -  ~ i .  .Table 111—8 Residence and Work.—Place of Aldermen
BA BU KU LE LI NS
Ward resident ^ 8 9 12 17 6 9Work in ward 1 2 — 1 2 3
Neither 3 1 - - 4 3
* I'hi. s includes only those who were self-employed.
Those who both 1 ived and worked in the ward
are entered as living in the ward only
Source: Council lists
The fact of living or working in the ward was of considerable 
importance in winning electoral support, as we shall see 
in later discussion of electoral politics. Candidates 
who lived outside the ward, or worse still outside the 
municipality, were vulnerable to charges that they had no 
close contact with local ratepayers, and no real concern 
with their immediate problems. They also tended to suffer
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from the disadvantage of not being involved in Local 
community life.
One attribute of aldermen that might well be important
as a qualification for local office is occupational
background. Table 111—9 shows that aldermen on all but
one council (Leichhardt) were predominantly drawn from
4higher income occupational categories. The representation 
of lower income categories depended largely on the success 
of the Labor Party at local elections. Leichhardt, 
where clerical and ’blue-collar' workers gained the most 
representation, contained l4 ALP aldermen. In the other 
lower socio-economic status areas, Bankstown and Liverpool, 
the majority of aldermen were from the first occupational 
category. These were local businessmen, mostly shop­
keepers, builders and contractors, factory owners, and 
so on. This was in marked contrast to the higher status 
areas, where more aldermen came from the second occupational 
category than the first. This was most notably the case 
in Ku-ring—gai, where aldermen were largely in salaried 
occupations, professional or semi-professional in nature, 
in North Sydney, this category was well represented, but 
so were local businessmen.
Table 111—9 Occupations of Aldermen, 1970
BA.(5) * BU(3) KU(l) LE(4) LI (6) NS(2) Total
1 Proprietary, 
managerial 7 3 1 4 7 6 28
2 Professional, 
administrative 1 6 11 2 2 7 29
3 Clerical, sales 3 2 0 6 1 0 124 Skilled/
unskilled workers 0 0 5 2 l 9
5 Home duties 0 1 0 l 0 l 3
TOTAL 12 12 12 18 12 15 81
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* Figures in brackets indicate the socio-economic status
ranking of the population (Table 11-2)
N.B. Aldermen who were retired were entered in the
occupation they pursued before their retirement
Source: Interviews and Questionnaire, and Council sources.
The success of businessmen in attaining local office
in lower socio-economic status areas is also shown in
Table 111—10. This shows that at the 1971 elections
they enjoyed a higher success rate at the polls than
other groups. Whilst their prominence on some councils
was due partly to their propensity to stand for office,
it was also due to a higher propensity to win than other
occupational groups.
Table 111-10 Occupations of Candidates and Elected
Aldermen, 1971
BA „ BU „ KU „ LE „ LI „ NS „ Total %vT vf 7T "A* 7T ‘A’ ----------- s1__2 1__2 1___2 1__2 1__2 1__2 1 2* Succ­
ess 
Rate
1 Proprietary 
& managerial 10 6 7 3 1 0 6 5 12 7 14 4 50 25 50#
2 Professional 
& administra­
tive
11 2 10 5 17 10 17 4 7 1 20 9 82 31 38 %
3 Clerical & 
sales 7 3 7 3 0 0 5 l 8 1 2 0 29 8 2 8%
4 Skilled & 
unskilled 
workers
2 1 2 0 0 0 9 2 7 3 1 1 21 7 3 3 %
17#5 Home duties 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 1 12 2
TOTAL 33 12 27 12 1.8 10 37 12 35 12 44 15 19473 37#
* Column 1 - all candidates
Column 2 — successful candidates
Source: Council election data; press; election literature; 
interviews.
In contrast to the marked success of businessmen in lower 
status areas, those from the second occupational category 
had a high failure rate in these municipalities. On the 
other hand, in higher status areas, those from the second
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occupational category showed the highest winning ability.
Table 111—11 compares the success rate of these two
categories in the three high status, and the three low
status municipalities taken together.
Table 111-11 Success Rates of Higher Income
Categories, 1971 Elections
. *
% Success Rate
BA, LE, LI BU, KU, NS
Proprietary and managerial 64 32
Professional and administrative 28 51
All candidates 34 42
* Success rate = percentage of each category successful in
winning election
Sources As for Table 111—10
These findings suggest that occupational background was 
important as a qualification for eligibility and that the 
actual qualifications differed from area to area.
In a brief discussion in Chapter 11 of the policy 
goals and values current in each council, major differences 
were noted. It is not surprising that Liverpool, the 
city of growth and progress committed to encouraging 
development, should attract local businessmen to stand 
for election, and endorse their candidacies at the polls.
In contrast, Ku—ring—gai1s residents expected their 
council to uphold a very different set of values, and 
typical Ku—ring—gai residents stood for office and were 
elected. Local businessmen hardly bothered to compete.
In Liverpool or Bankstown, local businessmen expressed 
many values which were shared by residents. The goals 
of expansion and growth were not just confined to a 
business elite, for they meant better facilities for 
residents as well as more profits for businessmen.
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Businessmen are likely to be regarded as community leaders 
in an expanding municipality, as it is their enterprise, 
and their goals that best epitomise the whole ethos of 
growth. An independent factor in giving them a status 
as community leaders is that for many of them — particularly 
shopkeepers - their business activities bring them into 
close contact with many local people. They are 'well 
known 1, and this is an important factor for success in 
local elections, as we shall see in the. next chapter. 
Furthermore, businessmen as anti-Labor candidates are 
particularly well placed to lay claim to the possession 
of those peculiar qualifications of local aldermen that 
seem to be accepted in the traditional picture of council 
administration. They have 'business experience ' , they 
have a large stake in the community as property owners, 
and they are generally not immediately associated with 
'politics1' in other spheres* Finally, local businessmen 
are likely to be in a better position to raise campaign 
funds than most other candidates.
Some of these attributes of local businessmen that 
make them successful aldermen have nothing to do with 
their interests as members of a particular group in the 
community, as distinct from an occupational category.
In some circumstances, businessmen do operate as an interest 
group, or seek to obtain individual favours from the council. 
In looking at the recruitment process, then, it is important 
to see whether businessmen as a group 'select ' or 'certify" 
candidates. In Bankstown, most of the businessmen aldermen 
on the 1968-71 council were members of a group called the
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Progressive Independents, formed to fight council elections 
and compete with the Labor Party for local office. It 
won considerable success, for reasons that will be pursued 
in more detail in the next chapter® The group did on 
occasions act in the council as a 'businessmen's group1’ , 
in the interests of local business, although this was not 
the only set of policy orientations that identified it 
as a group* In Liverpool, some of the teams of independent 
anti—Labor candidates were of a similar complexion, although 
not so persistent, cohesive, or successful* In both 
cases, the expression of anti—Labor sentiments, and an 
identification with the business community, were important 
attributes of candidates standing with the endorsement of 
the groups concerned.
In North Sydney, the 1971 elections were dominated 
by two groups of candidates, and the main issue was whether 
or not to take a much stricter and more prohibitive attitude 
towards multi—storey flat development. The two groups 
differed significantly in the occupational background of 
their candidates, and as a result of the victory of the 
’anti-flat ’ candidates, the representation of local business' 
men on the* council — who made up a large proportion of the 
candidates in the other group - fell, whilst the typical 
middle class resident, the professional or salaried 
administrator, gained greater representation. In this 
case, then, not only did opposing teams choose different 
sorts of candidates for good reasons, the electorate made 
the same choice0 In other situations, as in Ku—ring—gai 
or Liverpool, a dominant set of values espoused by
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particular groups in the community which coincided with 
occupational categories, was not seriously challenged« 
In so far as these factors were important at elections, 
the process of 'certification* by sponsoring groups — 
where these existed — and by the electorate at large, 
reinforced each other.
Table 111—1.2 Men and Women as Candidates in 1971
BA BU KU LE LI NS
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Men 29 12 25 11 17 10 34 12 35 12 33 11Women 4 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 11 4
1 — Candidates
2 — Successful Candidates
Sources Council election nominations and results.
The great majority of aldermen and candidates were 
men, as Table 111—12 shows. On the 1968—71 council the 
only women aldermen were in Burwood (l), Ku—ring-gai (l), 
Leichhardt (l) and North Sydney (2). In 1971» however, 
a third of candidates in North Sydney were women. They 
were almost exclusively members of local residents' groups, 
and the involvement of women in these groups was an 
important development in local politicss most were 
married, well educated and either employed in some 
professional occupation, or with a record of past 
employment in such occupations. Their interest in local 
politics epitomised the interests of residents in 
preserving an existing residential amenity and improving 
community facilities, and opposing flat development in 
their neighbourhoods. The increasing eligibility of 
women for local office was due to their sponsorship by 
residents' groups in which they were very active, and their
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close identification with the interests and the kinds of 
local political activity which were important factors in 
influencing voting patterns in 1971»
An important characteristic of most successful 
candidates for local office is that they were incumbent 
aldermen» Table 111—13 shows that on average about 
73 per cent of incumbent aldermen sought re-election, 
and that on all councils except Ku—ring—gai, about 
80 per cent were successful. The low incumbent success 
rate in Ku—ring—gai was due to incumbent defeats in 1968 
and 19711 elections that were exceptional for the issues 
raised, as will be seen later. The reasons for incumbent 
success differ from one area to another. In Leichhardt, 
for instance, no endorsed ALP alderman was defeated when 
seeking re-election during the period 19^8—68, although 
the situation changed in 1971«» In other situations, 
incumbency is an advantage in that sitting aldermen are 
better known than new candidates, and have had the 
opportunity to build up personal support and weld links 
with local groups.
Table 111—13 Incumbent Turnover, 1962—1971
BA BIJ KU LE LI NS
$ incumbents seeking 
re —election 72.2 77.1 70.8 71.4 77.1 78.3
% successful 76.9 8I 0I 53.9 82.2 75.7 83.0
Source: Council election returns, 1962, 1965» 1968, 1971
Although incumbency in itself might give sitting aldermen this 
type of advantage as candidates, it is not unreasonable to 
expect sitting aldermen who have employed a successful 
formula for election on at least one occasion to win again.
I have pointed out in this chapter that there were 
important differences in the attributes and the background
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of candidates from one area to another which indicated 
differences in the sorts of groups and interests involved 
in local politics. The process of certification by which 
these candidates were screened for eligibility also differed. 
These differences were related to general features of 
local politics, and in the course of subsequent chapters 
more of these relationships will be looked at. The 
background of aldermen in community affairs, and the way 
they come to stand for local office are of importance in 
influencing the way aldermen behave in office. The 
recruitment process establishes obligations and links 
between candidates and groups or individuals in the 
community. These obligations range from the formal rules 
binding Labor aldermen to party caucus procedures and 
discipline, to informal promises and inter-personal links 
established between individual candidates and those 
influential in helping them in some way during the process 
of acquiring and demonstrating their eligibility for 
office. These obligations may be ’internalised' in that 
the individual candidate sees himself as a direct 
representative of a particular group or interest, possibly 
even his own personal interests.
The electoral process itself provides perhaps the 
major opportunity for candidates to establish their 
eligibility and to weld links with groups and individuals 
in the community. And it provides a means of observing 
some of these obligations being fulfilled, through appeals 
for votes and actual voting behaviour. Much of the next 
chapter on the electoral process will be concerned with
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looking at the nature of electoral politics from this 
point of view. What are the kinds of relationships and 
obligations entered into, and what kinds of groups and 
interests are involved?
FOOTNOTES
1. L. G. Seligman, ’Political Recruitment and Party-
Structure: A Case Study'. American Political Science
Review, March 1961, p. 77
2. K. Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders:
A Case Study of Citizen-Politicians(Indianapolis, 
Hobbs—Merrill, 1970)• Ön the notion of 'Apprenticeship* 
see p. 12
3. Relationships suggested for all aldermen in the six 
councils cannot be extrapolated to apply to all 
aldermen in Sydney. The respondents are not a 
sample of this universe, but members of a particular 
universe chosen independent of such sampling methods.
4. The occupational classifications used cause some 
problems in individual cases. The first category 
contains local businessmen such as shopkeepers, 
owners of factories, and so on. Where no more 
occupational information was available than the 
description 'manager', they were entered in this 
group. Solicitors, architects, real estate agents, 
and so on, who might also have been 'proprietors', 
were entered in the second category, along with 
teachers, engineers, librarians, and so on. Also 
included in this group were salaried administrative 
staff in private business or the public service.
The final category, 'home duties' covers women not 
in employment. Aldermen who were retired (three
in Burwood, one in Ku-ring—gai and two in Leichhardt) 
have been entered according to their employment before 
retirement.
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Chapter IV LOCAL ELECTIONS: WINNING
SEATS AND WINNING VOTES
Voting at local elections is based on the same rolls 
used Tor State elections, except that non-resident rate­
payers can obtain enrolment, so long as no owner has more 
than one vote in any municipality. Companies and 
corporations as ratepayers can nominate a trustee to vote. 
Compiling the rolls and conducting the elections is in the 
hands -of the council. The town clerk normally acts as 
returning officer and is charged with keeping the rolls 
up to date. All seats on the council Tall vacant 
simultaneously once every three years and local elections 
are all held on a date Tixed by statute. Each oT the 
six local government areas was divided into wards with 
equal representation. In 1971 j Burwood and Liverpool 
had three wards returning Tour aldermen each, Bankstown 
Tour wards returning three each, North Sydney Tive returning 
three each, Ku—ring-gai Tive returning two each, and 
Leichhardt six returning two each. Until the I.968 
elections voting was compulsory and candidates in each 
ward were elected under a system oT proportional 
representation. For the 1968 and 1971 elections compulsory 
voting was abolished, reducing turnout Trom about to
approximately 30$> Tor Sydney metropolitan councils. ^
At the same time the preTerential ’“majority bloc * system 
replaced proportional representation.
This change in the system oT counting greatly increased 
the importance oT preTerences Tor winning elections.
Under the preTerential system, when the preTerences oT
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elected candidates are distributed, all votes are allotted 
rather than just a proportion. Moreover, far fewer 
candidates are able to achieve the required absolute 
majority of primary votes than are able to achieve a "quota1 
under proportional representation. Table 1V-1 shows the 
effect of the change. Under the preferential system the 
importance of reaching agreements with fellow candidates 
on the allocation of preferences is greatly increased.
Table IV—1 Percentage of aldermen elected on preferences
whilst polling fewer votes than one or more
unsuccessful candidates
Election Years BA BU KU LE LI NS
* * * * i *
1962
1968
and
and
19 6 5 (P.R.) 3.3
1971 (pref.) 29.1
1 5 . 0
25.0-
1 5 . 0
4 5 . 5
33.3
46.7
20.8
4l.6
3.3
1 3 .2
Source: Election returns.
Assuming voters follow 1how—to-vote* instructions, a candidate 
who polls exceptionally well can in effect select his 
fellow aldermen. In the East Ward in Bankstown, Lockwood, 
an independent candidate, polled virtually an absolute 
majority of primary votes in 1968 and again in 1 9 7 1«» In 
1968 his preferences elected the number two candidate on 
the ALP ticket, whilst the number one candidate did not 
win a seat. In 1971 Lockwood's support was withdrawn 
and the same candidate lost his seat. This occurred 
in spite of a fairly high leakage of preferences, about 
25$ in 1971o An independent candidate in the North Ward 
polled an absolute majority in 1971 and the election of the 
remaining aldermen was a formality, with nearly 90$ of his 
preferences distributed according to his "how-to-vote''
instructions
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The preferential system can be exploited by candidates 
in various ways * Anti-Labor teams can isolate Labor 
candidates by exchanging preferences, and any minority 
can be excluded in this way. Thus, a candidate sponsored 
by a Ratepayer’s Association in Roseville Ward in 1968 
topped the poll with 38, per cent of the vote, but was 
beaten for each of the three seats through a tight exchange 
of preferences amongst the remaining three candidates.
In fact, it is suicidal not to make ’preference deals’.
The arrangement of preference exchanges can go to the 
extent of teams standing largely for the purpose of aiding 
the election of another team. This occurs in cases where 
anti—Labor groups try to defeat Labor candidates. Labor 
Party members also stand as independents with the aim of 
picking up primary votes that will go towards electing 
the Party team. Labor teams now adopt a more pragmatic
approach than formerly in making arrangements with non—
2Labor teams to avoid being isolated.
An important feature of local elections is the small 
size of electorates. Tens or hundreds of votes are 
important rather than thousands. Table 1V-2 shows the 
number of votes polled by successful candidates in the 
last proportional representation election (1965) and in 
the 1971 election. Also shown is the ’technical’ number 
required for election under each system. The 'quota' and 
the absolute majority were roughly the same, because of the 
removal of compulsory voting provisions. However, because 
of the greater importance of preferences in gaining election, 
the average number of votes polled by successful candidates
7 6
was considerably less under the preferential system. 
Table IV—2 Number of vote6 required for election
BA BU KU LE LI NS_ _ 1 '
1965 - ’quota’ 4395 943 2490 1152 1210 1269
1965 - average vote of
successful 4270 958 1937 1427 1280 1221
1971
candidate s
- absolute qB'SO 968 1878 1364 1769 1260
1971
maj ority
- average vote of
successful 1658 339 995 710 510 587
candidate s
Source: Council records of election returns.
Following the introduction of voluntary voting in 
electorates that were so small, ‘getting out the vote'1 
became a vital factor. Candidates and party machines 
were not used to the techniques, but notices began to 
appear in- advertisements and on campaign literature offering 
free transport to the booths and candidates kept tally of 
their supporters on polling day to see if they had voted.
A local newspaper report on the 1971 elections in 
Liverpool remarked on the novelty of these techniques, 
and referred to the ’voter muster’ that occurred late on 
polling day:
At one booth in the East Ward only about 200 
votes had been cast by mid afternoon. Suddenly 
candidates and their supporters deserted the area 
and some time later another 400 voters appeared 
’out of nowhere *• 3
Candidates in their campaign literature exhorted people to 
’exercise your civic duty1 and warned of the dangers of 
apathy. A notable case of such a warning occurred in 
Leichhardt in the 1968 elections, when a Labor Party pamphlet 
carried the bold banner ’Voting is Compulsory*, whilst 
adding in smaller type beneath ’...if you want to return
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a Labor Council 1.
When such small numbers of votes can sway the result, 
some candidates take the trouble to canvass the postal vote. 
Non-resident landowners in some areas form a significant 
proportion of voters. In North Sydney, business firms 
and companies owning offices in the commercial centre 
were canvassed to seek to persuade them to enrol and 
nominate trustees to vote. In one ward, a candidate 
polled 95 out of 210 postal votes, approximately one quarter 
of his total vote. In Liverpool in 1971 one independent 
candidate polled 191 out of 356 postal votes in the East 
Ward. This represented more than a quarter of his total 
vote and allowed him to top the poll. For candidates 
who take the trouble and make special appeals to non­
resident property owners, the rewards can be significant.
These then are some of the general characteristics 
of local elections that help explain how candidates win 
seats: candidates arrange advantageous preference deals;
they put up ‘dummy* candidates or teams to .direct 
preferences to themselves; they attempt to ‘get the vote 
out1 with an efficient campaign organisation; they 
"organise* the postal vote. In the U. K . , local, elections 
are dominated in most cases by the national political 
parties, and the major factor in determining local election 
results is the attitude of the electors towards the
4performance of the parties at the national level. In
Australia, of the two major parties only the ALP competes 
for council seats openly and formally. In those of the 
six councils in Sydney where the ALP competed at local
78
elections, Labor candidates were unable to muster the 
same proportion of the vote that they attained in non­
local elections. This is shown in Table IV—3 which 
compares local with Federal Labor votes.
Table 1V-3 % ALP Vote in Council and Federal Elections (l)
Elec-
tion
BANKSTOWN 
Local Federal
BURWOOD 
Local Federal
LEICHHARDT 
Local Federal
LIVERPOOL 
Local Federal
1961
%
62.2
*
47.3
$
71.0
$
65.3
1962 40.4 39.9(2 ) 73.0 41.4
1963 58.6 39.5 72.9 58.1
1965 28.6 24.2 66.7 38.0
1966 51.7 34.4 61.0 54.9
1968 27.0 - 51.3 45.7 ^
1969 56.5 4l. 1 65.1 61.2
1971 2 0 . 9 ^ 16.O(3 ) 39.6 31.6 ^
(1 ) Federal electorates used were as follows — for BankstownBanks and Blaxland; for Burwood, Lowe; for Leichhardt 
until the 1968 redistribution, Dailey and for 1969» 
Sydney; for Liverpool, Werriwa. None of the 
boundaries exactly coincide with municipal boundaries;, 
but no major discrepancies appear likely as a result.
(2) At these elections the ALP contested only the two 
most pro—Labor wards.
(3 ) Several Labor Party members stood at these elections 
without official party endorsement as independents.
In Burwood, they polled better than the official 
party candidate in some cases. In Burwood, Bankstown 
and Liverpool, their candidacies may have reduced
the proportion of party supporters voting for the 
official Labor candidate.
N.B. In all cases the percentage formal primary vote is 
shown•
Source:Council election returns.
It is possible that a major reason for the decline in the
party vote was the removal of compulsory voting in 1968.
However, even before then only in Leichhardt were local
ALP candidates able to poll their usual »non-local'1
proportion of the vote The marked decreases in Labor
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votes can be understood in terms of local factors, such 
as the fact that in Bankstown several party members were 
associated with bribery charges following the council’s 
dismissal by the Minister in 1963» whilst the Progressive 
Independents remained untouched by the scandal. The 
reduction in the Labor vote of 1968 and 1971 in 
Leichhardt occurred when for the first time the ALP 
council was effectively challenged by a municipality-wide 
opposition fighting on local issues,
Non-Labor candidates stress the theme that ’there is 
no room for party politics in local government1. It 
appears to find some favourable response from voters.
Many seem to approach local elections outside the normal 
framework of party allegiances. Party is relevant for 
some of the ’faithful*, but by no means all. And party 
is important in a peculiarly local way, through the 
exploitation of the anti-party sentiment as a specifically 
anti—Labor sentiment.
The Labor Party itself has recognized its relative 
failure at the local level. It has often been claimed 
by party officials that the party's poor image in municipal 
politics has harmed the party generally. The ALP has 
received adverse publicity over cases of disciplinary 
action taken by the State Executive against local aldermen 
for breaches of caucus rules, and some of the more 
spectacular cases of corruption and maladministration 
have featured Labor councils and aldermen - as in Bankstown 
in 1963» and in Leichhardt in 1953* The party several 
times amended its rules to relax caucus discipline and
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dismantle the municipal organisations of the party concerned 
with exercising party control over Labor aldermen. There 
has been a trend by local branches in some areas to 
disengage themselves from municipal politics, by not pre­
selecting candidates. The most important results of the 
failure of the ALP in local politics has been an increased 
tendency for party members to stand as independents without 
official party endorsement. In Burwood in 1968 and 1971 
and in by-elections in the intervening period, some party 
members stood as independents in teams with non-members; 
others stood as ’Independent Labor’, and others as endorsed 
Labor Party candidates. The result was the largest ever 
Labor contingent on the council and a Labor mayor, who 
obtained support from outside the Labor group. In fact, 
the Labor members did not make a practice of caucusing and 
enforcing discipline to majority caucus decisions. The 
preferences of party members who stood as independents 
in Bankstown and Liverpool in 1971 helped elect official 
Labor candidates. Aspiring local politicians in the 
Labor Party have found that municipal politics has its 
own distinctive characteristics, so that it is not sufficient 
to attach a party label to their candidacies to gain entry.
These new approaches to local politics by the ALP, 
and by ALP members with aspirations in local politics, 
can be seen in part as an adjustment to the conditions of 
local political life, as well as a move to improve the 
party’s general image for the sake of success at other 
levels of government. The frequent disputes between 
individual party aldermen and party officials stem from
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the need 1'or aldermen to respond to local ward pressures 
it they are to succeed as local politicians, and their 
consequent unwiiLingness on occasions to bow to the caucus 
majority rulingu bids for the mayoralty and other 
positions on the council by individual members often 
involve making deals with non—Labor aldermen, deals which 
may not be accepted by the caucus. The pragmatic demands 
of' preference arrangements with non—Labor aldermen in 
their separate uards may be frowned on by party officials 
or branches, who are not so concerned with the purely 
Local ambitions of those party members who are active in 
local politics. Party aldermen are inhibited from 
making some of the highly specific localised appeals for 
electoral support from particular local groups in their 
ward because as aldermen they are first and foremost 
members of the Labor team, not ward aldermen free to take 
defiant stands for the sake of their constituents; if 
they do take sucli stands outside the rulings of the 
caucus majority, the result may be disciplinary action 
by the party.
The normal pattern of party conflict and the issues 
which divide the parties and form the content of State 
and Federal politics, are not relevant in local politics. 
Many of the important local issues are not of the type that 
involve the taking of united stands on matters of policy, 
and certainly not matters of ’principle* or doctrine.
There is much truth in the old adage: ’There is nothing
party political about a footpath or a drain’. Just how this 
is so will become clearer in the discussion of the way local 
candidates actually go about winning votes.
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Party candidates did not stand in North Sydney during
the 1900’s and in Ku—ring—gai, an even safer Liberal
area, they never made an attempt. In all areas there
was an absence of open party competition and electors
seemed to view local politics outside a party political
framework. it seems reasonable that some of the
characteristics of local elections in the United States,
in those municipalities where elections are formally
and in fact ’non-partisan', might prevail in the
5Australian situation. In these non-partisan elections,
it is found that candidates obtain votes through direct
and indirect contacts in networks of acquaintance spreading
through local community organisations of various sorts;
these more 'apolitical' types of organisations take the
place of parties. Candidates rely on their 'name' and
there 'reputation'* rather than on issues such as those
that form the subject of conflict between the political
parties; candidates are reluctant to take stands on
issues but rely on promotion of their own personal
'qualifications’* for office. Prewitt uses the phrase
the 'politics of acquaintance' to describe the customary
pattern of support for such candidates. As he sees it —
The election system provides advantages to those 
citizens who already have social and political 
resources; to those located favourably in the 
network of friendships and associates which play 
such an important part in city politics; .... 
to those who have natural organisational ties ^
and support; and.... to those already in office...
This model does have some relevance. It raises
questions about the sorts of relationships that are forged
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between candidates and supporters in campaigning for votes.
We can usefully distinguish between different types of
such links. F. G. Jiailey draws the distinction between
7moral and transactional relationships. A transactional
relationship is akin to that between the mercenary and 
his hirelings. The bonds that tie the faithful to a 
saintly leader are moral in nature. The hireling must 
be paid, or else he will take his services elsewhere.
The faithful give their service and support out of love 
or devotion to a person, a cause, or an ideal. This 
is not to say that the faithful don’t expect rewards, 
but the nature of the good to be delivered is usually 
quite different, and the faithful will wait much longer.
As Bailey put it —
The leader of a moral group has a higher credit-
rating than the leader of a group of hirelings. ®
A further distinction can be made, between diffuse 
and specific appeals. Diffuse appeals are directed at 
broad groups or categories of people who are thought to 
share a common interest. Specific appeals are directed 
at individuals, or smaller groups, and their content, 
the nature of the obligations and the terms of the 
relationship are usually much clearer. It is difficult 
to hold a politician to any future course of action when 
he makes diffuse appeals such as a promise to act ’in the 
public interest’, or 'in the interests of the working class'. 
Adrian Mayer distinguishes between diffusely and 
specifically transactional appeals in discussing electoral 
politics in an Indian municipality:
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The campaign... contained activity at two 
levels: one was a public level, at which
promises were given to the general electorate 
as part of the party's stated programme; the 
other was the private level, at which promises 
given and obligations encashed were not ^
necessarily connected to the party's programme...
Diffuse appeals characteristically are impersonal, made
at public meetings or via propaganda. Specific appeals
are usually made at a more personal level, often face to
face. There are examples of specific moral appeals as
well, as when an appeal for political support is made to
a relation or a friend.
The description of non-partisan elections given 
above seems to depict a situation in which moral types 
of appeal are dominant. At a diffuse level, candidates 
stress their community service, their public spiritedness 
and their desire to selflessly serve the community for the 
public good; at the specific level, they exploit ties of 
friendship and acquaintance with fellow club members or 
social contacts. Transactional links, although inescapably 
present in such appeals, are muted. In the six councils, 
we can find parallels. The 'anti-party' theme used by 
non-Labor candidates is a diffuse moral theme which we 
noted in the previous chapter was linked to other similar 
themes. All candidates list their 'qualifications' to 
serve, their record in community life, and so on. In 
doing so appeals are made to widely held beliefs or norms 
about local government representation. We also find 
characteristics of local politics akin to those described 
in the 'politics of acquaintance". One North Sydney
alderman described some of them:
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1 have Lived ail my life in the Ward, and 
been in business there; I was connected 
with the Ratepayer’s Association, which is 
what really got me involved. I belong to 
Local clubs — the RSL, the bowling club, 
and so on, and that keeps me in touch.
So I [lave a continuous stream of
people coming^to me about council matters -
you must be approachable....10
In talking of elections, aldermen continually stressed
how important it was to be 'well known':
the thing that affects elections most is how 
much personal support you can get....H
...the vote for the local man — the bloke 
who lives around the corner, is vital. One 
of the biggest things is do any of the names 
ring a be11?  ^^
However, being well known and having personal support is
not just a case of acquaintanceship, or identification
with a well known figure:
being well known isn't enough. You've got 
to do what's expected of you too.... -^3
It's the personality that counts - people 
get to know you, know that you have done 
good service. They get to know whether an 
alderman will help them and listen to their 
complaints — they support the man they feel 
has done them best. ^
It's the 'local' business that keeps the alderman 
in power, looking after people — here at the 
shop I get lots of complaints, and I make sure 
I do what 1 can . 5
Thus, personal support can also be built up by promising 
to help people with their individual problems, or by 
'cashing in' credit built up through favours done in the 
pas t.
The transactional element in a candidate's personal 
following is also present in the links forged with friends, 
fellow cLub memljers , and so on. People do not vote for the 
'local man' or a business associate just to get a warm
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glow of satisfaction from having a friend in a position
of authority or prestige. They also expect that should
the occasion arise, they will gain ready access to the
council through a personal approach to him and that he
will feel obliged to do them a favour and help them,
whether it is a question of a pot-hole in the road, or
a development application to be put through the council.
Transactional links may also be forged in other
ways in seeking support and votes. Some aldermen
stressed the support of groups or organisations:
You can't win without some group or 
organisation behind you, or the support of 
some section of the community. In my case 
it's sporting clubs, another alderman is very 
close to the churches, and so on. 16
For someone connected with a local progress 
association, the support can be very important, 
if the group has some status.... <
...clubs may try and mobilise their members to 
support particular candidates... the RSL could 
swing 1,000 votes if it wanted to — if you 
offend them you go to other groups and look 
for 1,000 more.... ^
'Those groups with concrete proposals — 
not politically minded ones — are very useful 
to us. Once you've done something for them 
they remain very loyal'. 19
Whilst service clubs and other basically 'non—political' 
associations do not usually consider it a proper part of 
their role to go 'politicking', aldermen assiduously 
attempt to win favour with such groups, by making promises 
for council services or grants, or if elected, by trying 
to keep the promises made.
When the number of votes needed to win election is 
as smaii as it is in local elections, it becomes a 
realistic proposition to buiLd up electoral support
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through the use of specific transactional appeals. Every 
vote counts. Residents of particular streets are 
promised kerb and gutter, or reminded that they got it 
last year; particular clubs are promised money for a 
community project; particular suburbs are promised 
facilities, and so on.
An important feature of elections in the six councils 
was the existence of teams of candidates of various sorts, 
a result partly of the necessity of alliances for the 
exchange of preferences. There are different types of 
electoral teams. In particular I shall distinguish 
between a local party and an electoral alliance. A 
local party presents a specific ’image* for the whole 
team, and campaigns for the votes for the team, 
stressing stands taken on local issues rather than 
emphasising the personal cadidacies of the individual 
members. Financial and organisational resources are 
pooled, and a common strategy employed. By pin-pointing 
local issues, the local party identifies itself with 
particular groups or interests, and also generally 
identifies an enemy. It enters into commitments on 
policies and can be judged on its record at subsequent 
elections.
An electoral alliance is a marriage of convenience 
between candidates who rely largely on personal followings. 
Each campaigns separately in support of his own candidacy, 
tapping known supporters and employing personal appeals.
Any stands taken in common are likely to be of a very 
diffuse nature, entailing few commitments, as the marriage
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is not a permanent one. Candidates in an electoral 
alliance employ specific transactional and moral appeals, 
alongside diffuse moral appeals. A local party employs 
transactional appeals that are more diffuse in nature 
than those commonly used by candidates building personal 
following.
We can re—state these distinctions with the general 
framework outlined in the first chapter. Candidates in 
electoral alliances, in making highly specific 
transactional appeals, operate in the distributive arena 
of politics. They promise favours, ’slices of pork’, 
and so on. They attempt to tot up the numbers to win 
from a fragmented structure of groups and interests.
Local parties aggregate these interests through more 
diffuse transactional appeals. Rather than just 
focusing on individual grievances about neighbouring 
blocks of flats, they raise regulative issues in an 
’anti-flat’ campaign. Rather than promising to see that 
planning discretion is exercised in favour of residents 
who want to move out and sell their properties for flats, 
they promise a re—zoning of an area to permit flats. 
Rather than devoting attention to promises to kerb and 
gutter particular streets, they draw attention to the 
need for more money to be allocated for kerb and gutter. 
Similar redistributive issues can emerge over protests 
over the level of the rate.
One aspect of the personal support a candidate can 
muster will come in for some attention in the analysis of 
electoral strategies of candidates in the 1971 elections.
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Many candidates poll best in booths near their home or
place of business. This is the 'friends—and neighbours'
phenomenon identified by V. 0, Key in his study of
20Southern politics in the United States, The vote
for the 'home town boy* indicated 'the absence of stable,
well organised, state—wide factions of like-minded
citizens formed to advocate measures of common concern'.
Thus, a concern for issues, promoted by or appealing to
state—wide groups would tend to produce a pattern of
21even support across the state for candidates,
D, R, Reynolds argues that extreme localism in support 
occurs where party loyalties are not strong, and that 
the development of broader support by 'generating issues
and aligning with non—locally based organisations'
22minimises the effect. Thus, we would expect to find
that candidates in local parties would show less evidence 
of 'friends—and—neighbours' support than candidates in 
electoral alliances, 
i. BANKSTOWN
During the i960's elections in the South and West 
Wards were increasingly dominated by competition for seats 
between the Progressive Independents and the ALP, The 
Progressive Independents, as I have pointed out, were 
largely local businessmen, and their major stated intention 
was to keep the ALP off the council. Associated with this 
was the claim to 'clean up' local politics and even to 
keep 'politics' out of council affairs altogether. They 
stressed their business-like approach, their attempts to 
introduce greater efficiency, and their opposition to
/.
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’horse trading', caucus control, and so on. Continuity 
of personnel and image, the use of common propaganda 
(including a local newspaper owned by one of the group's 
members), and the pursuit of consistent policies, entitle 
the group to be labelled a local party. It won all six 
seats in the two wards it contested on the 1968—171 council, 
but lost two to the ALP, and one to an independent, in
1971.
The group laid emphasis on its provision of amenities 
for sport and youth, on its use of new sources of finance 
to increase the construction of kerb and gutter and other 
street works, and on its use of contract labour rather 
than the council's 'inefficient' workforce in performing 
these works. On this point, the group was bitterly 
opposed by the local ALP. The ALP itself in these wards 
could be seen as a local party, as it focused attention on 
several local issues throughout the period. It attacked 
the Progressive Independents for their policy of permitting 
flat development, accusing them of favouring the speculator 
and developer but destroying Bankstown's 'garden suburbs'.
It made considerable capital at the 1971 elections out 
of a decision of 1969 supported by the Progressive 
Independents to build a $1.5m civic centre, accusing 
them of extravagance and misplaced priorities. It tried 
to raise the general issue of 'more kerb and gutter'.
These issues were fought out against a continual background 
of personal attacks which were occasionally quite rancorous.
The 1971 campaign also saw appeals by both parties 
of a more specific transactional type. The Progressive
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Independents pointed to the benefits that had come to 
particular streets they had provided with kerb and gutter 
and listed promises they had fulfilled in building 
particular local facilities. Campaign literature listed 
streets that were to be kerbed and guttered in the near 
future. The ALP countered with mention of the most 
pot—holed and dusty streets and promises of facilities 
for particular suburbs. The Progressive independent 
newspaper urged members of sporting clubs and youth 
welfare groups not to stay at home but to go out and 
vote, pointing to the various clubs that had benefited 
from new playing fields and amenities. The ALP 
campaigned particularly vigorously in the areas where 
flat development was an issue.
In the other two wards, this sort of polarisation 
between candidates was not evident. In the East Ward, 
there were no officially endorsed ALP candidates, whilst 
there was one in the North Ward who was in fact elected 
on the preferences of a sitting independent alderman.
The campaigns were notable for a lack of major issues 
and it was hard to distinguish candidates on this score.
In each ward, the results were dominated by a sitting 
independent polling approximately 50 per cent of the vote, 
both had been noted for their assiduous attention to 
local groups and organisations in the preceding years and 
both were able to muster a large personal following.
The campaign organisation of the Progressive
Independents depended on individual candidates recruiting
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helpers from amongst personal friends; many were former 
helpers, forming a core of close supporters. In the 
South Ward in particular, the candidates depended on 
propaganda rather than personal contact and active 
campaigning. As one candidate put it —
I can usually get 20 per cent, my running
mate about 30 per cent, that's good enough,
so campaigning too hard isn’t too important.^
In fact they both received less than 15 per cent in 1971» 
attributable perhaps to the fact that they didn’t engage in 
enough 'fence-mending’. In contrast, Keenan, who polled 
50 per cent in the North Ward ran a highly organised 
campaign. A dozen close supporters organised the 
distribution of literature and the attendance of booths 
on polling day, pursued personal contacts throughout 
the ward in search of support, and undertook door—knocking. 
Keenan’s personal effort was concentrated on renewing 
contacts with local community organisations and 
acquaintances. The reliance on such contacts within 
networks of organised social and community activity was 
a common feature of many candidates' campaigns.
Although I categorised the Progressive Independents 
as a local party, individual candidates in the group 
relied heavily on personal networks of support, as well 
as on appeals for a vote for the group as a whole.
Unlike some local parties, each candidate sought to 
maximise his own primary vote. Table IV—4 presents 
some data on the extent to which candidates polled in 
varying strengths at different polling booths. This 
provides a basis for the analysis of party support,
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the 'friends—and—neighbours1 vote, or local support based
on other sorts of appeals. In each ward, the three
candidates with the highest percentage vote are shown.
The second column in the table shows the range between the
highest and lowest percentage vote at separate polling
booths (for Mcilveen 6 2 per cent and 6 per cent
respectively). Another measure of dispersion is given
in column three. This is arrived at by calculating the
standard deviation percentage vote for each candidate
and expressing it as a proportion of the mean of
percentage votes at separate booths. This mean may
differ slightly from the per cent total v o t e , due to
differences in the number of votes polled at different
booths. The coefficient of variation provides a means
of comparing the degree of dispersion from one alderman
to another, when the difference in their percentage votes
makes comparison of simple standard deviations difficult.
Table IV—4 Bankstown 1971 elections — measures of 
variation in polling strength between
different booths
% Coefficient Number
Total Range of of
Vote Variation Booths
West Mcilveen (Pi) 27.4 56 .82 14
Ward Brennan(ALP) 23.8 35 .30
Vine 20.4 48 .77
South McCormack (ALP) 20.3 23 .31 11
Ward Duncan ( PI) 
Parker (Pl)P
15.4 15 .27
14.5 14 .26
East Lockwood 
Peffer P
45.6 38 .35 10
W ard 18.5 16 . 26
McDonald 14.6 31 .74
N or th Ke enan 51.0 57 .32 14
Ward Bowman (ALP) 17.4 21 -37
Wood 13.3 47 1.04
PI Progressive Independent
Unsuccessful candidate s (eliminated on preferenc
Source: Council election returns
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Variations in support from one booth to another were 
in some cases extreme 0 The major factor in this was the 
considerably higher support received by candidates in 
booths in their home suburbs, or near their place of 
business. Figure IV—i shows this for the aldermen that 
topped the poll in each ward. The map shows place of 
residence, and where relevant, place of business, and 
records the difference (plus or minus) between the 
percentage vote polled at each booth and the percentage 
polled as a whole by the candidate. The falling away 
of support for Keenan and Lockwood in the North and 
East Wards at booths distant from their home suburbs is 
quite striking. Keenan’s best support came in four 
booths grouped closely around his home and his shop.
The smallest variation in support in Figure IV—1 
was shown by McCormack in the South Ward. As Table IV—4 
shows, ALP candidates did not show the extreme variation 
of support given for some of the other candidates. This 
would be expected if they were polling a 'party vote', 
as party support at non-local elections is fairly uniform 
across the area. Nevertheless, ALP candidates still 
showed evidence of 'friends—and—neighbours' support.
Other factors were also important, though. McCormack 
polled particularly well at Revesby, where the polling 
booth was close to the Revesby Worker's Club, which had 
strong links with the ALP, and was upset by the council's 
refusal in 1969 of an application for permission to 
extend its premises. He also polled well at Padstow, 
where the ALP had attempted to exploit the flats issue.
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The fact that the Progressive Independent candidates 
polled relatively evenly seems to indicate that voters 
perceived the election to some extent in terms of the 
conflict between the two locaL parties.
A conspicuous case of localism in support occurred 
in the West Ward. The ward was divided physically 
by the Jiankstown aerodrome , and by a main road fringed 
by industrial development running alongside it and across 
the whole ward from East to West. The gap in the 
distribution of polling booths shown in Figure IV—1 , 
across the centre of the ward, shows this division.
The contrast in Table IV— k between the relative evenness 
of support for the ALP candidate, and Vine or Mcllveen, 
is striking. Mcllveen was a shopkeeper in the southern 
part of the ward, whilst Vine was a shopkeeper in the 
northern part. He polled up to 50 per cent of the vote 
in booths in his home suburb, whilst Mcllveen polled even 
better in the five booths shown in Figure IV—1, in the 
southern part of the ward. The other Progressive 
Independent candidates lived in the northern part of the 
ward. One in particular polled a strong local vote in 
his suburb, but not sufficient to win the seat*
The campaigns conducted by Vine and Mcllveen were 
directed to their own parts of the ward 0 This vote for 
the 'local man’ was due in part to overt transactional 
appeals each made to their own part of the ward. Vine 
claimed the northern part was neglected, and that Mcllveen 
had been getting a lion's share of the funds , whilst 
Mcllveen stressed his service to his own area, and
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promised specific facilities — including a new swimming 
pool — for the future. The Progressive Independents* 
newspaper claimed:
It would be reasonable to expect the mayor,
Aldo Mcllveen, to poll 80 per cent of the 
South Bankstown quota of the west ward vote, 
as he has done so much for this area,,,,*-4
The local vote for candidates was a central feature
of electoral support in Bankstown« Even for long—standing
candidates such as Mcllveen and Lockwood (first elected
1962 and 1956 respectively), the local vote was still
important. Keenan, elected for a second term in 1971
did in fact considerably increase his percentage votes
in booths throughout the ward, and his coefficient of
variation fell from .79 in 1968 to «32 in 1971* In
other words, there is evidence that he developed broader
patterns of allegiance across the ward, in the course of
his three year's incumbency. However, his local vote
was still a very significant part of his total support and
the appeals he made throughout the ward were in part of
the same specific transactional type as those that were
often associated with support for a candidate in his own
suburb. The Progressive Independents relied to a
considerable extent on such appeals, coupled to the names
of locally based candidates who fought their own parochial
campaigns, and the ALP was also drawn into this arena of
distributive politics. The campaign themes reflected
the pattern of local politics as a whole, which was not
centrally concerned with issues that affected broad sectors
of the electorate Local party competition on the basis
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of such broad issues was probably only secondary in 
determining patterns of support for most candidate.
2. LIVERPOOL
At the 1971 election the ALP increased the strength
of its contingent on the council from six to seven,
although it only polled 31 per cent of the vote. Its
seats were won by means of astute preference arrangements.
In each ward the contest was dominated by competition
between Labor and anti—Labor teams. The campaign was
on occasions rancorous, but apart from one case in the
East Ward referred to below, there was a marked lack of
issues of substantive policy to distinguish one team
from another. The ’enemy’ was seen purely in party
political terms in the campaign themes employed.
Anti—Labor teams condemned the caucus system and the
harm party politics (i.e. the ALP) did to local government
They stressed their 'business-like* approach to efficient
administration and sound management. Labor party campaign
literature appealed primarily to the party supporter.
The independent teams were accused of being 'Liberals in
disguise', as some were in fact members of the Liberal
Party. Voters were warned —
Will they represent your point of view? Will 
they run Liverpool like the Libs in Canberra?
Labor is a political party pledged to aid the 
family and working man and in no other form of 
government can so much day—to—day assistance 
be given as in Local Government. ^
The ALP teams did claim that they were more concerned 
with the provision of amenities for residents, such as 
sporting fields, swimming pools, and so on, and pointed to
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their achievements over the past few years in this regard: 
a new swimming pool in Green Valley, unprecedented 
expenditure on sports facilities, and so on. One or two 
independent candidates did make some contrast in stressing 
first and foremost the need to curb rate increases.
However', all teams made competing promises to provide 
specific facilities to particular suburbs — a new baby 
health centre, more playing fields, and so on. On this 
score they were hard to distinguish: competition for
votes took the form of attempting to out—bid opponents 
in appealing to highly specific parochial interests.
One conspicuous case occurred in the East Ward, where 
a large number of Moorebank residents had protested 
vigorously over a proposed industrial development in part 
of their suburb. The council had opposed the development, 
although it conformed with zoning requirements, and none 
of the candidates were prepared to oppose local sentiment 
publicly. Candidates were reduced to attacking their 
opponents’ sincerity on the matter. An unsigned letter 
was delivered to letter boxes in the district alleging 
that one independent alderman in fact supported the 
project, and accusing him and his running mate of not 
being fully behind local opinion. The latter, having 
topped the poll in that part of the ward with 30 per cent 
of the vote in 1968, polled only 10 per cent in the same 
area in 1971» whilst his overall vote remained about 
25 per cent. Both narrowly lost their seats.
Most candidates, whether Labor or non—Labor, stressed 
their personal record and qualifications. Leading Labor
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candidates in the North and East Wards put advertisements 
in the paper stressing their personal records without 
mention of their party affiliation, to supplement the 
official Labor campaigns. The North Ward candidate 
was very active in the sporting community, and his 
half—page newspaper advertisement depicted him in his 
track-suit presenting a cup to a local team of infant 
sportsmen. The text stressed his record on the council 
in getting more funds for North WTard sports facilities.
The East Ward candidate stressed the many battles that 
he had fought for individuals who had come up against 
implacable and unswerving local and State bureaucrats, 
adopting as his motto -
Let's be fair dinkum, cut the red tape, and
get things done III!
Voters in all wards were asked to 'Vote for Jo e ' , or 
'Frank', or 1G u s '. This characteristic personal touch 
was reflected in the local neighbourhood support that 
many of the candidates polled.
Table IV—5 shows the same measures of variation in 
support for Liverpool that were used for Bankstown.
A notable feature is that ALP candidates showed nearly 
as much variation in votes polled as non-Labor candidates, 
reflecting the importance of the personal campaigns some 
conducted. These variations are again explicable largely 
by the influence of place of residence on voting support. 
Durrant, the Labor candidate in the North Ward, polled 
73 per cent of the vote at Warwick Farm booth, nearest 
his home suburb. Napier in the South Ward polled 
44 per cent of the vote at Lurnea in the booth nearest
lül
hi.s home. In both wards, there are problems in using 
figures from aLi of the booths. In the North Ward, 
one booth on the fringe of the urban area showed a polL 
of 17b votes, of which 144 (82 per cent) were for
Oliveri; Durrant polled nil. The booth was near 
Oliveri1s home and adjacent to a bus depot and a 
speedway track both owned by him. This was an interesting 
case of the 'politics of acquaintance'. This booth 
rather distorts the total picture of polling in the Ward. 
Both Durrant and Oliveri polled relatively evenly in 
the residential suburbs of the Green Valley Housing 
estate, where the major part of the ward's electors 
lived.
Table IV—5 Liverpool 1971 elections — measures of 
variation in polling strength between 
different booths
1° Coefficient Number
Total Range of of
Vote Variation Booths
East Card ^ 24.9 18 .33 7
Ward Smi th 21.2 25 .^3
Bradshaw (ALP) 17.6 19 .35
Coco P 9.7 36 .88
N or th Oliveri 30.4 71 .83 11
W ard Durrant (ALP) 27.3 73 .56
Sadler ^ 8.8 13 .59
Heyhoe ^ 8.3 24 .83
S ou th Napier (ALP) 29.2 33 .42 12
W ard McCarthy 20.1 27 .47
Galuzzo ^ 12.8 31 .56
Chapman 10.4 82 1.31
<6 Unsuccessful candidatesi (eliminated on preference:
Source:Council election returns.
In the South Ward, a similar problem arises in that 
Chapman polled a large proportion of his vote in the 
outlying rural villages of the Ward. In Bringelly, where
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he was Chairman of the Progress Association he polled 
83 per cent, or 99 votes out of 120. The small numbers 
polLed at these outlying booths makes the use of this 
data difficult. Removing four rural booths from the 
series, the coefficients of variation for the remaining 
candidates becomes: Napier, .27; McCarthy, *37»
Galuzzo, .45. Support for the ALP, and for McCarthy,
their major opponent, was thus distributed more evenly 
than Table IV—5 might suggest.
The 1971 elections in Liverpool underlined the 
inability of the ALP to poll the proportion of the vote 
they polled at non—local elections. Whilst ALP 
candidates did rely heavily on appeals to the party 
supporter, several also conducted personal campaigns, 
appealing directly to particular sectors of the community, 
or trying to mobilise a personal following. It may be 
that for party candidates, personal acquaintance provides 
the spur for a party supporter to cast a vote, but the 
74 per cent that Durrant polled in his own suburb suggests 
that his personal following was to some extent 
independent of party allegiance. This sort of personal 
support was evident for non-Labor candidates, and it 
seems likely that this factor accounts to a large extent 
for the ability of non—Labor candidates to do so well in 
terms of votes polled.
3. KU—RING—GAI
The 19b8 and 1971 elections in Ku—ring-gai were 
dominated by a local party concerned with preventing rate 
increases« Candidates endorsed by the Ku—ring—gai
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Ratepayers Committee won a 7—5 majority in 1968 on a 
promise to ‘peg the rates’ for three years, a promise 
which they kept. Ratepayer candidates also won a 
majority in 1971« In 1968 and 1971 1 the Ratepayers 
Committee distributed common campaign literature for its 
endorsed candidates and held public meetings in their 
support. individual candidates also conducted their own 
campaigns in their respective wards, but the promise not 
to increase the rates was the major plank in their 
platforms•
The polarisation that occurred as a result of this 
campaign led to significant changes in the character 
of electoral poLitics. The aldermen under attack in the 
1968 elections were mostly of long service, some of them 
with close links with local community organisations, 
particularly neighbourhood progress associations. Their 
approach to council policy was based on the notion that 
Ku-ring-gai was a special municipality of high status 
residential suburbs that deserved the best in services 
and amenities. in this attitude they mirrored the 
approach of progress associations whose major aim was 
to obtain more and better services for their immediate 
neighbourhood. All progress associations publicly 
opposed the Ratepayers Committee. Not only did the 
Ratepayers campaign challenge traditional policy goals, 
they seemed to herald a new political style. The 
Ratepayers Committee was branded with a ’Faceless Men' 
image, and Ratepayers candidates were criticised for 
making rash promises that they might not be able to keep.
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It was argued that candidates at elections should not go 
’politicking’$ the only promise they should make is to 
•follow their conscience’ and ’act in the public good’, 
and the only outside influence they should be beholden to 
is the community at large, not sectional interests within 
it „
Other appeals of sitting aldermen to voters were 
the same as they had made in past years. They sought 
to mobilise personal followings and exploit personal 
networks of acquaintance, particularly in their own 
neighbourhoods. Apart from the sorts of themes referred 
to above, their campaign literature listed their 
’qualifications’ and their record of activity in 
’community service’. The difference in the patterns 
of support received by these aldermen, and by the 
Ratepayers candidates, is indicated by Table IV—6 which 
shows measures of variation in local support for 
candidates who polled best at the 1968 elections. The 
most extreme variations of the support were for 
non—Ratepayers candidates, and although some of the 
Ratepayers candidates did show quite marked local 
variations, the difference between the two sets of 
candidates is seen by calculating the mean coefficient of 
variation for each group. For the Ratepayers candidates 
it was .28, for the rest, .55*
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Table 1V-6 Ku-ring—gai 1968 elections — measures of
variation in polling strength between
different booths
Coefficient Number
Total Range of of
Vote Variation Booths
Wahroonga Turner (r ) 38.9 20 .17 7
Ward Ache son 20.6 23 .33Basto (r ) 11 «8 16 .38
Pymble— Rickard 30»5 39 .47 8
St Ives Bennett (r ) 22.8 34 .44
Ward Mason 17.7 44 1.07
Gordon- McMillan (r ) 33.7 21 .26 7
Killara Harris P 20.5 20 .36
Ward McDonald $ 16.2 34 .76
Roseville Kartzoff (r ) ** 38.4 21 .17 6
Ward White 23.0 33 .41
Robins 20.2 20 .43
R
4
Ratepayers Candidate
unsuccessful candidates (eliminated on preferences)
Source: Council election returns»
Support for all candidates shows evidence of a
'friends—and—neighbours* voting pattern. However, the 
Ratepayers electoral appeal was a broad one and succeeded
in cutting across the traditional patterns of local allegiance 
for sitting candidates. These differences are well 
illustrated in Table IV—'7, which shows the percentage vote 
polled by each of the candidates at each booth in two of the 
four wards, and indicates booths located nearest candidates' 
home s.
The relationship between place of residence and a high 
percentage vote is evident for all candidates, but least for 
the Ratepayers candidate McMillan. It is most marked 
amongst the candidates opposing the Ratepayers team. The 
variation in Mason's vote was remarkable. The ward 
straddled the Pacific Highway, which runs down the centre 
of the municipality on a ridge that provides a marked
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division into eastern and western suburbs«, Mason's support
came from the suburbs to the west of the Highway, where
he lived. It is notable that Bennett polled worst where
the other candidates had their personal followings0 In
Gordon-Killara Ward, Harris and MacDonald were officials
of two local progress associations, and their support
reflects the suburbs in which these associations were
located (booths 12 and 14 respectively).
Table IV—7 Ku-ring—gai 1 8  elections — percentage
votes polled at each booth by candidates 
in two wards
Pymble—St Ives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
Rickard 18 50 29 27 11 iz 13 4l 3 O . 5Bennett (r ) 30 17 21 46 16 12 16 30 22.8Mason 24 3 3 4 itz 3 18 3 17 «7
Gordon-Killara 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total
McMillan (r ) 4l 35 23 32 32 28 5k 35.7Harris 17 18 13 29 2Q 19 9 20.5MacDonald 11 6 4 8 12 32 16 16.2
R - Ratepayers Candidates
Underlining of figures indicates for each candidate the 
two booths nearest his/her home address.
Source: Council election returns.
The 1968 election was a defeat for the progress 
associations. In 19719 the neighbourhood parochialism 
which they fostered, and which was an important part of 
the traditional pattern of electoral support, was even less 
of an influence. Only three members of the pre—l.968 
council who had been targets of the Ratepayers Committee 
campaign stood. In most wards there were only four or five 
candidates for the two seats: candidates endorsed by the
Ratepayers Committee and an opposing team. Once again 
the campaign was concerned largely with the issue of the
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rate. The polarisation that had occurred over this issue, 
and the absence of parochial issues and neighbourhood—based 
candidates, was indicated by the much greater evenness of 
support for the major candidates. The mean coefficient 
of variation for the Ratepayers candidates was .14, and 
for their opponents .20. Some of the levelling out in 
overall support can be attributed to the redrawing of 
ward boundaries. The new wards were smaller and account 
was taken of the Pacific Highway as a major boundary 
between local communities. One further influence may 
have helped produce a more uniform pattern of support 
in one ward at least. .In Gordon Ward, the candidates 
successfully opposing the Ratepayers aldermen were strongly 
supported by the local Liberal Party. Leaflets were 
circulated in which their candidacies were endorsed by 
the local Liberal Party Parliamentarians, and they 
received support from the local party branches. This 
had little to do with the issue of the rate, but seems 
to have been a reaction against these aldermen for playing 
leading roles in several issues in which the council had 
been in dispute with the Liberal State Government. Apart 
from purely local issues of embarrassment to State 
Government departments, the council had been a leader in 
lobbying among local, councils on broad environmental 
issues, critical of the government and seeking changes
2 6in legislation relating to conversation and pollution.
The 1968 and 1971 elections saw important political, 
changes in Ku-ring—gai. The pattern of neighbourhood
personal support was broken down by a local party appealing
108
at a more impersonal level on the basis of a widely felt
municipality—wide issue - the level of the rate«,t
NORTH SYDNEY
As in Ku-ring-gai, local issues dominated the 1.971 
elections in North Sydney. Two opposing municipality—wide 
local parties reflected the polarisation of the 1968—71 
council on the issue of flat development. One party 
called itself ’Resident Action’, and was based on a 
coalition of local neighbourhood residents5 groups that 
had been formed in the preceding years over protests 
against the effect of high-density flat development on 
the character of residential areas. Their campaign was 
aimed at mobilising support from existing residents on 
this issue. The opposing group was the North Sydney 
Citizen's Group, whose candidates were largely local 
businessmen. One half of the Resident Action candidates 
were women, and most of them had come into local politics 
through residents' groups. The Resident Action campaign 
attempted to emphasise the polarisation of interests over 
the flats issue. The campaign leaflet for their candidates 
in Kirribilli Ward opened with the statements ’Some 
developers don’t want these people on the North Sydney 
Council'. One of the candidates was quoted prominently 
in a leaflet as sayings 'You can’t give up. It's a 
constant fight - the developers against us — the peopLe'.
The Citizen's Group denied strongly that they represented 
developers' interests, but they accused aldermen who stood 
as Resident Action candidates for their "inconsistencies'
in administering planning regulations, their unwillingness
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to accept the advice of their planning staff, and the 
expense to ratepayers in court costs incurred by the 
council« The council frequently appeared before the 
Land and Valuation Court to defend council decisions 
refusing approval for particular developments against 
which appeals were lodged by the developers0 The Citizen's 
Group warned of the dangers of control by the council of 
'minority' interests and 'sectional pressure groups’«,
They attempted to raise new issues, such as the financial 
management of the council, to combat the broad appeal of 
the Resident Action campaign« They claimed to have the 
skills to be more efficient administrators and managers« 
Their campaign was a costly one, relying heavily on 
printed propaganda, with supplements in local newspapers, 
plus news sheets and leaflets distributed to letter boxes«
No members of the Citizen's Group won election and 
amongst them were two sitting aldermen« The new council 
of 15 included 9 Resident Action candidates. Most of 
the rest had been sympathetic to their campaign. Given 
the nature of the campaign, and the stress by each of the 
major groups on broad local issues, one would expect 
candidates to have polled relatively evenly amongst 
electors in each ward. Employing the same measures of 
variation of voting support used for previous councils, 
for the three candidates who topped the poll in each ward, 
the mean coefficient of variation for the ten local party 
candidates (of whom eight were Resident: Action) was .24, 
and for the remaining five non-party candidates, «5 0 ®
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The sorts of factors that seem to account for the 
difference are illustrated by Table IV—8 . Of the 
candidates in Tunks and Bel.more Wards the highest 
variations in support occurred for three non-party 
candidates - Fitzpatrick, Brunton and Hutley. They 
polled exceptionally well in the booths in their own suburbs 5 
Hutley and Brunton were both local shopkeepers, in these 
respective suburbs, whilst Fitzpatrick as a medical 
practitioner had opportunities to build up a large network 
of acquaintanceship in the locality» These three were 
long standing aldermen. The variations in support for 
Resident Action candidates in these wards also seems to 
correspond to distance from place of residence, but the 
variations are not nearly so marked.
Table IV—8 North Sydney 1971 elections — percentage
vote s polled by candidates at separate booths
Tunks Ward 1 2 3 4 Total
Fitzpatrick 19 42 2 2 47 30
Ambler (RA) 2 2 2 6 1 2 1 2 23Brunton 2 19 9 2 0
Belmore Ward 1 2 3 4 Total,
Goddard (RA) 25 21 32 19 25
0 * Dea 26 1 0 2 2 3 0 2 0
Hutley 16 46 4 14 2 0
Kirribilli Ward 1 2 3 Total
Hamilton (RA) 29 32 2 1 28
King (RA) 15 49 4o 24Woodward ’RA) 25 2 0 23 22
Halvorsen (NSCG) 21 24 1,4 18
RA - Resident Action
NSCG — North Sydney Citizen’s Group
Underlining shows booth nearest home of candidate
Source % Council election returns
Ill
In Kirribilli Ward, however, there was one notable exception. 
King polled exceptionally well in the locality in which she 
was president of the local residents8 group and where she 
had been very active in local issues. The other two 
Resident Action candidates and the Citizen's Group 
candidate all polled relatively evenly§ in fact, all 
three lived outside the ward.
The situation in North Sydney was similar to that 
in Ku-ring-gai, in that local party activity based on 
broad local issues cut across other sorts of vote-winning 
methods, notably the personal following of long standing 
aldermen in their own localities. In some cases, these 
followings were enough to ensure their re-election, whilst 
sitting aldermen who had become aligned with the losing 
party and who had previously relied to a large extent on 
this sort of personal support were defeated.
5 . LEICHHARDT
The I97I elections saw the defeat of the Labor majority, 
taking the council out of Labor Party control for the first 
time since the formation of the municipality by the 1.9^8 
boundary revisions. The ALP topped the poll in only two 
out of the six wards and won only four of the twelve seats. 
This reversal had been forshadowed in 1968 when the 
Balmain—Leichhardt Labor Party, organised by two former 
ALP aldermen who had been expelled from the party in I967 
for disobeying a caucus ruling over an issue that vitally 
affected Balmain, had made large inroads into the Labor 
vote. However, they only won the Balmain seats, the ALP 
elsewhere being able to maintain a lead in primary votes
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sufficient for the preferential system to elect full teams
of candidates. The 1971 anti-Labor campaign was led by
others, although the Balmain aldermen were left to fight
their own campaign in their ward. The new anti-Labor
organisation contested all other wards and adopted the
name of Campaign for a Better Council (CBC),
The CBC qualifies to be labelled a local party on
a number of grounds. Regular meetings of candidates
and campaign organisers were held in the weeks and months
prior to the election to discuss strategy and to organise
the production and distribution of campaign literature.
They raised common funds largely through public appeals
to individuals, so that funds were drawn from a large
number of small contributors, and pooled these financial
resources for advertising, printing, and so on. Equally
important was the pooling of campaign experience and
political ’know-how’. Typical of their application to
detail, as well as their view of the opposition, were
the efforts made to combat any electoral malpractices
such as double voting or ’ballot-box stuffing’. The
rolls were combed to challenge names of dead people,
and before the election a detailed list of instructions
was given to scrutineers in the polling booths on measures
28to be taken to prevent any malpractices.
The CBC adopted a common platform aimed at 
capitalising on a perceived general disenchantment with 
the Labor regime. They attempted to crystallise this 
by their description of the Labor council as ’arrogant’ 
and ’dictatorial’, and the claim that it was unwilling
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to listen to the opinions of residents« They promised 
a more ’open’ style of government that particularly took 
account of the protests or opinions of residents and 
encouraged their participation« An interesting variation 
on this theme was the promise to employ foreign language— 
speaking officials to act as interpreters for the migrant 
community, particularly the Italians«
Coupled with these appeals were promises to 
concentrate on preserving or enhancing residential amenity 
by providing more parks and play areas, planting trees, 
putting the interests of residents ’before the interests 
of land developers’, and vigorously opposing proposals 
of the Department of Main Roads to build two expressways 
that cut broad swathes through residential areas right 
across the municipality. Appeals were made to various 
community organisations, by promising more involvement 
in community activities and welfare services of various 
sorts, particularly in old people’s welfare and pre-school 
and youth facilities.
The CBC campaign was helped by a sympathetic local
and metropolitan press. Three local newspapers supported
the CBC campaign. One, ’The Glebe’, conducted a
particularly virulent campaign using a highly colourful.
and readable style of ’muck—raking' journalism. Like
the CBC campaign, ’The Glebe’ concentrated on the theme
of ’arrogance’, but coupled it with accusations of
corruption. Cases in which the council was imputed to
have acted corruptly were documented, however flimsy the 
29evidence. Stories of local residents who complained
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of being treated unfairly were given prominence0 Continual 
reference was made to a number of past issues that had 
attracted widespread press attention. One story, given 
prominent coverage in the metropolitan press, concerned 
the issuing of firearms to the council’s by-law inspectors, 
supposedly for their protection in performing their 
enforcement duties, such as patrolling public lavatories 
at night. ’The Glebe’ welcomed the defeat of the ALP 
with the headlines; ’Gun Law Ends*. A further issue 
that had attracted considerable press and television 
publicity over the preceding three years and had concerned 
the proprietor of ’The Glebe’ personally, involved the 
council’s treatment of the managers and tenants of an 
Old Men’s Home in Glebe, inherited from the City Council.
The council was eager to be rid of the responsibility of 
the establishment and finally handed it over to the 
Balmain Hospital0 The manager had made accusations of 
corruption in the administration of the home and had 
been dismissed. The manager, with the support of the 
inmates, staged a ’take-over’, and opposed moves to have 
the home transferred to the hospital, or to any other 
institution. Partly to gain support, he began production 
of ’The Glebe’. On several occasions the council 
attempted to forcibly take possession of the Home from 
the inmates, who had barricaded themselves in, and violence 
flared on a number of occasions, notably when the deputy 
mayor was assaulted at a meeting outside the Home« The 
Balmain aldermen took up the inmates’ cause, and provided 
more excellent ’copy’ for the metropolitan press when the
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mayor called the police to a council meeting to forcibly 
eject one of them during a debate on the Home«,
Little, if any, of the extensive press and television 
coverage of Leichhardt council affairs could be said to 
have favoured the council. A final pre-election episode 
added a Gilbertian flavour to the campaign. The council 
organised an impressive ceremony to unveil a plaque 
commemorating the completion of the new municipal 
library. This fulfilled a promise made in the I.968 
elections. No amount of bunting or union jacks could 
hide the fact that the building was nowhere near completion, 
and a television crew was on hand to film the builders 
recommencing their work on the structure after the pomp 
and ceremony were over.
In the separate wards CBC candidates waged their 
own campaigns. In Glebe, both candidates were members 
of the Glebe Society, and one had long been active in 
community welfare activities, particularly with old 
people. The membership of the Glebe Society provided 
a large and well organised team of campaigners who 
engaged in door—knocking, street campaigning and 'letter­
box stuffing’ many weeks before the election,, Local, 
issues with which the Society had been concerned figured 
prominently in the campaign. In other wards, candidates 
likely to attract personal following from similar community 
organisations stood. In Leichhardt Ward, the CBC 
candidate was the one sitting non-Labor alderman outside 
Balmain Ward, and he conducted his own traditional 
campaign that had won him a strong personal following
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over several elections. He stressed his record of 
'approachability', and the personal help he had given 
people who had come to him. He stressed other campaign 
issues, such as the level of the rate. He organised 
the postal vote, polling 100 out of 150 in his ward, 
enabling him to lead his Labor opponents by this margin.
In response to this concerted challenge, the Labor 
candidates relied very largely on their traditional 
campaigning style. Their campaign literature stressed 
the ’Vote Labor' appeal, and they showed a reluctance 
to engage in debate over the local issues raised by 
the C B C , except to promise 'more of the same', pointing 
to achievements of the recent past such as the swimming 
pool and the new library. They did publish and 
circulate to every letter box their own newspaper to 
combat 'The Glebe', but the contrast in style and 
content probably did them more harm than good. A hint 
of desperation appeared when they claimed in this 
newspaper that the CBC campaign was 'Communist inspired'. 
The attempt to appeal to the party voter was epitomised 
by the appearance of hastily stenciled posters on 
election eve clandestinely posted up in Glebe, their 
authorship unacknowledged, smearing the CBC candidates 
by naming them under a banner of 'Vote Liberal'. Labor 
candidates in some wards were confident on election eve 
that the traditional election day activities of the party 
faithfuls in door—knocking and driving supporters to the 
polls had gained them enough votes for victory. One 
of their miscalculations may have been in thinking that 
these 'supporters' had in fact cast their votes for them.
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Table IV—9 shows the extent in decline of Labor 
support at the 1968 and 1971 elections„ In 1968 the 
decline was particularly marked in Balmain and Rozelle, 
where the Balmain—Leichhardt Labor Party was most active 
and also where the sorts of social changes discussed in 
Chapter 11 were most evident. In 1971 the decline was 
most marked in Glebe, where these changes had taken 
place, involving the new middle class residents in 
local politics through the formation of local groups.
It was in Balmain and Glebe that the leading anti—Labor 
candidates polled best in 1971? 54 per cent and 51 per cent 
respectively. The fairly even decline in other wards 
indicates the success of the CBC in mobilising a 
widespread dissatisfaction with the Labor regime«
Table IV—9 Percentage Labor Vote by Wards, Leichhardt
1965 1968 1971
Annandale
Balmain
Glebe
Leichhardt 
Lilyfield 
Rozelle
57 ° 5
62.0
59.3
67.6
86.8
52o5
24.2 
75.0
45.9
46.3 
54.8
45.3
33.8 
42.6
37.8
37.9 
42.2
N.B. Percentage formal vote is shown. The Labor
vote comprises votes cast for all candidates on 
the Labor ticket.
Source: Council election returns«
The election was very largely conducted and perceived 
as a two-party competition. There were other candidates, 
but with one or two exceptions they polled little support« 
The domination of the elections by the two parties is shown 
in the large share of the total votes they polled between 
them (column 1, Table IV—1 0 )e The Table also shows the
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evenness of support for the party candidates, further 
evidence of the widespread salience of the issues raised.
There is little, if any, evidence of the phenomenon 
of the 1 friends—and—neighbours' vote for most of the 
party candidates. The variations in support were the 
lowest for any of the councils and did not correspond 
as closely as in other councils with proximity to home 
address. Only in Lilyfield and Annandale did individual 
non-party candidates poll significantly more than 
10 per cent of the vote. In Lilyfield, one polled 
18.6 per cent, and in Annandale one polled 16.2 per cent. 
Their respective coefficients of variation were .4l 
and .36, considerably higher than the average for the 
party candidates (.17). Their support depended much 
more on a 'friends—and—neighbours* vote, in the absence 
of any identification with the major contestants in the 
election. In Annandale, however, the candidate did 
draw support across the ward away from the CBC, as he 
stood on a similar anti—Labor platform.
The * traditional * Labor vote in council elections 
in Leichhardt did seem to be largely an expression of 
party support by a proportion of the electorate who 
voted Labor at non-local elections. The only occasions 
on which the party vote dropped well below that normally 
polled in non-local elections were when local issues 
were prominent in creating an anti—Labor feeling. This 
had been the case in 1956, in the first elections after 
the dismissal of the Labor council and sensational 
revelations of corruption. It was, as we have seen,
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the case in 1 9 6 8  and 1 9 7 1 * On other occasions,
fluctuations in support at each election from ward to
ward followed the general pattern of support for the
Labor Party exhibited in different subdivisions in
Federal elections. Thus in Table IV—9, the exceptionally
high Labor vote in Rozelle was a regular feature, and
this reflected the steady 80 per cent Labor vote at
Federal elections since 1955 in the Rozelle subdivision.
Table 1V-10 Leichhardt 1971 Elections - measures of 
variation in support for candidates at 
separate polling booths
* Coefficient NumberTotal Range of of
Vote Variation Booths
Annandale Wilson(ALP) 3 8 . 4 12 .12 4
Ward Waterson(CBC)P 24.3 12 .19
Balmain Criglass 54.3 13 .09 4Ward Hoy (ALP)P 29 0 3 1 6 . 2 6
Glebe Young (CBC) 5 1 . 8 19 . 11 6
Ward McMahon(ALP)^ 3 9 . 4 11 .09
Leichhardt Dougherty ( CBC,) 44.0 10 .10 6
Ward Newton (ALP)P 3 5 . 6 15 .23
Lilyfield Mcllveen (CBC) 3 6 . 7 23 . 21 5
Ward Rodwell (ALP) 35.2 17 .17
Rozelle Casey (ALP) 40.1 19 . 20 4
Ward Bray (CBC) 39.7 21 .20
* unsuccessful candidates
Source: Council election return •
6 . BURW00D
The 1971 election in Burwood, as in most previous 
years, was marked by low-key campaigns, a lack of local 
issues that polarised candidates, and the absence of local 
parties. ALP candidates stood in each of the wards, as 
in past elections, providing the only spark of
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competitiveness to the public campaign. in the East Ward
there had been a marked stability in incumbency, with
two aldermen standing undefeated for over twenty years,
during which time the total of thirty six vacancies at
nine elections were filled by only nine different people.
At the 1971 elections the four sitting aldermen formed
an electoral alliance, and between them polled sufficient
votes to put the issue beyond doubt. The lack of sharp
public conflict in this campaign reflected one alderman’s
comment on elections in Burwood —
I have never known any election where one 
candidate criticised another»,„
...apart from the ’Labor' label there is little 
to distinguish one group from another. 30
And as one other alderman put it —
Perhaps half the vote is for the political 
label, the other half is for the personality — 
a bit of local colour...what else have you 
got to draw them out? There’s nothing 
contentious, there isn't any issue — except 
perhaps the rate, and the ’hole in the road 
outside my front gate' sort of thing - that's 
all. 31
The tendency for ALP members to stand as independents 
was noted earlier in the chapter. In the West Ward, the 
mayor and his 1 running—mate' were both prominent ALP 
members, and past candidates for State and Federal seats 
in the Burwood area, but they stood as the 'Mayoral Team' 
as independents. Their campaign steered clear of issues, 
apart from promising more services and a greater concern 
for 'social welfare* matters, while pledging not to 
increase rates in 1972. They concentrated on the Mayor's 
record, his personal achievements, his 'progressive 
approach' and his record as a 'sound administrator'0
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ALP teams tended to rely on stressing the party label 
and made little effort to arouse interest in local issues, 
Candidates’ election literature and newspaper advertisements 
stressed their personal qualities and qualifications rather 
than issues.
Figure IV—2 does show some evidence of a ’friends— 
and—neighbours’ effect in candidate support. The maps 
show differences in support for the two who topped the 
poll in each ward. Because of the small size of the 
wards, extreme localism of the type found in Bankstown 
might not be expected, but there is still evidence that 
support for some candidates decreased with distance 
from the neighbourhood of residence. This is particularly 
noticeable in the support received by Newey in the North 
Ward, and Reed in the East, in the booths closest to 
their homes. In Newey’s case, he ran a tobacco kiosk 
within ’hailing distance’ of the polling booth. O ’Neil 
and Sutherland both polled best in the southern part 
of the West Ward where they lived. O ’Neil was the ALP 
candidate, but in fact showed the greatest variation 
between booths of any of the candidates in the West Ward.
The district was fairly homogeneous in the support offered 
the ALP at Federal elections, although the small variations 
in this support did follow the same trend as the variations 
in O ’Neil’s vote. It may be that personal acquaintance 
or knowledge of the local candidate acted as a spur to 
the party voter, who might otherwise not bother to 
register his support for the party.
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FIGURE 2. BURWOOD 1971 ELECTIONS
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In Burwood, the absence of major local issues and 
local parties was matched by the reliance of most candidates 
on their personal reputation and on networks of personal 
relationships with voters. When three or four hundred 
primary votes were enough to gain election, winning support 
on a face to face basis with acquaintances was a viable 
proposition.
CONCLUSION
We have seen how in different local areas elections
were decided on very different issues, and votes won by
a wide variety of means. It remains to be seen to what
extent the politics of winning elections reflect
characteristics of local politics as a whole. There
are a number of ways in which one might expect this to
be the case. Elected politicians may feel constrained
or obliged to fulfil obligations or promises made during
an election campaign, and to act in office in such a way
that their chances of re-election are not damaged, assuming
32they wish to gain re-election. For the groups involved
in local politics elections may provide an important means 
of attaining their ends, so that the sorts of issues raised 
and the sorts of interests expressed are likely to be those 
important in the decision making process as a whole.
Thus, electoral support built up through specific transactional
appeals entails meeting commitments in the distributive
arena of politics while in office. Debts have to be
paid and favours granted as promised. Whether or not
this sort of electoral support is important in a particular
area depends on the sorts of demands being made and the
interests expressed in local politics as a whole, not
just during the election campaign. In those councils 
where local party activity was important, the election 
provided the means of mobilising support and political 
resources behind an issue that had been important for 
some time, and a means of overcoming opposition that had 
been met in other spheres of political conflict,, The 
election of a group of candidates committed to a particular 
platform, although not necessarily immediately ’deciding’ 
any particular issue, does almost certainly have direct 
policy consequences through the fulfilling of promises 
and the desire to make changes on the part of the new 
incumbents. There are some elections that provide a 
mandate, as in the case of Ku—ring—gai, where promises 
to ’peg the rates’ were kept. These elections are often 
’single-issue' elections.
At the same time the electoral process can obfuscate 
as well as clarify issues. Candidates who win elections 
by means of support from a personal following, in elections 
that are relatively issue free, do subsequently go on to 
make policy decisions, for which the process of election 
and possibly re-election have no direct relevance. The 
same applies to candidates elected on the Labor Party vote, 
and even for those elected on the basis of an anti-Labor 
sentiment. For these candidates, elections don't involve 
policy issues. in the distributive arena, it does not 
necessarily matter what the cumulative effect of separate 
favours is, nor does it matter in most cases for the 
recipients who else has been granted favours. The elected
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representative is only ’accountable’ by individuals for 
fulfilling particular obligations made separately, and 
independent of other obligations. Thus for instance, 
he may grant favours not only to particular streets of 
residents wishing to prevent development, but also to 
property developers seeking development approval in other 
parts of the ward where neighbours do not protest. While 
broader issues ought to be involved, in an electoral 
contest where the issues are distributive and in a local 
polity where this is normal, they are irrelevant. Thus, 
a whole range of decisions can be made without regard to 
some of the possible issues involved and without fear of 
the electoral sanction on these issues.
Elections raise only a limited range of issues.
Some groups seek to achieve their ends outside the electoral 
arena, and often in spite of it. Candidates elected by 
means of particular vote winning strategies may pursue 
policies completely irrelevant to these strategies.
Thus, for the Progressive Independents in Bankstown, some 
of the stands they took at various times in support of 
business interests (which will be described later) were 
not matters of important electoral impact affecting their 
chances of success. Pre —1971 'pro—development' aldermen
in North Sydney had certainly not been elected because of 
'pro—development’ platforms; for instance, some had 
personal followings. Indeed in the context of the election 
campaign the epithet ’pro-development’ was considered 
libellous. In North Sydney at least, the election did 
provide an effective means of raising an issue that had
126
formerly been decided outside the context of electoral 
politics. The same could be said in Leichhardt and 
Ku—ring—gai. Whatever one thinks of the merit of the
cases that were argued in the campaigns, at least the 
changes occurring as a result of the elections were the 
result of ’public’ rather than ’private’ politics.
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r e s i d e n t i a l  streets by c o n t r a c t o r s ’ trucks for the 
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c h a l l e n g i n g  the result of the poll in Rozelle, where 
the Labor c a n d idate won one of the two seats by  only 
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One issue w h i c h  the n e w s p a p e r  made a c c u s a t i o n s  on is 
d e s c r i b e d  in C h a p t e r  Vlll, and c o n cerns the approval 
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h o uses that h ad been a p p r o v e d  by  the council, but 
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32. Fable 111—13 showed that 'approximately 75 per cent 
of incumbents sought re-election in 1962—'71 
elections. It seems safe to assume that they 
wanted to gain re-election.
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Chapter V LOCAL INTEREST GROUPS
Contacts between members of the council and local 
community groups have been looked at in the context of the 
group membership of aldermen. That discussion provided 
some evidence of the influence of various groups in the 
local polity, when it was seen that in different areas 
the eligibility of candidates for local office seemed to 
be derived from an association with different groups: 
neighbourhood groups in North Sydney, sporting groups 
or the chamber of commerce in Liverpool, sporting groups 
plus a broad spectrum of community organisations in 
Bankstown, and so on. Most of these groups did not 
formally sponsor candidates at local elections. Whether 
they did or not, membership of these groups was seemingly 
of some assistance to aldermen in their local political 
careers. Thus, the groups involved had acquired a 
position of influence in the local polity.
Table V—1 shows the salience of local groups for 
aldermen, by showing for each category or type of group 
the number of aldermen who thought that groups in that 
category were ’prominent’ in matters of council business 
and local politics. Many of the groups named and listed 
would eschew any label that included the word ’political’. 
Sporting clubs, community service groups such as Rotary, 
Returned Servicemen’s League (RSL) Clubs, and so on, were 
concerned with local politics as a peripheral activity in 
terms of their prime stated goals as organisations. Indeed, 
these groups were less frequently involved in local politics
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than progress associations, ratepayers associations or 
chambers of commerce. Progress associations, for instance, 
were formed largely with the view of obtaining council 
services for particular suburbs or neighbourhoods. The 
groups listed in Table V—1 show those that are most overtly 
political in their aims towards the top of the list. The 
involvement of all groups in local council affairs varied 
from area to area. In general, the salience of different 
types of groups for aldermen in each council corresponds 
to the importance of these groups in the recruitment 
process (Table 111—7). We see, for instance, the 
importance of neighbourhood groups in North Sydney and 
Bankstown, the importance of the chamber of commerce in 
Liverpool and the importance of sporting clubs in Liverpool 
and Bankstown.
Neighbourhood groups received the most mention and 
were the most salient type of group in all councils except 
Burwood, where none existed, apart from ad hoc residents’ 
protest groups appearing over specific local issues and 
disbanding once these issues were resolved. Those 
neighbourhood groups named possessed a greater continuity 
of membership and activity than such ad hoc groups, common 
though the latter were in some areas.
The majority of aldermen named only groups that were 
active within their own wards. Of the groups active in 
local politics, most drew their membership from a particular 
locality, and focused their attention on the neighbourhood 
level. The focus for community group activity was the 
suburb and the neighbourhood or at most the ward rather
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than the municipality. Particularly in the larger
municipalities, the focus of their political activity was
through contact with their ward representatives.
Table V—1 The Saliency of Interest Groups for Aldermen
Type of group Number of aldermen mentioning group(s)
of each type
BA BU KU LE LI NS
Neighbourhood groups 9 0 7 4 7 10
Ratepayers Association 0 10 6 0 l 1
Chamber of commerce 0 3 4 1 6 1
Sporting clubs 8 1 3 0 6 1
Youth/welfare groups 1 0 2 0 2 2
Community service 4 1 0 0 1 0
Other * l 1 4 3 1 0None 0 0 0 2 0 0
Number of respondents 9 10 9 9 10 10
* Several groups were mentioned that fell outside 
the major categories: Parents and Citizens
Associations (one each in Bankstown and Burwood); 
Road Safety Council (one in Ku—ring-gai);
Library Association of New South Wales (three in 
Ku—ring—gai); Balmain—Leichhardt Labor Party 
(three in Leichhardt). Some aldermen also 
mentioned branches of political parties, but 
these are not included (three in Bankstown, 
one in Leichhardt and two in Liverpool).
Party branches were quite important as ’interest 
groups' in some respects, but clearly not all 
respondents would consider them in the same 
category as other local community groups and 
organisations.
Source: Questionnaire.
Personal representations of this nature were the most common 
tactic of local interest groups, whose demands were largely 
parochial. The experience of most aldermen in interest 
group politics was confined largely to their own wards, 
emphasising again the parochialism of much of local politics. 
Municipality-wide organisations were the exception rather 
than the rule, and most groups were active largely in the 
distributive arena of politics. This was not the case 
for all groups, including perhaps some of the most important
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or influential ones. The discussion of the activities 
of different sorts of interest groups that follows below 
will enlarge on these generalisations.
The archetypal neighbourhood group in local politics 
in the six areas was the progress association. They were 
largely a phenomenon of newer suburbs, as their major 
purpose was to obtain services and facilities for their own 
neighbourhood. In older suburbs, progress associations 
were not found, or if they existed, they also performed 
other functions apart from lobbying for council services 
and other facilities. Thus, some were ’output1 rather 
than ’input’ structures, helping the council run some
community facility or activity rather than making political
2demands. Some became the organisational focus for a 
broader range of community activities, such as fund raising 
for, and administration of, child—minding centres or 
kindergarten schools. In North Sydney, there were six 
active progress associations, and some were concerned with 
functions such as this rather than the traditional 
pursuits of obtaining 'essential services'. Others were 
involved in the issue of flat development, but in most 
suburbs new groups emerged over this issue, as we shall see. 
In the outer suburban councils progress associations 
abounded. There were ten in Liverpool — most of them 
in outlying villages and semi—rural areas — nine in 
Bankstown, and eleven in Ku—ring—gai. There was not one
for every suburb, but they were fairly evenly spread and
some served more than one suburb
The nature of their activities and the sorts of demands
they made in local politics are best shown by illustration.
In banks town, one of the most active progress associations
was in Panania, covering parts of the South and West Wards.
In summing up the association’s achievements of 1969 on
the occasion of its annual Christmas party, the publicity
officer thanked local aldermen and parliamentarians for
attending the function, and continued:
We feel 1969 was a good year for Panania. The 
Bank of New South Wales built such a modern building, 
the council a modern Senior Citizen's Centre, the 
dozens and dozens of jobs we asked Alderman Parker 
to attend to in the South Ward, which he did; not 
forgetting all the work we asked Alderman Mcllveen 
to attend to. 1970 promises to be a year of 
progress. Hundreds of homes should be sewered by 
the end of the year....
The council has promised us lots of kerb and 
guttering, Weston Street is now nearing completion, 
so keep your fingers crossed, it might be your 
street next.
Yes, our rates have gone up. There is nothing we 
can do about it, but you can come along to the next 
meeting...and help us see we get a fair share of 
the money spent on works in Panania. 3
Another report thanked the aldermen for taking them on a
bus tour of the municipality, and added:
Alderman Mcllveen...filled several pages of his 
notebook with our requests. In Panania, at least, 
we have genuine local government. ^
Alderman Mcllveen's attention to their requests was typical
of the attitude adopted by aldermen who saw progress
associations as vital sources of information on these sorts
of needs and demands — not only demands for facilities to
serve the suburb, but niggling complaints of residents
about the state of their street, broken kerbs and gutters,
or the state of the drains. Their function was described
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by one alderman in Bankstown:
They are concerned with local matters only — 
there is a very localised feeling in Banks town....
They are useful in bringing matters to my 
attention, they are close to the people, they 
know the problems. ^
Another saw them in the same light, but a little less 
charitably —
They are mostly only old women’s turnouts.
Someone will get up and beef about his own 
street and his own front lawn - that’s all they 
are interested in. But it all adds up, I 
suppose. 0
We have already seen evidence in Bankstown of the great 
importance of localised support for aldermen at elections, 
and it was through progress associations that some of the 
’patron—client’ relations and the electoral support 
derived from them were built up. The active membership 
of progress associations was generally small in most areas, 
but this did not diminish their ability to act as filters 
of local demands. They could become a focus for sudden 
local issues, when they called public meetings at which 
residents might appear in their hundreds rather than the 
faithful dozen or so. They were run by individuals who 
were usually well known in the neighbourhood and thus 
kept in touch with minor complaints and needs.
There were occasionally particular factors that 
diminished their effectiveness of particular associations,,
In bankstown, one or two were ’tainted’ in the eyes of 
Progressive Independent aldermen in that they were dominated 
by Labor Party sympathisers, and one suffered the even 
worse fate of being taken over by members of the Communist 
Party. The same happened to a Ratepayers Association
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in Liverpool, which was disbanded as a result of 
’infiltration’. in Ku-ring-gai, we saw in the previous 
chapter how progress associations were out of sympathy 
with the council elected in 1968. Traditionally, they 
were very active and influential, as in a wealthy area 
the availability of funds for local facilities meant that 
the prizes were greater» And Ku-ring-gai’s residents 
expected ’the best’. The Ratepayer Committee policies 
and those adopted by the council majority to restrict 
expenditure conflicted with their demands for more 
services. Members of the majority group did not rely 
on them for support:
The progress associations supported the losing 
candidates, and they will put up for election 
again. They are only small organisations.
And even if I do everything right they’ll 
oppose me. 7
The 1971 elections were notable for the lack of influence of 
progress associations in most wards.
In Ku—ring—gai, progress associations were not the only 
important neighbourhood groups. Local politics was 
distinguished by the fervour with which ad hoc groups of 
residents protested on issues that affected the amenity of 
their neighbourhoods. The siting of a rubbish dump; the 
use of residential streets by heavy traffic; commercial 
and flat developments, and other issues, produced sudden 
outbursts of local political activity from residents.
Some of the groups, such as the Northeast Wahroonga Action 
Committee, outlasted the original issues that they raised, 
and broadened their activities. In this case, the group 
became concerned with several ’conservation’ issues,
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particularly preservation of areas of natural bushland in 
the municipality, as well as the issue of the siting of a 
rubbish dump on which it fought its major initial campaign. 
The campaigns conducted by many of these groups were 
distinguished by their efficiency, their professionalism 
and their effectiveness, as well as their fervour. 
Articulate spokesmen, with well researched and well 
presented arguments, with the right ’contacts' and the 
knowledge of how to use them, were backed by attendances 
of hundreds at public meetings and petitions signed by 
thousands. Whilst these groups were concerned with 
regulative issues on occasions, their initial impetus 
almost invariably stemmed from a purely parochial interest 
in preserving the amenity of their own suburbs. To this 
extent, they were concerned with distributive issues as 
much as the progress associations. The difference came 
when they regularly found themselves arousing hostile 
opposition from developers or other residents, in which 
case the issues broadened.
The importance of sporting clubs has been noted in 
Liverpool and Bankstown in particular. In many respects, 
they were similar to progress associations in seeking 
local facilities, mostly for junior sport. Every Saturday 
in Bankstown over 10,000 children from the age of five 
upwards played organised sport, many of them using council 
facilities. They belonged to clubs organised locally, 
or played for youth club teams, and so on. Several 
service clubs took a close interest in providing finance 
and equipment for these sporting activities and for other
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youth activities. The 1 sporting lobby* was equally' 
important in Liverpool. Demands were voiced not only 
for more money for sports amenities from council funds, 
but more specifically, by individual clubs for particular 
local amenities. They were as much concerned with 
pork-barrel politics as progress associations. The same 
is true for service clubs such as Lions, Apex, and branches 
of the R SL, seeking funds for particular local amenities 
and community activities to which theyr lent support.
In Liverpool progress associations were largely' 
confined to outly'ing semi—rural areas and villages - with 
one important exception in the East Ward - but their role 
was filled to some extent in the suburbs by ALP branches.
In Bankstown as well, aldermen tended to bracket ALP 
branches and progress associations together, at least in 
those wards where the ALP was not engaged in continual 
conflict with the ward aldermen. Party branches were 
naturally of special significance to party members on 
the council. It was notable, however, that local branches 
were important for the sorts of parochial matters that 
also concerned progress associations. For most ALP 
aldermen, the party branch was a source of individual 
complaints and representations, rather than a source of 
pressure over matters of policy. In Liverpool there 
were cases of branches attempting to 'dictate* to ALP 
aldermen on matters such as the level of the rate, but 
aldermen vigorously asserted their independence in public. 
In fact, there were occasions on which such pressures were 
ignored, as when a rate increase was decided on by the
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caucus in spite of concerted pressure from the party
branches. But involvement in council policy was rare.
One ALP alderman commented:
The branch is involved all the time - but in 
parish pump stuff. if people there have a 
complaint, we take it up. They don’t take 
stands on policy matters. ®
According to the party rules, branches cannot direct
aldermen, but they can ’request’. But as one Liverpool
alderman put it 'you have to watch pre —selection’,
although he referred to his branch as 'just like any
other progress association'.
In Leichhardt, as in Liverpool, party branches filled
a similar role, although some were far more active» One
ALP alderman commented:
We look after the ward and we report to branch 
meetings, but the party doesn't control you.
Once elected you are a representative of the 
whole municipality. But you go along with 
them, you don't go being silly. But I've 
never met a branch like this one — they'll 
spend more than half a meeting questioning us 
on local matters. ^
The involvement of local branches in council affairs varied 
from branch to branch. The Lilyfield and Leichhardt 
branches tended to show a closer concern in the performance 
of aldermen than other branches. The Lilyfield branch 
registered the one recent case of the defeat of a sitting 
alderman in pre-selection, and ballots were often hotly 
contested. Some of this interest stemmed from council 
employees who were branch members, and formed an important 
pressure group within branches over local council affairs, 
usually matters of administration in which they had an 
immediate interest. The importance of the party for
i4o
Labor aldermen was expressed in the rigidity with which 
they observed the rules of caucus secrecy and solidarity. 
For many years, the local party branch had been the only 
active organisation which showed concern over council 
matters. Labor aldermen, safe in the assurance of 
re-election, so long as they obtained endorsement, 
were accountable to no—one but their branches, the party 
hierarchy, and their fellow aldermen.
This changed radically during the 1960's, and 
culminated in the election campaign of 1971 1 already 
described. New residents’ groups, notably the Balmain 
Association, the Glebe Society and the Annandale 
Association, were formed and began to raise local issues. 
Their membership was predominantly middle class, and 
their leaders mostly from professional occupations.
They sought to enhance or preserve a special sort of 
residential environment that they had found or created 
by renovation and renewal, in these traditionally working 
class suburbs. They initially showed a misplaced faith 
in calling on ’expert advice’, and employing rational 
argument and persuasion in challenging traditional 
policies and attitudes. As an official in one group 
put it:
Lou just can't seem to argue reasonably with 
them, they repeat the same old formulae according 
to what has been decided in the party room. The 
only thing that seems to move them is the 'numbers' 
in the party.
They presented a direct challenge to the Labor Party's 
traditional monopoly of local politics. They adopted 
styles of local political activity - the 'protest meeting',
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the focusing of continual attention on council affairs,
publicity campaigns, and so on — that by—passed the
traditional channels of access to aldermen, and the
accepted means of exerting influence. As one alderman
expressed it at a public council meeting:
We have this Glebe Society, and others in Balmain 
and Annandale — why do these people have to form 
an organisation, why can’t they do like everyone 
else has always done and come along with their 
complaint to the ward alderman to ask them to 
get things done for them?
These groups, in the eyes of Labor Party aldermen, were
using 'pressure tactics', or as one put it 'stand—over
tactics'. At the formation of the Annandale Association
in November 19b9, a Labor ward alderman attended the
meeting and moved an amendment to the proposed
constitution. The constitution asserted that the group
was not 'party political'. His amendment sought the
deletion of the word 'party'. He was willing to see the
Association evolve as a historical society, but not as a
pressure group. The constitution as adopted made it
clear that it was a major aim of the Association to engage
in political activity to ensure the conservation or
preservation of their suburb's existing residential
character. The Labor alderman left the meeting following
the defeat of his amendment, stating he would have nothing
12more to do with] the Association. These new groups not
only challenged council policies, they also challenged 
the accepted way of 'getting things done', that is through 
the party, or by personal contact with ward aldermen 
followed by resolution in the secrecy of the caucus room. 
It was partly because these local groups were unable to
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obtain a sympathetic hearing for their demands that they 
were unable to resolve local issues in the distributive 
arena. At the same time, it became clear that there 
were important regulative issues at stake, and as the 
conflicts broadened, so the opposition to the council 
came to be expressed in a challenge by a local party.
Both because of basic clashes of political style and 
political interest, these issues were not contained 
within the traditional pattern of distributive politics, 
in which the ward aldermen granted favours to those 
who asked ’politely’.
In North Sydney, as in Leichhardt, a new type of
local political organisation that emerged during the
1960’s induced changes in the local polity by practising
a different style of politics. As neighbourhood groups,
they sought protection for their suburbs from the effects
of flat development. Most had their beginnings in
ad hoc protest movements prompted by particular development
applications in particular streets. Initially, they
voiced demands in the distributive arena, seeking
favourable interpretations to be made of a very loose
13and unspecific set of planning regulations» In doing
so, they aroused opposition from developers, and brought 
into issue the content of the rules themselves, thus allying 
themselves with groups with similar interests to theirs 
in other suburbs. In this way they finally presented a 
direct challenge to council policies» It was this that 
really distinguished them from the typical progress 
association, although in fact some of the progress
associations also became active in voicing protests about 
flat development. However, traditional progress 
association concerns are largely matters of distributive 
politics, being purely parochial. The contrast was one 
of political style as well, rather similar to that in 
Leichhardt, in that many aldermen preferred the polite 
approach of the supplicant to the militancy of the 
pro tester.
The reaction of aldermen to these groups was mixed.
Aldermen could be divided into three categories; first,
those that were consistently opposed to the 'anti-
developer* stance of the groups and matched this with a
hostile attitude towards the groups themselves; second,
those who were relatively neutral on both accounts; and
third, those who shared the 'anti—developer' attitude
and were favourably inclined towards these groups.
We shall look more closely at the policy opinions of
aldermen as exhibited in their voting behaviour on the
council in a later chapter. The attitude of the first
category was expressed by one alderman as follows:
...you can't stop development, it's economics.
This is an old area, people are dying or moving 
out — who buys the property? - the developer, 
no—one else can afford it. You'd be bashing 
your head against a brick wall to try and stop 
it — you must develop or die. I'm not against 
development — if it must happen, we must watch 
it and guide it.
These aldermen voiced their hostility to these 'new' groups 
in several ways. They condemned their 'militancy', their 
use of 'protest meetings' and petitions, called them 
'professional trouble makers', and so on. They criticised 
them for being 'ill-informed', and for jumping In before
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they got ’all the facts’. They accused them of being
'pressure groups' and 'sectional interests', in a
pejorative sense. In several cases, they contrasted
them with progress associations:
These local pressure groups are not putting 
things fairly to the residents.8,
...their sole aim is to fight the council...
...by the subversive way they go about things, 
they get all the publicity; they consist solely 
of people with a grudge...'whingers*• Some of 
them have missed out on the big price for their 
property.
In contrast:
Progress associations have normally been 
constructive, never outlandishly 'agin* 
anything.•.
...they treat things as they come, they 
recognise the council as the responsible body.
These new groups...hit out without full knowledge 
of what the Act will allow us to do. But with 
the progress association, I go along to their 
meetings and tell them what we can do under the 
Act. Unless they can show me they are right... 
then it's not the pressure they put on that counts, 
but the weighing up of the facts. 1
These 'facts', for some, consisted of the advice of the
professional staff. It was no coincidence that opposition
to demands for 'participation' by these groups was
expressed by council officials. The Town Clerk, commented
at a council meeting on a motion vto conduct a plebiscite
over a particular development application:
It is wrong in principle to write to residents 
and ask their views in the form of a plebiscite. 
Aldermen are elected as representatives of the 
people, and this is the correct guage of public 
opinion. ^
This sort of view of the decision-making process was 
sometimes expressed by aldermen of the second category, 
who were numerically the largest. They were prepared, 
however, to accept that on occasions the residents' groups
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'had a case', but they were cautious to claim that in
recognising this, they had not been 'pressured'.
The third category was seen by the first, and some of
the second, as gutless political opportunists bowing
before minority pressures. They adopted a stance that
favoured group participation as an end in itself, or
saw themselves as spokesmen for these groups. They
were not ashamed to admit being influenced by them:
Citizens groups here are very active — and good 
luck to them...They seem more concerned with 
specific issues than - to use the right local 
government language — 'making a contribution*.
But X say that anything is a good thing which 
helps foster public interest...As an elected ^g 
politician I'd be a damned fool to ignore them.
I see myself as a spokesman for these groups.
The interests of residents come first. -*-9
As we shall see, it was the attitudes of the second category,
whose approach was largely ad hoc, that mattered when it
came to making decisions.
We have already seen the activities of the Ratepayers 
Association in Ku—ring—gai, as a local party in 1968 and 
1971* Formed in 1966 as the Ku—ring-gai Ratepayers 
Defence League in response to a proposed 30 per cent 
rate increase, it attracted one thousand people to a 
public meeting. It was led largely by retired people, 
to whom rate increases were particularly odious, as they 
were on fixed incomes. It was entirel}^ single-minded, 
concerned to castigate the council on undertaking 
extravagant projects, and on not taking into account 
'the ratepayers'. Their single-mindedness was illustrated 
when they decided not to permit membership to non- 
rate paying residents. In Burwood, the Association was
formed in similar circumstances in ± 9 6 6  but it did not go 
on to whole-heartedly participate in local elections, 
it was not so well led or supported, and its activities 
became more sporadic, and more concerned with parochial 
issues of the type progress associations were concerned 
wi th.
Both organisations were formed with the purpose of 
offering a direct challenge to major aspects of council 
policy. Aldermen treated them in this light, as a 
threat to their positions0 They were condemned in 
similar tones for ’pressure tactics’, 'misinformed 
criticism', and so on. In K u —ring—g a i , although the 
rate increase was reduced to 20 per cent as a result of 
protests, in subsequent years aldermen maintained their 
outright hostility. Part of the reason for the polarisation 
was the pressure from service—demanding progress associations, 
particularly in the newer suburbs. In Burwood, there was 
no such direct polarisation, and the Association's 
activities faded away after the first year or two of 
activity. Aldermen in 1970 did not see the Association 
as a challenge to their positions, but as a group that on 
occasions was helpful for 'bringing matters to the council's 
attention'.
So far, this discussion has been concerned with residents 
groups. The only interest groups representing 'business' 
that received a mention by aldermen in naming groups that 
were 'prominent', were local chambers of commerce. Only 
in Liverpool did a majority of respondents mention the 
chamber of commerce. The chamber in Liverpool was better
organised and more politically active than any in the other 
six areas. In Liverpool, it had achieved a very high level 
of membership amongst shopkeepers and businessmen, including 
many local industrialists. We noted in Table 111-7 that more 
aldermen belonged to the chamber than on any other council.
In fact, alL five of the non—Labor respondents were members. 
This was an indication of its status. In contrast, in 
iiurwood, the chamber was not very active and not highly 
regarded by aldermen. It was often said that it was 
’unrepresentative’ of businessmen. In Bankstown, chambers 
of commerce were active in several local shopping centres, 
as well as in Bankstown itself, and there were several 
also in the various small shopping centres in North Sydney 
and in Ku—ring—gai. This indicated one important
characteristic of these organisations. They were concerned 
largely with a fairly narrow range of interests affecting 
their own shopping centre.
The most common area in which chambers of commerce ('ante 
into contact with the local council was over the matter of 
levying a local rate on the shopping centre alone for the 
provision of off-street parking for shoppers. To this 
extent, members saw their political activity as an extension 
of the promotional activity of the chamber. In Bankstown, 
Liverpool, Ku—ring—gai and North Sydney local shopkeepers 
agreed to pay local rates for the purpose of building 
parking areas, and for some other' purposes such as 
•beautification’ or street watering. Property ouners were 
prepared to pay for improvements to their shopping centre 
that would improve business, and Lhe counciL was seen as
a useful agent for providing the services. In North Sydney, 
shopping centres which had the most vociferous and active 
chambers of commerce led the queue for the provision of 
parking lots, but generally it was a case of a direct 
payment for a specific service, delivered when the payments 
totalled the amount required.
these issues occasionally caused conflict within the 
chamber, but brought the local business community into no 
direct clash of interests with other groups. Other sorts 
of issues did, however, arise in some areas. in 
Liverpool and Bankstown the chambers of commerce pressed 
for higher density residential development around the 
shopping centreso In Liverpool, the chamber disagreed 
with council support for applications from commercial 
developers to construct shopping centres away from the 
existing centre. They also sought to persuade the council 
to enforce rigid controls on roadside stalls, which they 
claimed undercut central city shops and had an unfair 
advantage. In Bankstown, the chamber complained that 
not enough money was being spent on roadworks in the shopping 
centre.
These issues and others will be looked at later in the 
course of case study descriptions. Generally speaking, 
the interests of ’the business community’ as a whole were 
less relevant for most local issues than the interests of 
separate businessmen. This was particularly true in matters 
of property development. It was through the impact of 
various council-administered town planning and building and
health regulations that shopkeepers, property developers
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and the business community in general most often came into 
contact w i Lli the council. Thus, real estate agents, for 
instance, whilst they may have had local branches of 
their professional organisation, did not operate through 
them in local, politics. They acted individually through 
more informal channels of influence, during the process 
of lodging separate development applications.
It was noted in Chapter 1 that major issues affecting 
the broad interests of developers, or groups involved in 
the development process, tended to be resolved at the 
State level» At the local level, there was usually not 
the need for groups of this sort to maintain a consistent 
interest in local politics, for it was the Minister, or 
State cabinet, that made the rules and the major policy 
decisions. in Leichhardt, the Balmain Industrialists 
Association lodged a submission on proposed zonings in 
the local planning scheme, but their demands were directed 
as much to the Minister as to the council, for in 
determining objections to proposed zonings, as well as 
overseeing the formulation of these initial proposals 
themselves, it was the Minister who had the final decision. 
This was particularly important in Balmain, as the 
waterfront contained port facilities and associated 
industries. These involved the Maritime Services Board, 
and State and Commonwealth government departments concerned 
with industrial development, shipping, and trade. In 
Liverpool, decisions about the release of non—urban Land 
for development and about the rate of commercial development 
were matters vitally affecting the State Planning Authority’s
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Sydney Region Outline Plan, and also were important 
political issues for the .State cabinet because of spiralling 
land prices.
One important planning issue that was resolved at 
State government level concerned the amount of discretion 
to be allowed local councils in dealing with development 
applications for commercial and industrial development.
The issue held up planning schemes in Bankstown, Liverpool 
and Ku-ring-gai for up to two years«, The Minister 
received representations from development interests about 
the desirability of limiting councils' ability to refuse 
planning consent or impose 'unreasonable* conditions on 
major commercial and industrial development projects 
under the rules then applying in planning scheme ordinances« 
The State Planning Authority was also concerned to impose 
some measure of uniformity on planning scheme ordinances 
and the conditions under which development approvals were 
granted for this type of development throughout the 
metropolitan area. The Minister announced proposals in 
line with these views. Local councils combined in making 
representations to the Minister to try and retain their 
discretionary powers and finally the matter was settled by 
an independent commissioner, who in effect arbitrated a 
compromise. This was an important case of developers' 
interests seeking to attain their ends by going above the 
heads of separate councils to the Minister who had the 
final rule—making authority, although concerted pressure 
from councils was sufficient to force a compromise on
the Minister
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Despite these cases and the importance of distributive 
politics for business and developers* interests at the 
local level, broad issues affecting groups of businessmen 
or developers were occasionally resolved at the local level, 
or were raised as issues at that level. Thus, the North 
Shore Planning and Development Group in North Sydney 
occasionally made public statements or wrote to the council 
about the administration of planning regulations, complaining 
at the councils ’capricious* approach and objecting to 
increasing prohibition on flat development. Even so, in 
North Sydney, individual development firms fought their 
own battles in trying to obtain development approval for 
specific projects anti it was here that the issues lay. 
Occasionally, development companies would place advertisements 
in local newspapers publicising their projects and would 
conduct surveys of the neighbourhood to try and counter 
claims of residents' groups objecting to the developments.
In North Sydney, though, we have seen hou the 10?1 elections 
were fought over the broad issues of flat development and 
residential amenity. One of the local parties Involved 
was composed largely of local businessmen, and was strongly 
opposed to those candidates who were sponsored by residents' 
groups and who called for curbs on flat development.
I It imately, tin* issue at the local level involved these 
broader interests, rather than just the expression of demands 
by separate developers for a favourable interpret at ion of 
the existing regulat ions.
In Liverpool, the formulation of a planning code to 
regulate flat development saw the count i 1 seeking tin- \ i e w s
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of ’development interests'. They asked a local design 
consultant who specialised in flat development, and through 
whom most of the local builders lodged applications for 
flat development with the council, to make proposals on 
a flat code. His suggestions were detailed, and although 
the council did not follow them in toto, they again sought 
his comments before the final adoption of a code. This 
was a somewhat exceptional case, and one that illustrates 
the position of influence held by developers, and the 
development ethos, in council policy making in Liverpool,
Finally, the importance of 'businessmens’ parties' 
must be noted. The Progressive Independent group in 
banks town and some past teams of candidates and aldermen 
in Liverpool were composed of local businessmen, and 
occasionally acted in the interests of local business.
The propensity of local businessmen to stand for local 
office should alert us to the influence of local business 
in council politics, not just in matters concerning broad 
policy, but in the distributive arena of politics as well. 
These matters will be returned to again during the course 
of the study, particularly in the description of issues and 
decisions in Chapters VT11 and IX.
1 have argued in this chapter that many of the interest 
groups active in local politics were concerned largely with 
distributive issues. These issues do not involve outright 
conflict of the type engendered by regulative or 
redistributive issues. Tor the most part, local residents, 
businessmen and other groups tried to achieve their ends 
in local politics by asking favours rather than joining
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battlco When a particular group found that favours were 
consistently rejected, or consistently approved, or if 
requests for more parks or kerb and gutter were consistently 
turned down - then local politics took on the character 
noted in Leichhardt or North Sydney, where disadvantaged 
groups raised regulative issues. In both Leichhardt and 
North Sydney, groups of residents were successful. However, 
it was at this point, when issues broadened, that they 
tended to become matters of political dispute at other 
levels of government, particularly when powerful business 
interests concerned with metropolitan development were 
involved.
FOOTNOTES
1. These categories are the same used for Table 111—7«
One type that aldermen mentioned in some councils has 
not been included. Three aldermen in tiankstown, 
one in Leichhardt and two in Liverpool mentioned 
party branches. They are not included because a 
question that asked for names of local ’groups and 
organisations' could not be expected to obtain 
consistent data on the importance of political 
parties. It is interesting, however, that some 
aldermen did see party branches in the same light
as other sorts of groups in the community with 
regard to their ’interest in council work’.
The role of party branches is discussed subsequently.
2. On the distinction between ’input’ and ’output’ groups
see J. Dearlove, ’Councillors and Interest Groups in 
Kensington and Chelsea’, British Journal of Political 
Science, 1971? P« 142
3. Banks town Independent, 28 January' 1970
4. Hankstown Independent, 28 April 1970
3. Personal Interview, March 1971
(). Personal Interview, March 1971
7. Personal Interview, November 1970
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8. Personal Interview, April 1971
9. Personal Interview, May 1971
10. Personal Interview, May 1971
11. Council meeting, February 1971
12. This same alderman in answering the question on 
local groups in my questionnaire said that ’none* 
were prominent in the area (see Table V—l).
This * turning a blind eye’ was characteristic of 
the feeling of many Labor aldermen: they wished
that these groups would go away, and maybe hoped 
that by ignoring them they might.
13. The nature of these regulations is discussed in 
Chapter IX
14. Personal Interview, November 1970
15* Personal Interview, November 1970
16. Personal Interview, November 1970
17» North Shore Times, 17 September 1970 
18. Personal Interview, October 1970
19 Personal Interview, November 1970
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Chapter VI THE PAID OFFICIALS
There is uniformity amongst local councils in most 
aspects of formal administrative structure, including the 
rules of recruitment and conditions of employment, the 
sorts of officials employed, the tasks they are meant to 
perform, and so on. Much of this uniformity is due to 
provisions of the Act and its Ordinances. Each council 
must employ a town clerk, a building and health inspector 
and an engineer, and they must possess certain qualifications. 
These qualifications are laid down by Ordinance, as are 
the means of attaining them, the syllabuses for examination, 
and so on.
The Act stresses the 'civil service' nature of the 
local government service, following the U. K. tradition. 
Officials are not political appointees but 'servants' of 
the public. They are protected against arbitrary decisions 
affecting their livelihood and positions. The Act 
embodies provisions safeguarding security of tenure, 
allowing a dismissed official the right of appeal, and a 
hearing by an independent commissioner.  ^ The 'civil 
service' nature of local government officialdom is sponsored 
by employee associations focusing their attention on the 
State-wide service, reviewing legislation and ordinances 
affecting members of the service as a whole, as well as 
taking up (with the Department of Local Government) cases 
of members with grievances against particular councils in 
which the principles of an official's independence or
professional integrity are at stake Most of these
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organisations see themselves as professional associations. 
Town clerks, building surveyors, health inspectors, 
engineers and town planners see themselves as members of 
separate professions as well as members of a common civil 
service. The Local Government Clerks Association, or 
the Local Government Engineers Association are not only 
concerned with rates of pay and conditions of work, but 
also with enhancing the status of their profession. They 
are closely involved in determining the sort of training, 
and the standards required, to qualify for entry to the 
profession. They organise conferences, publish journals 
containing information on developments within the 
profession, and generally disseminate technical information 
to their members.
In a discussion of the basic interests of government 
bureaucracies, Sayre and Kaufman (in the context of a study 
of New York city government) see their two basic aims as 
first, to exert direct control over personnel matters
affecting their own livelihoods, and second, to 'maximise
2bureaucratic autonomy'. In pursuing the latter, they
attempt first to secure some degree of 'independence' from 
political interference and from 'special interests' , and 
to gain acceptance of a norm asserting their independent 
status as 'administrators'. They attempt to assert their 
influence in the policy making process, to ensure that they 
are dealing with programmes and policy rules with which 
they are in agreement. In particular, they are concerned 
to preserve their reputation as administrators within their 
own particular area of government policy, to avoid failures
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and mistakes, and prevent errors; this often gives rise
to a fear of innovations and risks espoused by enthusiastic
'amateurs'. Finally, they wish to exert control over
the rules and procedures, and the routines, under which
their members operation, often in order to avoid
unpleasant disruptions to established patterns of work.
In performing its tasks — implementing a programme,
regulating private activities, collecting taxes, and so
on - the government bureaucracy adopts a particular style
of decision making with regard to its relations with
people who are directly affected by its activities. It
acts 'without regard to persons'. A precondition for the
impersonality of bureaucratic decision making is that
procedures for performing tasks be clearly specified.
In order that delegation and control can be exercised in
the hierarchy, rules exist to specify individual duties.
Merton describes the importance of such rules:
Within the structure of hierarchically arranged 
authority, the activities of 'trained and 
salaried experts' are governed by general, 
abstract, and clearly defined rules which 
preclude the necessity for the issuance of 
specific instructions for each specific case.
The generality of the rules requires the constant 
use of categorisation whereby individual problems 
and cases are classified on the basis of' 
designated criteria and are treated accordingly.,
Merton argues that bureaucracies are characterised by an
obsession with the rules and procedures, rather than the ends
they are intended to achieve. This may be one reason that
bureaucrats attempt to exert control over the nature of these
rules.
Local government officials are not just bureaucrats in
kthis sense, many are also professionals. A major interest
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of the professional is that he should be permitted to 
exercise control over those aspects of the organisation's 
activities that his technical training give him a special 
competence for. He is interested in upholding or defending 
ends, not just means, the content and goals of programmes 
or policies, not just the procedures or rules for 
implementing them. In fact, for many of the professionals 
in local government, their major tasks are inspectorial, 
that is in ensuring particular regulations such as health 
and building or planning laws are complied with. Thus, 
they have a professional as well as a bureaucratic interest 
in upholding the impersonality of rule application and 
the uniformity of the rules. In other contexts, the 
professional is also concerned with giving advice on the 
formulation of policies. Planners want to exercise 
their professional competence, and believe they have a 
special expertise that gives them a right to do so, in 
formulating as well as implementing planning regulations. 
Engineers believe that technical criteria should be 
employed in determining a roadworks programme„
Bureaucrats and professionals, by virtue of the nature 
of their activities as I have described them, are 
antipathetic to distributive decision making. The 
routinisation of procedures for rule implementation entails 
the formulation of rules, or policies, but the distributive 
arena is one in which no policies are found in this sense. 
Rather than conforming with the norms of bureaucratic 
universalism, distributive decisions are particularistic. 
They are made 'with regard to persons' regardless of any
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rules. Professionals attempt to introduce order and 
regularity into programme implementation or rule application 
through trying to impose their technical expertise on the 
policy making process. They believe they know what needs 
to be done and how it should be done. The formal 
procedures of local government decision making lay 
emphasis on the opportunity of the chief professionals to 
give their 'expert advice'. We also noted in Chapter 1 
that the Department of Local Government says that as much 
authority should be delegated to officials as possible, 
once 'policy' has been determined. Taken together, the 
assertion of these norms encompasses the sorts of 
interests I have identified with the professional and the 
bureaucrat. Paid officials in the six councils largely 
subscribed to these norms.
In spite of the basic uniformity in administrative
structure, there are ways of differentiating between
councils according to the overall degree of bureaucratisation
or professionalisation that they exhibit. Several methods
of comparison will be adopted. The first uses certain
'measurable' differences in the structure of council
organisation, the number of formal positions held by
professionals, and the extent to which councils attempted
to improve the quality of information upon which they made
decisions, or utilised professional skills to improve the
5'quality' of the decision making process itself. These 
measures, listed below, are all shown in Table VI—1,
1. The size of the organisation: A. Downs, in his
definition of a bureau stipulates that it must be 'large'.^
l6o
The larger the organisation, the greater the need for 
enumeration of sub—tasks, and the greater the pressures 
for clearer delineation of rules and procedures. Size 
also influences the degree of specialisation and 
specialists are often professionals.
2. The employment of a full-time personnel officer: In
most councils, personnel functions are performed in an
ad hoc fashion within the town clerk's department. The 
employment of a full-time personnel officer is a species 
of increasing specialisation, and possibly professionalisation. 
It also indicates a concern with essentially bureaucratic 
interests — methods of work, means of personnel recruitment 
and promotion, and so on.
3. The employment of 'extra' professional staff: The
employment of a professional personnel officer is one 
example. Other examples include publicity officers, 
social workers and professional librarians. In some cases, 
their appointment is the unavoidable result of a decision
on providing a particular service. However, the exposure 
of aldermen to employees espousing professional values 
may affect the way they approach council decision making 
as a whole. The norms of 'expertise' and professional 
values get a greater airing.
4. The appointment of a full-time professional planner
as head of an independent planning department: on some
councils the planner is also the engineer (in which case 
he was an engineer before he became a planner), or the 
planner is in the engineering department. The existence
of a separate planner is an indication of increasing
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prolessionalisation. The existence of a separate
department indicates a greater differentiation of functions.
5. The employment of ’management science’ consultants: 
this includes office management, filing systems, work study, 
and so on.
6. The use of staff or consultants for survey or research
work: the commitment of staff and funds to improving the
quality of information is an expression of faith in 
expertise and professionalism.
7. Capital budgeting or forward works planning: forward
planning of works needs or requirements undertaken by the 
engineer indicates an ascendancy of professional values.
Table VI—1 adopts a simple ranking method for making 
an overall comparison between the six councils, based on 
scores given for each measure. Generally speaking, the 
larger the organisation, the better it scores on the other 
measures, as might be expected. However, the smallest 
council, Burwood, scores relatively well, whilst Leichhardt 
scores nil. It could be argued that engaging in luxuries 
such as employing consultants, or embarking on new 
services in which professional personnel are employed, is 
partly a function of the ability of the council to afford 
them. That this was not the only factor important in 
Leichhardt was demonstrated when the new council of 1971 
proceeded to hire more professional staff, and actively 
sought advice from experts outside the council on several 
matters. A greater professionalisation of council decision 
making was one of the pleas of some of the anti—Labor 
candidates, particularly those in the largely middle class
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Table VI—1 Bureaucratisation and Professionalisation
1 . Number of ;administrative staff employed:
BA BU KU LE LI NS
1 9 6 5
1 9 7 0
Rank
1 8 1
2 0 4
U)
20
27
(6 )
1 1 7
126
( 2 )
5 0 ^
70
( 5 )
87
(3)
8 5 ^
(4)
2 . Personnel 'Officer:
Part-^Full No No No No
time t ime
Score 1 0 0 0 12 0
3. Additional Profe ssional Staff:*
Personnel
Officer Yes No No No No No
Librarian Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Publicity
Officer No No Yes No No No
Social
Worker Yes No Yes No No Yes
Score 3 1 3 0 1 2
4 . Professional town planner as head of separate department:
Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Score 1 0 1 0 1 1
5 . Employment of «management science' consultants:
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Score 1 1 1 0 0 0
6 . Use of staff or consultants for survey work or research:
Staff Consul— Consul- Neither Staff Both
tant s tant s
Score 1 1 1 0 1 1
7. Capital budget/forward works programming:
No Yes N 0 N 0 Yes No
Score 0 1 0 0 1 0
TOTAL SCORE BA BU KU LE LI NS
(2 to 7 ) 7 4 6 0 4* 4
RANK a) O ) (2 ) (6 ) (3) (4)
4 estimated from salary figures given in financial estimate s
The rest are taken from official statistical returns made 
under Ordinance 96 : 'administrative* staff includes all
office workers.
^ Liverpool appointed an 'Administrative Officer' under the 
Town Clerk, specifying one of his duties as a 'personnel 
officer'. Elsewhere staff matters are generally dealt 
with by the town clerk or his deputy on an ad hoc basis.
* by 'professional' here is meant officials possessing 
qualifications recognised by respective professional 
associations or designed for specialisation in a 
particular field of employment.
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Local residents' groups. Furthermore, the point of these 
measures is not just that they might indicate a commitment 
by a council to increased professionalisation but that 
they indicate the extent to which councils are exposed to 
the norms of expertise and professionalism.
One important measure not listed in Table VI—1 is the 
extent to which councils delegated authority to officials.
At one extreme, the council in Leichhardt delegated 
virtually no authority at all. They jealously preserved 
their discretionary powers in town planning matters; 
they made all decisions on the administration of building 
and health regulations; they would not permit minor 
public works items costing over $100 to be undertaken 
without authorisation; they dealt with all staff matters 
and demanded detailed reporting on matters such as hours 
worked and amounts of overtime payed to outside staff; 
council minutes recorded the purchase of every box of 
paper clips and every tube of glue. This attention to 
minor detail was largely a matter of formality, but was 
symptomatic of the council's overall attitude. What was 
of most importance was the lack of delegation of any 
discretion to the paid officials, or even the absence of 
delegation in applying quite specific rules and regulations, 
as in building and health matters. Where powers of this 
sort are delegated, it is an indication that aldermen have 
surrendered their ability to make distributive decisions.
The implementation of adopted regulative policies becomes 
routinised, and given the sorts of characteristics of 
bureaucratic or professional administration outlined earlier, 
they are removed from the distributive arena altogether.
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Where it is a case of exercising discretion (as in many 
instances of statutory planning administration, where 
discretionary powers are extensive), then the ’ideal1 
professional or bureaucrat will use these powers for the 
purpose of achieving the goals underlying the regulations
7and not base decisions on ’alien or irrelevant grounds'.
Delegation of authority to administer town planning 
regulations was most extensive in Burwood, where the town 
planner had the authority to '...approve or disapprove 
of development applications or subdivision applications, 
which in the light of his experience... and having regard 
to codes, policies and practices clearly defined by the 
council, he believes could be approved or disapproved
g
without reference to the plans committee'. This was an
exceptional act of delegation, when the council decided 
to forego the considerable area of patronage available to 
it within the ambit of planning regulations. In fact, 
a rejected applicant was given the right to appeal to the 
plans committee, although no cases of decisions of the 
planner being overruled were recorded. And the planner 
would refer 'politically contentious' matters to the 
committee. The contrast between Leichhardt and Burwood 
in this respect does fit the relative scores they achieved 
from the measures shown in Table VI—1.
Of the other councils, it was the two with the highest 
scores in Table VI—1 that showed the most willingness to 
delegate authority in town planning administration.
Ku-ring—gai for many years proposed to set up a 'staff 
board' of the chief professional officers to determine
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building, subdivision and development applications ’in line 
with, policies laid down by the council’. The proposal was 
suggested by the mayor and received council support as far 
back as 1964, but was never implemented because it was 
intended to come into operation once the council's local 
planning scheme became law. This had not eventuated 
by 1971* Furthermore, support for the proposal was 
not unanimous by any means, and the 1968 council did 
little to keep the proposal alive. In fact, then, little 
if any authority was delegated in town planning matters, 
although there was more delegation in the administration 
of subdivision regulations.
Apart from Burwood, Bankstown delegated most authority 
to its planner. Some routine matters were delegated 
under a resolution of 1957 > but additional powers, such 
as the application of a council code on advertising signs, 
the consideration of applications for extension of 
buildings, the change of use of industrial premises or 
shops, the approval of dwelling houses in residential zones, 
and so on, were delegated in 1965« However, all the major
discretionary powers of the council were retained in the 
hands of aldermen. Some of these lesser matters of 
development control were also delegated to the planner in 
North Sydney and in Liverpool. In Liverpool, authority 
was delegated to the planner to refuse flat development 
applications in areas zoned ’non—flat' in the council’s 
draft scheme, but in fact the council often overrode his
delegated authority
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It was a more common practice to delegate authority 
to chief building and health inspectors to administer 
regulations. The rules themselves were far more clear 
cut, allowed for less discretion, were written into 
uniform statutes, and aroused less controversy than the 
administration of planning regulations. All councils 
allowed their health and building inspectors to serve 
notices on those contravening ordinances relating to 
the dilapidated, unsafe, or unsightly state of buildings, 
their sanitary condition, and so on, and on shopkeepers 
and traders for contraventions of public health 
regulations. In fact, some powers are granted directly 
to health inspectors by statute in this regard. All 
councils except Leichhardt delegated some authority to 
approve or reject building applications. In Burwood 
the health inspector was empowered to institute legal 
proceedings where notices had been served, without 
reference to the council. This measure, like the 
delegation of town planning matters, was adopted in 1 9 7 0.
Problems associated with attempts to plead exemption 
from building regulations, and attempts to avoid being 
prosecuted for non-compliance, were most frequently 
encountered in Liverpool. They were dealt with not by 
officials, but in the building and health committee by 
aldermen. Acting rather like a quasi—judicial tribunal, 
the committee would hear personal representations from 
supplicants who wished to appear in person. But some 
aldermen acted as both advocate and judge, pleading for
individuals who had contacted them personally At a not
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untypical meeting in September 1970, the committee made 
numerous recommendations to the council. It recommended 
granting approval for three separate requests for variation 
of prescribed building lines. Six cases of illegal 
structures were reported by inspectors: one was allowed
to remain, decisions in three cases were deferred, in 
one case legal proceedings were threatened and in another 
they were instituted. Eight cases of illegal occupancy 
of temporary structures were reported: six were allowed
to continue so long as some progress was made towards 
completing a permanent structure, in one case legal 
proceedings were withdrawn, and in another a decision 
was deferred. In one of these cases, approval had been 
granted to occupy an outbuilding since 1965 ’subject to 
the erection of an approved dwelling’. This was the 
eleventh occasion the matter had come before the council 
since then, and the committee again decided to permit 
continued occupancy. Liverpool was a fringe urban area 
being settled by the less wealthy and the poor, who often 
had a struggle to set up home or business. Financial 
hardship, illness, and so on, were argued as grounds for 
not completing a permanent dwelling, whilst the family 
occupied the garage or an outhouse. Aldermen sometimes 
referred to them as ’battlers'. One was quoted as 
saying:
People living in temporary dwellings are the
pioneers of the twentieth century. 9
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The sympathy often felt, and the real dilemmas faced, were
epitomised by the comments of one alderman:
Generally I go along with those who say we shouldn't 
bend the regulations; but they all do it themselves 
for friends or people that approach them. Going 
to court is expensive for the council — many cases 
don't get that far...I have disagreed sometimes when 
they have let something go — but genuine hardship 
cases do come up — what do you do? How could you 
take a pensioner to court? Someone living out the 
back of Bringelly, he's six miles from nowhere, maybe 
he's breaking a few regulations — but you take a 
different view of it in the middle of a residential 
street. You treat every one on its merits, the 
circumstances are different in each case. If it's
reported you have to act on it — but if you know 
the circumstances you can turn a blind eye — that 
is in genuine hardship cases. If you have a bloke 
renting a garage at twenty dollars a week that's 
different.
Whilst pressures for exemptions from regulations were 
strongest in Liverpool, they were present in most councils. 
In Bankstown, they tended to be resolved by personal 
intervention by aldermen with the official, as these matters 
did not come before the council or any committee. One 
alderman described his approach to these problems, 
contrasting the attitude of the aldermen to the problems 
of individuals, with that of an official or appointed 
administrator:
...you have to temper justice, every case is 
individual, there's no simple right or wrong.
The actual needs of people are better served by 
aldermen. You have a development or building 
application come up, and nine times out of ten 
the professional officer won't say 'if you do 
this or that then it will be O.K.* he just says 
'no'. But if the individual comes to an 
alderman, you can say this to him. You don't 
have to break any laws, perhaps you ease a code.
But aldermen who lean over too far do cause 
problems sometimes, you have to stick to 
your codes... H
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ln Bankstown, the planner had some delegated power in
matters of minor discretion, such as varying building lines,
and this typified the less pervasive involvement in these
sorts of matters by aldermen than in Liverpool.
Demands from individuals to aldermen that they
intervene on their behalf in the ’ adminstrative’ process
occurred also in other areas of council decisions. It
occurred most frequently over matters such as pot-holes
in the road, offensive drains, or the efficiency of the
garbage service. Council engineers complained at the
frequency with which aldermen approached them demanding
prompt attention to some minor matter over which they
had been contacted personally by a constituent. This
upset their programmes and took up their time. It also
upset their sense of ’fair play’:
...naturally precedence is given to requests by 
aldermen to do jobs. If everyone came direct to 
the counter outside here or to the engineering 
department they would get fairer treatment. We 
get so many requests from aldermen, the others 
who come direct to us, there’s not much chance 
for them. ^
If aldermen get a complaint about something I 
see that it is attended to. It’s a bit unfair 
on those who don’t complain through their 
aldermen. ^3
Some officials suggested aldermen should refer people to
them rather than act on their behalf. One Burwood
alderman’s comments on this were fairly typical:
There is perhaps a tendency for people to come 
direct to an alderman with something they could 
go to an officer about. But I do all I can for 
them and take up their problems. I would never 
fob them off onto an officer. But L have to make 
sure I am not interfering with the administration. 
Aldermen who won’t see peopLe do themseLves and local 
government a disservice. All the aldermen in Burwood 
have a good reputation for being accessible. 1-3
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One council engineer expressed the position succinctly:
Some aldermen will tell people to ’go through 
the proper channels' but they are very much in 
the minority. it doesn't do their chance of 
re-election any good.
One indication of the importance placed by aldermen 
on taking up individuals' complaints and acting on their 
behalf was the sort of procedure adopted for dealing 
with them. in all councils the personal contact between 
alderman and official was important. But in Bankstown 
the volume of complaints was so great that aldermen were 
issued with special forms for submitting them. In 
Burwood, on the other hand, that portion of the meeting 
set aside as 'question time' and 'any other business* was 
used by aldermen to bring matters of a minor nature to 
the attention of the officials. The minutes faithfully 
recorded what had been done in response to these requests. 
Question—time was also important in this respect in 
Liverpool. In Leichhardt, requests frequently were 
submitted in the form of petitions and a special portion 
of the agenda was set aside for them. The engineer 
explained the position:
If a complaint is made to me about some road or 
footpath, we say the best way to get something done 
is not to get us to put in a report but to put 
up a petition. They'll take notice of that. ^
The extent of delegation and the question of the degree
of detailed aldermanic intervention in matters of
•administration' is only one side of the coin. Professional
officers of the council fulfil an important advisory role.
Practically every matter on which a council makes a
decision is accompanied by a report and recommendation
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from a chief officer and those matters raised by aldermen 
without such a report being available are invariably- 
deferred until one is. We have seen, however, that 
the degree of professionalisation and bureaucratisation 
differed from council to council, and it was argued that 
this might indicate the varying status given to officials 
and their professional advice. Officials must compete 
for attention with other sources of information and 
influence to which aldermen are open. The questionnaire 
asked aldermen to say how important they considered 
various named sources of information were in making council 
decisions. Not surprisingly all aldermen (except one 
in Bankstown) considered the paid officials to be ’very 
important' or 'important'. Responses to this question 
offer difficulties in comparing one council with another, 
as aldermen seemed to make their evaluations differently. 
Thus, Leichhardt's aldermen were far more eager to enter 
all sources as 'very important* or 'important* than 
Bankstown's aldermen, for instance. Leichhardt respondents 
were far less discriminating than other aldermen. The 
least likely explanation, based on our knowledge of the 
decision making process obtained from other sources, would 
be that Leichhardt's aldermen were more receptive to 
information or Influence from all sources. It seems more 
likeLy that their evaluations were based on a need to 
assert certain norms of 'open government* or 'local 
democracy' in their responses.
A supplementary question overcomes this problem of 
comparison. Respondents were asked to list the three
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most important sources from amongst the nine that were
listed in the question. The result is shown in Table VI—2.
The note in the Table explains how the scores were computed.
They allow for direct comparison between the six councils,
which is the purpose of the present analysis.
Table VI—2 Relative importance of sources of information
for council decision making
BA BL' KU LE LI NS
Local press .04 .11 _ — • o 00 _
Aldermen .04 .15 .33 .13 - .15
Gons tituent s • 71 .33 .11 .54 .29 .19
Groups .33 - .11 .08 .25 .22
Observation .67 .52 .48 .67 .54 .56
Contacts .04 .15 .11 - .21 .30
Party - - - .04 .08 -
M. P . ’s - - - .13 - -
Officials .17 .63 .74 .38 .42 .59
Other — .11 .11 .04 .13 —
The scores were computed by scoring responses as follows:
three for the most important source; two for the second
most important; and one for third. Score s for each source
were then summed to arrive at a total council score for each
These total scores were expressed as a proportion of the 
total possible score to adjust for the difference in the 
number of responses from council to council. The highest 
possible score is one.
Source: Questionnaire. Q. 13.
Paid officials ranked highest only in Burwood, 
Ku-ring-gai and North Sydney. We might have expected this 
from Table VI—1 for the latter two, and our subsequent 
discussion of delegation would lead us to expect Burwood 
also to rank well on this score. But the data in Table VI—1 
are not consistent with Bankstown1s low score. In 
Bankstown there were special factors that help account for 
the low status of officials. The majority of the council 
was highly critical of the running of the engineer’s 
department. In December 1969 a ’motion of censure’ against 
the engineer was passed with a minority of only three
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dissenting. The motion expressed 'concern’ at the 'lack 
of co-ordination, planning and efficiency in the engineering 
department', and concluded by 'instructing' the engineer 
to improve matters. The council was particularly critical 
ol the outside work-force, comparing its output 
unfavourably with that of private contractors. This was 
an important local issue, as the need to perform essential 
public works in the municipality was a major council 
priority. it seems probable that this attitude towards 
the performance of the engineering department had some 
effect on the overall status afforded officials by 
aldermen, indicated in Table VT-2. The relatively' low 
status afforded officials in Leichhardt is consistent with 
all that has been said on the subject in the present 
chapter.
The data in Table VI—2 suggest a general explanation 
of the difference in attitudes towards the paid officials. 
They support the proposition that professional and 
bureaucratic interests find most expression in the 
decision making process where distributive pressures from 
local groups and constituents are least in strength and 
importance. The highest scores for paid officials tend 
to be found where groups and constituents score least 
and vice versa. Thus in Banks town, the very Low score 
for officials is accompanied by a high score for 
constituents and for groups. This reflects the picture of 
local politics we have built up in the preceding chapters.
In electoral, po I i t Lcs, personal support and specific 
transactional ties were important, including networks of
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contacts in local community groups. The face—to—face 
nature of these Links is illustrated by the greater 
importance of individual constituents than organised groups. 
However, groups were important in the recruitment process 
and were relatively highly regarded by aldermen. These 
groups operated Largely in the arena of distributive 
politics. Where distributive politics was so important, 
we would expect the officials to find it relatively 
difficuLt to win the attention of aldermen, for reasons 
discussed earlier in tlie cliapter. A similar pattern is 
evident for Leichliardt , if we include party sources (tliis 
includes M.P.’s) with constituents. 1 have described 
party influences as falling largeLy within the distributive 
arena, and the only other significant 1externaL’ source 
of information for aldermen was complaints or special 
representations from individual constituents» Again, in 
Liverpool, if we include ’informal contacts’ witti 
constituents as being of a similar nature with respect to 
tlie likely content of the information received — i.e. 
concerned largely with seeking personal favours, or 
soLutions to personal problems from individual aldermen — 
a similar pattern emerges, consistent with my description 
of some aspects of electoral politics and the Importance 
of individual influences in the administrative process.
As in Bankstown, local groups were largely operative in 
the distributive arena.
Burwood and Ku— ring— gai present tLie opposite case.
Ln Burwood, whilst constituents uere fairly important as 
sources of information, compared with Banks town or
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Leichhardt the relative importance of constituents and 
officials is reversed. if we include ’groups’ and ’contacts’, 
we can include Liverpool with these last two. In Burwood, 
groups were not very active and not important for aldermen, 
in Ku—ring—g a i , groups such as progress associations were 
active, but as we have seen, they suffered setbacks and 
a loss of influence with the election of the 19b8 council.
The emergence of a local party supplanted the former 
importance of distributive politics, as was evident from 
the changing pattern of electoral support. Finally, 
in North Sydney, constituents were not important, but 
relative to other councils, groups were. The pattern 
would be little different from Liverpool (except for the 
difference in the status afforded officials), were it not 
for the important difference in the sorts of groups and 
the nature of their demands. in North Sydney the most 
important local groups had come to take on a coherence 
of purpose and a breadth of appeal that indicated their 
merger in the 1971 elections as a local party, thus 
supplanting distributive politics as the arena in which 
the most important local issues were being fought out.
The negative relationship between the importance of 
officials and constituents for providing information to 
aldermen is seen from Table VI—3, which suggests another 
sort of explanation. The occupational background of 
aldermen may exert an independent influence on the status 
they afford professional advice. Those from professional 
occupations themselves not surprisingly attach greater 
importance to advice or information from officials than
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do those from other occupations. Local businessmen express
a slight preference for constituents, and those in clerical
and blue coLlar occupations express a stronger preference.
Table VI—3 Paid officials and ward constituents as
sources of information: responses classified
by occupational background of aldermen
Number of Average Score s
Occupation Respondents Officials Constituents
1 Proprietary 18 1.17 1.440 Professional etc. 21 1.90 0.62
3 Clerical, sales 6 1.17 1.67
4 Blue collar 5 0.60 l „40
5 Home duties 1 3.00 loOO
The average scores were computed on the same basis of scoring 
for individual responses as employed for Table VI—2.
Source: Questionnaire, Q.13.
The data in Table VI—3 is not drawn from a sample of aldermen, 
but from members of six particular councils. On these 
councils the representation of occupational types differed 
greatly (see Tables 111—9 and 111—1 0 ). If it is a
characteristic of those from professional or administrative 
occupations that they express a low preference for the 
personal representations of constituents as a source of 
information, it seems reasonable to infer that they dislike 
the attention to minor administrative detail that dealing 
with these complaints and problems demands. Instead, 
they defer to the paid officials. Those from professional 
occupations in the six councils were found largely in 
three of them, and this orientation to official duties 
does correspond to differences in local politics between 
these three councils and the others.
These different attitudes to local politics that seem 
to be associated with occupational background might well
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have been one of the qualifications that made different 
occupational types eligible for local politics in the six 
areas. in an area where distributive issues are important, 
a willingness or desire to embrace this style of politics 
would seem to be a pre-condition not only for winning 
office but for being attracted to local politics in the 
first place. In Bankstown or Liverpool, successful 
aldermen were largely local businessmen or clerical and 
blue collar workers, and those from professional 
occupations had a dismal record in winning office. In 
these councils, distributive politics was an important 
part of local political life. In North Sydney or 
Ku— ring— gai, where professional, people predominated, 
distributive politics was less important. Local politics 
was more concerned with broader issues. In Leichhardt, 
a characteristic of the challenge to Labor rule was the 
number of professional people involved, particularly 
through the new residents* groups. They were drawn 
into local politics through new channels, and their 
involvement was based on their espousal of particular 
interests and issues. It was not the traditional pattern 
of distributive politics that attracted them. in Burwood, 
there were few if any major issues in local politics, 
whilst at the same time aldermen did not seem to be 
greatly obsessed with the granting of personal favours 
that characterised distributive politics. Roughly half 
the aldermen were from professional occupations, and 
appeared prepared to agree that for the sake of ’efficiency* 
or ’good administration’, paid officials should be granted 
a greater status and authority than in most other councils.
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We cannot say for certain from the data at hand
what independent role occupational background, or a set
of attitudes associated with it, plays in influencing the
style of local politics. My major point has been that
an existing style attracts those sympathetic towards it
or willing to enter office under the present rules of
the game. Only in Leichhardt and perhaps North Sydney
have we seen an indication of an influx of professional
people actually associated with important changes in
local politics — notably the decline in importance of
distributive issues. In these cases, these changes
are attributable to important changes in the structure
of local political interests. The attitudes of the
new aldermen towards their duties and those of the
officials were only secondary to the actual interests
they represented and the policies they pursued. They
were not in politics to produce ’better government' —
although this was one aspect of the Leichhardt campaign —
but to change council policies.
The notion that members of the middle class espouse
'good government' norms is one that Banfield and Wilson
emphasise in their discussion of American city politics.
They refer to the middle class approach as 'public regarding'
rather than 'private regarding':
...middle class and upper class people... believed 
that the interest of the community 'as a whole' 
should be determined in disinterested ways and then 
be carried into effect expeditiously and efficiently 
by technicians. This point of view was at odds 
with that of the lower class, which preferred 
favors, 'friendship', and 'recognition' to the 
public-serving and self-denying virtues of 
efficiency, honesty and impartiality. ^7
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The stark contrast between say Leichhardts politics and
Ku-ring-gai's might well support a similar sort of
interpretation in the present context. Nowhere is this
contrast better illustrated than in the attitude of
aldermen towards officialdom. As we saw, in Ku-ring-gai
there had been a move to set up a ’board’ of chief
officials to administer planning, subdivision and building
regulations. Some of the typical ’good government norms’
were expressed by one alderman:
The alderman’s main duty is to decide policy...
You musn’t be swayed by sectional interests, you 
must stand fast for the good of the community as 
a whole, although it is difficult0
I am of the firm opinion we should delegate more 
author!ty...Decisions have to be made by experts, 
amateurs shouldn’t be making decisions on these 
technical matters,,.Ratepayers may well be much 
happier if experts in finance made financial 
decisions.
The contrast with attitudes of Leichhardt’s aldermen is
demonstrated — perhaps a little too starkly — by the
comments of a Leichhardt Labor alderman on attempts by
the engineer to get the council to adopt a works programme:
Sometimes they’ll put works in a programme we 
don’t think are so important and we trim them, 
if they try and tell us what rate to set I tell 
them to go to buggery and prune the estimates.
We decide the rate, that’s our job — there are 
a couple of others amongst us like that, we want 
to tell them what to do, not be told what to do 
by them. -*-9
The point must be made that not all of Ku-ring-gai’s 
aldermen would agree with the comments of the respondent 
quoted above. lie himself stressed that the important 
thing about local democracy was the accessibility of the 
aldermen to the complaints and requests of ratepayers, and 
in their actions most of Ku-ring-gai’s aldermen were
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little different from other aldermen in this regard.
We must also note that whilst progress associations and 
parochial neighbourhood pressures were less important 
after 19b8 , they were certainly still present and actively 
engaged in local politics. And the only characteristic 
that distinguished the new aldermen from the aldermen 
they defeated was their espousal of particular policies. 
They were of a similar occupational background and did 
not differ in their attitudes towards paid officials or 
some of the tenets of ’good government norms’.
Members of the middle class do not become involved
in local politics solely for the sake of ’better
government’. This is clear if we consider that middle
class involvement differs from one area to another. In
Ku-ring-gai they were professionals, in Bankstown or
20Liverpool, local businessmen. They were in politics
partly because as residents and businessmen respectively 
they had particular interests and certain public goals. 
Local businessmen in these working class areas did express 
some of the ’good government norms’ in condemning party 
politics in local government, but in office they were 
largely indistinguishable from Labor aldermen with regard 
to their participation in the distributive aspects of 
local politics. It seems reasonable to conclude that 
whilst occupational background may have some independent 
effect on the attitudes and behaviour of aldermen, their 
behaviour is adapted to an existing set of norms and 
practices in the local polity within which they are able 
to pursue their interests. Any desire to change a local
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political style is rooted in a challenge to particular’ 
policies or decisions, rather than a challenge to this 
style itself based on a belief in ’good government norms' 
as ends in themselves« In order to understand how such 
a political style emerges in a particular local polity, 
we need to know a great deal more about the polity than 
the occupational background of aldermen. It may well 
be, however, that a broad set of beliefs or norms typical 
of the middle class does produce differences in 
expectations about council politics amongst local 
ratepayers from one area to another. These supposed 
differences may play a major role in determining the way 
local politics operates.
FOOTNOTES
1. A commissioner cannot reinstate a dismissed official, 
but can only make a recommendation. Ihe sanction 
against the council lies in the adverse publicity
a wrongful dismissal can bring, through the public 
hearing. the commissioner is appointed by the 
Minister for Local Government and reports to him as 
well as the council. This Ministerial involvement 
may afford a further sanction.
2. Wallace S. Sayre, Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York 
City, (Neu York, Russell Sage Foundation, I960)
PP. 430-437
3. Robert K. Merton, 'Bureaucratic Structure and
Personality', in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and 
Social Structure, (New York, Free Pre s s , 19b8) pi 2 50
4. The term 'professional' may be a little grand when 
applied to a building inspector or even a local 
governmeni town planner, in the context of the sorts 
of occupations traditionally labelled 'the 
professions' - law, medicine, and so on. 1 am not 
using the term as an indication of society's view of 
the status of various occupations, but as an indication
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of the views of members of the occupational category 
themselves. It is not so much a question of status, 
as a matter of identification with fellow members 
of a specialised occupation for which some degree 
of 'academic' training has been undertaken, an 
identification that is represented by their 
membership of an exclusive association, one of 
whose main aims is safeguard or enhance certain 
standards associated with membership of the 
1 profession 1 .
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of this question in Mr Justice Else—Mitche11,
'Councils' Discretionary Powers - Their Use and Abuse 
in Health, Building and Planning Matters', Shire and 
Municipal Record (NSW), January 1969? p. 8 3 6
8. Burwood Council Minutes, 27 January 1970
9. Alderman J. Bradshaw, quoted 
28 September 1 9 6 6
in the Liverpool News ,
1 0 . Personal Interview conducted April 1971
1 1 . Personal Interview conducted March 1971
1 2 . Personal Interview (bankstown) conducted September 1970
13. Personal Interview (Ku-ring-gai) conducted September 1970
14. Personal Interview c onduc ted June 1970
15. Personal In terview (Bankstown) conducted September 1970
1 6 . Personal Interview conducted September 1970
17. E. C. Banfield, J. Q. Wilson , City Politics, (Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967) p. 170
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18. Personal Interview conducted December 1970 
19» Personal Interview conducted May 1971
20. I would argue that Banfield and Wilson's proposition 
about the middle class and 'good government norms', 
if it has any validity, applies best to those from 
professional or salaried occupations, and not so well 
to members of the business community. Wolfinger 
has argued similarly that the notion that machine 
politics in the United States is a working class 
phenomenon ignores the high degree of support and 
the participation in the spoils system of members 
of the business community, who have always benefited 
from contracts, licenses, and so on, granted as 
patronage by the machine. He even argues that 
professional groups have not remained free from 
such patronage, and have willingly participated 
in spoils systems. See: Raymond E. Wolfinger,
'Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and 
Other Revisionist Thoughts', The Journal of Politics, 
May 1972, pp. 365-397.
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Chapter Vll FORMAL AND INFORMAL PROCESSES
OF COUNCIL DECISION MAKING
Up to this point we have been concerned largely with 
the sorts of demands made upon the council by groups and 
individuals, and the structure of interests found in each 
area that helps account for the sorts of issues that 
characteristically emerge. We now turn to considering 
some of the formal and informal characteristics of the 
council decision making process, to ask whether they have 
any independent effect upon the way issues are defined 
and decisions made.
I have already indicated that the structure of local 
councils encourages distributive politics. Elected 
representatives are open to individual and parochial 
pressures, and have immediate access to the process of 
detailed administration. This access is legitimised and 
sanctioned through the committee system and through the 
legal stipulation that the council is responsible for 
every aspect of the duties performed by its servants.
Whilst there are widely held norms about the separation of 
•policy’ and ’administration’ in the roles of alderman and 
official respectively, these have little practical relevance 
and conflict with other sorts of norms about local democracy, 
the committee system, and so on. The council is formally 
responsible for both policy and administration. There is 
no separate executive body and the mayor is elected by the 
council from amongst its own members for yearly terms.
He holds no formal authority independent of the council.
His formal duties are largely those of chairing meetings,
18b
time particular institutional forms or traditional 
conventions and practices, peculiar to a council, and 
creating variations in the basic model of administration 
outlined above and in the first Chapter, may exert some 
independent influence*
Turning first to the committee system, Table VT1—1 
lists the basic structure for each council. Only in 
Burwood, Liverpool and Ku—ring—gai do we find a system 
conforming to the traditional model for local government 
committee administration. Under such a system, every item 
for decision by the council passes first through a committee 
composed of a small number of aldermen. The committee makes 
recommendations, which the council either adopts or alters.
In the committee, which conventionally meets in private, 
paid officials take a more active part in the discussion 
than in the council, although of course they do not vote. 
Committees are formed for each of the council’s major 
functions. It is generally held that councils should have 
confidence in their committees, and should not upset too 
many recommendations0
In most councils, the prevailing system was of long 
standing, and was perpetuated partly for reasons of 
organisational inertia. However, the existence of a certain 
form of committee structure, and the ways in which it 
actually operated did reflect in some cases the pressures 
faced by the council from outside. At the same time, there 
were ways in which the structure of administration and 
decision making influenced the course of local politics.
These will be discussed separately for each council in 
conjunction with other features of the decision making process.
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Table Vll—1 Committee Structure and Membership
Name/Function Membership
BANKSTOWN
1 Finance Whole council — meet in public,
2 Works (inspection only) prior to council meetings
(fortnightly) (l—2)
3 Industrial (stalf) Mayor plus four others. Meet
4 Parks when required in private (3—6)
5 Signs Parks committee contains one
6 Pools member from each ward.
7 Parking and TrafTic Four aldermen plus co-opted
members.
8 Environmental Four aldermen, staff and co-opted
(7 and 8 advisory only) 'experts'.
BURWOOD
1 Finance Five or six aldermen. Meet
2 Works fortnightly or when needed —
3 Plans Mayor chairman of all committees,
4 General Purposes meeting at different times, (l—6)
5 Pools
6 Parking and TrafTic
7 Redevelopment Four aldermen, Mayor as chairman
8 Town Planning All aldermen
9 Joint Library Three aldermen as delegates
10 History of Burwood Five aldermen
KU -RING—GAI
1 Finance (& works staff Four aldermen plus mayor.
and parks) Meetings fortnightly, mayor chairs
2 Building and Health Finance; committees elect
3 Subdivision vice-chairmen to chair meetings.
4 Development
LEICHHARDT
1 Finance All aldermen. Meetings held in
2 Works (inspection only) private fortnightly before council
3 Staff meetings. 'Site1 inspections by
works committee arranged ad hoc.
LIVERPOOL
1 Finance Five aldermen. Mayor ex—officio
2 Works chairman, but meetings chaired by
3 Health and Building vice-chairman elected by council.
4 Development Meet fortnightly or when required.
5 Baths and Parks (1-7 )
6 Parking and Traffic
7 Bush Fire
8 Staff Mayor plus vice-chairmen of 1-4.
NORTH SYDNEY
1 Finance All aldermen. Meetings held in
2 Works public, fortnightly, alternate
3 General Purposes weeks to council meetings.
4 Town Planning
5 Building and Health
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1 . BANKSTOWN
From 1988—71 the mayoralty was held by a member of 
the Progressive independent group. Six in number and all 
drawn from the South and West Wards, the group vigorously 
denied 'caucusing* or concerted action, but in fact on 
many occasions did act in such a fashion. However, the 
council was not consistently polarised, largely because 
of the absence of an ALP group of significance. The 
Progressive Independents did not need to consistently 
enforce conformity to a majority view as, on many issues, 
they did not have to face a concerted 'opposition'. 
Furthermore, the norms of 'independence' and the antipathy 
towards Labor caucus methods did act as a constraint upon 
such practices. However, there were occasions on which 
the group was seen to 'close ranks' when confronted with 
opposition from the rest of the council. And there were 
some policies and interests that the Progressive Independents 
represented that provided the group with some cohesion.
During the period of two and a half years up to 
May 1 9 7 1 j the council formally divided to register a vote 
on a motion before it only twenty—nine times. The use 
of the formal division was an indication of controversy in 
the open council. It was used to register a confrontation. 
Most motions were passed 'on the voices', or alternatively 
by a show of hands, neither of which would be recorded in 
the minutes. That there were relatively few such divisions 
does show that on the whole the Progressive Independent 
group did not produce polarisation, but that agreements 
were reached on issues amongst a majority of aldermen 
without the public conflict entailed in a division.
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The use of these divisions to reveal patterns of 
conflict suffers from the fact that they do not necessarily 
cover all those issues that members themselves considered 
important. The extent of the Progressive Independent 
influence, for instance, can not be known for certain, as 
many issues on which they may have been seen to act in 
concert never came to the point of public controversy, but 
were settled more informally. Nevertheless, the calling 
of a division was a customary method used by minorities 
to register a protest against a majority decision. Many 
of the issues subject to such divisions were quite crucial 
and cover a great number of the important local political 
issues of the period.
The divisions have been analysed using ’cluster 
analysis'. The result is shown in Figure VT1—1. The
method used rests on the calculation of agreement scores 
between all individual pairs of aldermen.  ^ The number 
of times a pair agreed is expressed as a percentage of 
the number of times they were both present and voted from 
amongst the total number of divisions. The scores are
entered in a matrix which shows graphically the existence
2of blocs. In the present case, the rather low cut-off
point of an agreement score of 60 is used, but in fact
the majority of scores within each of the blocs are higher
3than 70* The diagram shows two blocs, one composed of
five members of the Progressive Independent group, and one 
composed of six members. In fact, this latter bloc, of all 
of the North and East Ward representatives, showed greater 
solidarity. The mean agreement score of these aldermen
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Figure VI1-1 Cluster_AnaljsiA Bankstpvn_C< 
Voting Divisions,, Showing Blocs
Bowman
Lockwood
100 92
Keenan 95 85 79
Wood 66 83 66 87
77 85 83 68 62Jamieson
Mcllveen
Duncan
Buchanan 80 81
Gillman 66 62 82
Parker 70 62 75 61
CO
North Ward; Bowman (ALP) 
Wood 
Keenan
South Ward: Buchanan (Pi) 
Duncan (Pi) 
Parker (Pi)
East Ward: L ockwood
McGuigan 
Jamiesofi (ALP)
West Ward: Mcllveen (PI) 
Carruthers* (Pi) 
Gillman (PI)
* Mayor
PI - Progressive Independent
Source: Council Minutes, record of twenty nine voting divisions December 
1968 to April 1971
191
was 82, whilst the five in the other bloc showed a score 
of 72. The remaining alderman was the Mayor for 1969 and 
1970> and although a Progressive Independent, he had a 
higher mean agreement score with the other bloc (56 as 
against 44).
If we look at the sorts of issues that were the
subject of divisions and from which these bloc patterns
derive, we see that many were concerned with basic policy
matters with which the Progressive Independents were
identified. One such was the general attitude that growth
and development were to be welcomed and encouraged. The
group voted in concert over the principle of permitting
flat development in the municipality. A number of
development applications saw some Progressive Independent
aldermen (but never in fact all of them) voting against
taking what they called an 1unreasonable1 or 'harsh' line
with developers in seeking to impose conditions or refusing
applications. One major issue that saw the group close
its ranks against the rest of the council was a proposal
to levy a local rate on industrial property, against the
opposition of industrial property owners. In this matter,
as in the case of flat development, the group — composed
as we have seen of local businessmen — in fact acted in
4the interests of local business.
The blocs not only show a split between the Progressive 
Independents and the rest, but between aldermen from the 
northern part of the municipality and aldermen from the 
southern part. This added a different dimension to the 
division of the council into two blocs. North and East
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Ward aldermen were continually wary of any move by the 
Progressive Independents to obtain an ’unfair’ share of 
council resources for their wards, and the Progressive 
Independents often reacted likewise. Thus, South and West 
Ward aldermen attempted to delay a move by East Ward 
aldermen to obtain approval for a youth centre in their 
ward, until plans for one in the South Ward had come to 
fruition. Several of the divisions involved ward 
'demarcation disputes'. One North Ward alderman complained 
at the decision to cut down some trees outside the new 
South Ward youth centre, but was told to keep out of an 
issue that was essentially a local 'ward matter', and 
should be left to the discretion of the ward aldermen.
This produced a 6—6 division. The reframing of a lease 
agreement with a soccer club led to a division on similar 
lines over whether the task should be delegated to a 
committee of East Ward aldermen, or to a committee of the 
whole council. A major dispute that brought out the 
inter—ward conflicts was the proposals supported by 
Progressive Independents to re—draw the ward boundaries. 
North and East Ward aldermen claimed it was a 'gerrymander' 
against their interests.
In spite of these disputes, which were occasionally 
quite bitter, there were several important factors in the 
decision making process that served to minimise conflict.
It has already been mentioned that on some issues there 
was basic agreement that cut across the lines of division 
I have drawn. The policy of increasing expenditure on 
parks and the attempts to increase the volume of public
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works were two important examples. Furthermore, the role 
of the mayor indicated by his almost neutral position in 
the pattern of bloc divisions was an important mediating 
influence. He adopted almost a ’presidential’ role, 
attempting to stay aloof of some of the squabbles on 
the floor of the council chamber. On one occasion, for 
instance, he cast his vote as chairman against his fellow 
group members, having originally voted with them to 
produce a 6—6 tie. He did this to maintain the status quo. 
In mayoral elections he had the support of some aldermen 
outside the Progressive Independent group. In the council 
chamber he often put the point of view of officials, almost 
as an executive leader of the administration, rather than 
an alderman, a member of the Progressive Independents, 
or a ward representative. In fact, when first elected 
the council voted to grant him an allowance of $10,000, 
intended virtually as a salary, or at least as compensation 
for his time devoted to the position. This was forbidden 
by the Minister on the grounds that it was contrary to 
the spirit of the Act, which espoused the principle that 
aldermanic service was purely voluntary. The council, 
then, acknowledged that he should in some measure play an 
active role as executive leader. As mayor, he was 
responsible for several policy initiatives, notably the 
construction of a new civic centre. Again, these 
initiatives cut across ward or bloc divisions.
These features of the decision making process were in 
contrast to those of previous years, when the council was 
continually divided between Progressive Independents and
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supporters, and the ALP group and supporters. Conflicts 
had been bitter and disputes protracted. In similar 
circumstances, a system of committees that had once 
operated had been abolished, because in the words of one 
official, ’it just meant things were being argued twice, 
it was wasting time’. In other words, divisions in the 
council prevented the operation of the important norm that 
a committee decision should normally be accepted. Not 
only were divisions between ALP groups and others a reason, 
but ward divisions as well contributed to this.
Although conflict between the wards was a cause of 
the division of the council into two blocs, parochial 
ward interests were recognised by conventions which 
allowed some measure of autonomy to ward aldermen in 
making decisions on ’ward matters’. These conventions 
were rarely challenged, and helped minimise inter—ward 
conflict. Ward aldermen were often delegated authority 
to work out final details of approval for development 
applications in conjunction with the town planner, or to 
implement or elaborate the details of other council 
decisions. Funds for the council works programme were 
divided in four equal parts, one quarter for each ward, 
and ward aldermen had complete autonomy in determining a 
ward works programme. The Parks Committee contained one 
alderman from each ward, and reached agreement on the parks 
expenditure programme on a basis of approximate equity 
between the wards. Although conflicts over policy matters 
were important in council decision making, it was 
these ward matters that were the ’bread and butter’
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of local politics, It was for this reason that many of 
the disputes centred on the protection of parochial ward 
interests by ward aldermen,
2. BURWOOD
As we saw in Table Vll—1, Burwood operated with a 
full committee system which worked as it was intended to. 
Council meetings were generally short and the great majority 
of committee recommendations were adopted without debate.
The council generally was prepared to accept that a 
decision arrived at by a committee was * as good as* a 
decision that could be arrived at by the council as a whole. 
Several other factors contributed to this feature of 
council decision making. The council was not polarised 
on any consistent basis into blocs or groups; aldermen 
preferred reaching private agreements and compromises to 
airing disputes in public; and the mayor fulfilled an 
important mediating role.
There were five ALP members on the council and two 
from the Liberal Party, The mayor was a member of the ALP, 
elected with the support of several non—Labor members for 
each of the three years 1968—71* Party divisions were 
generally not important in council issues, with one or two 
exceptions such as matters concerning industrial relations. 
Several aldermen, asked to name those issues that had 
aroused most controversy, either replied there were none, 
or sounded rather dubious about labelling those they named 
as 'controversies', Phrases such as 'this is a friendly 
council' or 'we all get on together, there are no factions 
or personal animosities', were some indication of the lack
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of polarisation, as well as support for the norm that 
disputes should be settled amicably in private. This was 
described by the mayor:
Differences are often settled outside the council 
or committee informally. Aldermen get together 
and groups meet and decide things. This is a 
good thing. 5
Rather than ’grandstand* or work up controversies in the 
heat of public debate, aldermen approved of the principle 
that matters should be settled quietly and informally.
Far from showing evidence of publicly visible polarisation 
in council divisions, divisions in fact were never called*, 
The nearest the council came to publicly registering major 
disputes was through a show of hands. The vast majority 
of motions were passed on the murmur of ’the voices’ and 
it was generally known beforehand what the result would be. 
The general lack of controversy was also commented on by 
the mayor:
Few issues call for a line-up on party political 
lines. In recent years, in fact, this council 
has been very harmonious in all respects. Take 
the last rate increase of 8 per cent. Once the 
need was seen the support was unanimous. °
These features were to a large degree a direct reflection
of the overall state of quiescence that characterised local
politics in Burwood.
Committee membership was determined on the basis of 
personal preferences of members, with seniority being a 
deciding factor. There was, however, one case of an 
independent alderman being voted off a committee because he 
failed to vote as expected in a mayoral election. Apart 
from this there was no evidence of any attempt by any group 
to ’pack* committees. One exceptional feature of the
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committee system was that the mayor was chairman of all, 
and they met at different times to allow him to perform 
this role* This was just one indication of the important 
mediating role of the mayor* Further evidence of this 
was provided by responses of aldermen to a question asked 
in the questionnaire* Respondents were asked to name 
those aldermen they considered should be the «most 
respected' and also to separately name those they considered 
most often had their opinions accepted by the rest of the 
council.« Respondents could name as many other aldermen 
as they wished, or if they wanted, themselves® Two in 
fact named themselves as being influential* For each 
question, nine responses were received, so that a complete 
pattern of reciprocal choices could not be drawn up for 
the twelve aldermen. Table VI1—2 shows the number of 
choices each alderman received, whilst Figure VI1—2 shows 
also who made these choices* Generally speaking, those 
that were most respected also were attributed with the 
most influence* They were 4, 5 and 7® 4 was the mayor,
5 was his opponent for the mayoralty, and in fact won the 
position following the 1971 elections, and 7 had been an 
alderman for over thirty years and mayor several timesfl 
Figure Vll—2 shows clearly the central position 
occupied by the mayor (4) in the pattern of relationships 
measured* (The pattern was very similar for the other 
part of the question) » The split between A.L.P aldermen 
and the rest is evident, particularly from the reluctance 
of non—Labor aldermen to choose Labor members* However, 
there were several choices from Labor to non—Labor aldermen,
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Table_VIT -2 A]I dprmen Respected and Considered Influential by their
Colleagues
Number of choices received
Alderman Party Ward Respected Influential
1. ALP West 0 1
2. - West 1 0
3. ALP West 1 0
4.« ALP West 8 6
5. Lib. East 4 4
6. - East 1 0
7. - East 7 6
8. - East 2 3
9. Lib. N orth 0 0
10. ALP North 1 0
11. ALP North 0 0
12.
* Mayor
North 2 1
Source: Questionnaire, Questions 14(a) and (b)
Figure VIT-2 Pattern of Choices_.of_ Aldermen for ’Most Respected'
Cpllepg.ups
N.R. No response to the question was received from 2,6, or 11. 2 and 6 
were choices of other aldermen, but 11 was not mentioned, and does 
not anpear in the diagram.
For party membership see Table VTT-2 above.
Source: Questionnaire. 14(a)
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and the Mayor was notable in this regard. He roeeived 
mention by aldermen regardless of their party membership. 
These patterns of choice serve to emphasise the mayor’s 
position as a mediator. This was a role he saw himself 
as playing, although he did also attempt to make several 
policy initiatives. in some of these he was successful.
He was associated with moves to purchase commercial 
properties by the council for consolidation and resale 
and with policies for flat development and its control.
He also was a major force behind the decisions to delegate 
greater authority to the officials that we noted in the 
previous chapter. The council was relatively isolated 
from outside pressures, including parochial ward 
pressures. An ’executive—centred’ style of decision 
making, in which the mayor accepted the constraints 
imposed by the need to compromise and reach agreements 
amongst aldermen, but in which the paid officials through 
the committee system and through delegation of authority 
piayed an important role, was one that suited the political 
situation.
3. KU—RING—GAJ
in contrast to Burwood, council meetings in Ku—ring—gai 
were occasions for long debates and the public airing of 
controversy. Bather than being exceptional, divisions 
were the norm for matters of contention, as aldermen insisted 
on publicly registering their stands. Most major 
controversies were the subject of rescission motions.
A motion to rescind a decision can be given within a short 
time after the decision is taken and the matter then 
comes before the next council meeting. This never
happened in Burwood, but in Ku—ring—gai it was commonplace.
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The major reason for these characteristics of council 
decision making was the polarisation of the council between 
the new majority, elected on the Ratepayers Committee 
ticket, and the remainder of the aldermen, most of them 
of long service« The mayor for 1969 and 1970 was elected 
by the majority and had been a prominent member of the 
Ratepayers Defence League« The initial polarisation of 
the council meant that his role as mayor was a partisan 
one« He used his casting vote when required to support 
the stands taken by the new majority« He had few links 
with the old aldermen, but had had a somewhat stormy 
political career on the council prior to 1968 , including 
one occasion on which the council expelled him from meetings 
for engaging in fisticuffs with a fellow alderman. As 
mayor, he made little if any effort to adopt a mediating 
role in order to try and achieve consensus or compromise, 
and clearly his position within the council did not really 
suit him for such a role« indeed by his somewhat liberal 
interpretation of standing orders in chairing council 
meetings, and his refusal to exert leadership, the tendency 
for long and often acrimonious debates in the council 
chamber was accentuated« He preferred to let the council 
argue matters out rather than intervene to achieve a 
settlement»
An analysis of the 82 voting divisions in council 
meetings in the two years 1969—70 shows the nature of the 
split between aldermen supported by the Ratepayers Committee 
and the minority who opposed them at the 1968 elections« 
Figure Vll—3 shows that taking all divisions, the minority
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showed a greater degree of solidarity as a bloc than the 
majority. Figure VI1—4 gives some indication of the 
extent to which this bloc pattern was due to the issue of 
finance, and shows the very high level of cohesion of each 
of the blocs on finance divisions of which there were 3 0 .
The Ratepayers aldermen strongly denied they caucused or 
that they were subject to any influence from the Ratepayers 
Defence League or the Ratepayers Committee. In fact, some 
members of the group resisted suggestions by others that 
the group should meet regularly to decide stands to be 
taken on council issues, and such meetings did not take 
place. Officials of the Ratepayers organisations made 
little if any real effort to exercise direct influence on 
the group as a whole. The group’s cohesion on finance 
matters, and the cohesion of the minority, were the result 
of firmly held policy stands and common electoral commitments.
Within the ratepayers majority, one alderman in
particular (MacMillan) showed a tendency to waver from
7the stand taken by the other members of the group.
This results in a lower mean agreement score for members 
of the ratepayers bloc than for the opposition minority 
bloc on finance matters. These mean agreement scores are 
shown in Table Vll—3. Excluding MacMillan, the score for
the ratepayers bloc on finance divisions goes up from 
83 to 88. The low score amongst the majority group for 
non—finance matters shows that group cohesion did not 
carry over from matters concerned with the level of the rate. 
Agreement scores ranged from 29 to 71« In fact, two blocs 
were identifiable within the majority group on non—finance
Figure VII-J Cluster^ Analysis, Kit.ringrgai 
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divisions. J a g o , Basto and Keogh formed a distinct bloc, 
with agreement scores of 67» 71 and 71» (Some evidence 
of this is seen in Figure Vll—3 )• The mean agreement 
score with the remainder of the majority group was 45 j and 
ranged from 29 to 31* Amongst these other four aldermen 
(Bennett, Turner, Strenger and MacMillan), the mean 
agreement score was 63, ranging from 37 to 70* The 
lowest inter—bloc agreement scores occurred between Turner 
and each of the three in the other bloc. An important 
aspect of the division between these blocs was the 
opposition of these three to Turner as mayor in many issues 
with which he was identified, for instance, through a 
motion contained in a mayoral minute. The three also 
tended to take more 'militant1 stances in opposing 
developments that aroused residents' protests than the 
other aldermen.
Table Vll—3 Mean Agreement Scores for bloc members
Ratepayers Opposition
All divisions (N = 82)1 63 77
Finance (N = 30;1 83 94
N o n —finance (N = 52]> 53 71
S o u r c e : Council Minutes, 82 recorded divisions.
The opposition retained a much higher level of 
cohesion in no n —finance divisions. Much of this was due 
to stands taken in defence of traditional council policies 
of various sorts, which the newer aldermen had fewer qualms 
about questioning. All except one of the minority had been 
aldermen for at least one term prior to 1968. Part of their 
cohesion was probably due to personal relationships they 
had developed over their long terms as fellow aldermen.
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The analysis of voting divisions enables us also to 
look at the question of ward parochialism. In Ku-ring—gai 
the membership of some committees was determined on the 
basis of equal ward representation, and there was some 
evidence that in minor matters, the norm of ward autonomy 
operated. Thus, ward aldermen had the major say in 
determining a programme of works within their wards.
We have seen how the issue of the rate produced a 
fundamental division of the council into two blocs, but 
this did not entail overriding ward parochialism as a 
factor in decision making on some other matters. Whilst 
progress associations were of less importance than formerly, 
there were other organisations exerting pressures on ward 
aldermen, which even those with their victory as ratepayers 
candidates behind them sometimes considered it unwise to 
ignore•
Assuming that the three ward aldermen perceived the 
interests of their ward in the same way, one might expect 
them to vote in unison on matters directly affecting their 
ward, if ward pressures were important for them. Such 
ward matters included development applications, the siting 
of facilities and also several divisions over the drawing 
of new ward boundaries. For Roseville and Gordon—Killara 
Wards, the number of ward matters was insufficient for 
analysis and in both cases the problem was compounded 
by high absenteeism on these divisions. The number of 
ward-related divisions in the other two wards was still 
rather small, particularly in Wahroonga Ward. However, 
Table VI1—4 compares agreement scores between ward aldermen 
for ward—related divisions and all other non—finance
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divisions. This comparison removes the influence of 
the major cleavage over finance matters. it does seem 
evident that cohesion amongst ward aldermen generally was 
greater for ward—related matters than for other issues.
Table VI1 —4 Agreement Scores on Ward Matters
Agreement Scores
Wahroonga Ward Ward Matters Non—Ward Matters
Basto - Strenger 67 47Basto — Turner 67 38Turner — Strenger 79 64
Mean: 71 Mean: 50
( N = 14 ) ( N = 38 )
Pymble—St Ives Ward
Bennett — Mason 60 55Bennett — Rickard 71 54Rickard — Mason 93 76
Mean: 73 Mean: 62
( N = 20 ) ( N = 32 )
Source: Council Minutes, 52 non—finance divisions.
This occurred regardless of the relationship between ward 
members over finance matters. All three in Wahroonga were 
members of the majority bloc, whilst in the other ward 
Bennett, also a ratepayers alderman, was on the opposite 
side to Mason and Rickard on this issue. In Wahroonga, 
Basto disagreed more often than he agreed with his ward 
colleagues on matters that were not concerned with ward 
issues, or finance. Amongst non—finance issues, thd 
influence of ward pressures changed this to a fairly high 
level of agreement on ward matters. In Pymble—St Ives 
Ward, agreement scores between all three aldermen increased 
when ward pressures were relevant considerations. It 
does seem, in fact, that aldermen were subject to the 
influence of parochial demands when these were relevant
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and when the major issue of local politics — the level of 
the rate - was not at stake. This applied as much to 
new as to old aldermen.
4. LEICHHARDT
Of Leichhardt's eighteen aldermen, fourteen were 
Labor Party members. Of the four others, three were from 
the Balmain Ward. They acted as an opposition, voicing 
the demands of local residents' groups and crystallising 
the issues that proved important in defeating the Labor 
Party at the 1971 elections. The Labor majority applied 
the rules of caucus decision making to every item that 
appeared on the council agenda. A meeting of the Labor 
caucus would go through every item and a majority decision 
would be taken. It was in the caucus that conflicts 
within the Labor group were resolved. They never emerged 
onto the floor of the chamber. During 1968—171, no Labor 
aldermen broke the rule of caucus solidarity by voting 
against a majority caucus decision. Thus, every item 
that was made an issue by the opposition produced an 
entirely predictable result. Matters of contention 
might prompt two speakers from the Labor group, the mover 
and the seconder, to answer the opposition. Council 
meetings were not occasions for debate and decision, but 
opportunities for Labor aldermen to explain or justify 
decisions already taken and for opposition aldermen to 
attempt to make political capital.
Within the caucus the norm of ward autonomy was 
adhered to. For most ALP aldermen the 'bread and butter' 
of local politics were parochial ward issues, of direct
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concern to their ward constituents and their local party 
branches. In most cases, for matters that had no extra- 
ward political importance, the three ward aldermen would 
decide the issue and the remainder of caucus would accept 
their decision. One alderman described the operation 
of this norm:
If you have the numbers in the council, you leave 
it up to the ward aldermen. If they don’t know 
their people they are in trouble. I wouldn’t 
buy into an argument over flats in another ward, 
that’s for the people in those areas, they should 
go to their boys and sort it out. But over 
things like the town hall, the swimming pool, g 
the new library, that’s a matter for all of us.
The norm was justified by aldermen in terms of the need to
have ’local knowledge', or that they should 'know their
people' as the alderman quoted above said. This also
contained the more pragmatic consideration that ward
aldermen ought best to be able to judge the political
implications of local issues. There were occasions,
however, when the arrangement caused the Labor majority
some embarrassment, when favours granted by ward aldermen
were found to have broader implications. One such case,
when a flat development was approved that was contrary
to the council's draft planning scheme and created a
considerable amount of controversy, was described by an
alderman from a neighbouring wards
We had to support it to the hilt in public because 
of the majority decision in caucus. The ward 
aldermen had the say there, we didn't like the 
decision at all. They should have known.
If they knew what was going to happen they might 
have thought different. 9
The importance of ward parochialism was seen also in 
the way decisions were made over matters of public works
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programming. These were matters of considerable controversy 
in the caucus as ward aldermen fought to obtain a lair 
'slice of the cake'. Ward separatism was encouraged when 
the redrawing of the City of Sydney boundaries added Glebe 
to Leichhardt municipality as a separate ward. Glebe's 
problems and political background were foreign to the rest 
of the aldermen, and vice versa, and pressures from Glebe 
aldermen to maintain in Glebe a considerably higher 
standard of services than Leichhardt had previously 
provided, accentuated inter—ward conflicts. These 
parochial considerations were not generally evident on 
the floor of the council chamber, because of the religious 
adherence to caucus discipline. However, it was the 
practice for ward aldermen to move and second motions 
for matters that affected their ward — such as development 
applications in their area, and so on. This was expected 
of ward aldermen even on those occasions when the majority 
of the caucus had decided the matter had extra—ward 
significance, and overriden the ward aldermen.^
Where the Labor majority was unassailable and caucus 
rules strictly adhered to, the caucus meeting provided 
the crucial arena for council decision making. In this 
arena, the importance of distributive issues for aldermen 
was recognised by the virtual delegation of authority to 
ward aldermen on ward matters. In this respect the 
decision making process was similar to ßankstown. On 
both councils, so long as broader issues did not impinge 
on the granting of favours of various sorts by ward 
aldermen, arrangements that recognised the common interest
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of fellow ward members were adopted. Jn Ku—ring—gai these 
informal arrangements were less evident, although ward 
parochialism did reveal itself in the stands taken by- 
aldermen. In Liverpool, as we shall see, the fundamental 
partisan split between Labor and non—Labor aldermen added 
a new dimension that actually inhibited the making of 
such arrangements.
5. LIVERPOOL
The 1968 council was split evenly between ALP aldermen 
and independents. The ALP group regularly caucused on 
issues it chose. In each of the three years 1968—171 the 
mayor was an ALP member. In 1969 and 1970» this resulted 
from a drawing of lots after a 6—6 vote, but in 1971 the 
ALP had the support of two independents for its candidate. 
The mayoralty gave the ALP caucus ‘the numbers' in the 
council through his casting vote, when the council was 
split 6—6 on any issue.
The domination of council decision making by the 
Labor caucus was due in part to its majority, but also to 
the frequency with which independent aldermen split on 
issues. The council decision making process was not 
always characterised by the split between the ALP group 
and an 'opposition'. One indication of this was the 
ALP's decision not to insist on 'packing' every committee 
with a Labor majority. It is likely that such a policy 
of confrontation would have been counter-productive.
Thus, in 1970 when committee memberships were determined 
by agreement between the caucus and the rest of the council, 
and adopted in the chamber by a 'blanket' motion, on two
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of the major committees only two of the five member's were 
Labor aldermen, and on three the chairman was an 
independent. in L970 and 1971 the chairman of the finance 
committee was in fact a prominent local Liberal Party 
member. In 1971» three of the five chairmen of the major 
committees were independents and only on three was there 
an ALP majority. However, these three — parks, development 
and works — were perhaps the most important in terms of 
the Labor teams* policies. Furthermore, through their 
control of the council they could upset a committee 
recommendation•
in spite of the support from two non—Labor aldermen 
in 19711 the mayoralty remained essentially a partisan 
position. He was subject to caucus rules and caucus 
majority decisions and this imposed a constraint on his 
independence of action and his ability to take initiatives.
The division of the council into Labor and anti —
Labor blocs is shown in Figure Vll—5* Voting divisions 
were not the norm in Liverpool. Aldermen registered 
their public stands on issues by asking that their names 
be recorded as opposing a resolution, or by signing their 
names to motions of rescission. The data used for the 
figure consists of these recorded ’opposition v otes’ and 
co—sponsorships of motions in 1969“70« Together they 
totalled one hundred. The data suffer from a number of 
faults. Some aldermen were far more eager to record 
their stands and sign their names to motions than others 
and I have made no adjustment to the co-agreements to take 
this into account. The number of names recorded in each
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vote or co—sponsorship ranged from two up to six. There 
may have been others in agreement and the data does not 
distinguish them from those in disagreement. What the 
co-sponsorships and recorded votes do show are the 
occasional mutual choices by aldermen of allies, across 
a wide range of issues. They do not show a total pattern 
of agreements and disagreements on each of the occasions. 
In the Figure, the ’scores* represent the number of times 
a pair of aldermen were found in agreement in a 
co—sponsorship or a recorded opposition vote.
The ALP bloc and the non—Labor bloc are fairly well 
defined in Figure Vll—5. There were, however, several
inter—bloc agreements between aldermen. Some of these 
occurred over uncontroversial matters, but others did 
involve controversy. Most were matters over which the 
caucus took no stand, largely because of a tied vote in 
the caucus, when Labor aldermen were left free to vote 
as they wished in the council. Several such issues 
involved flat development control, the issue being whether 
or not to enforce the council’s draft planning regulations 
that prohibited flats in areas that had formerly been 
zoned for flat development. Three Labor aldermen 
consistently voted in favour of upholding the new 
regulations and in doing so usually found themselves in 
a minority with one or two non—Labor aldermen.
The data do not provide conclusive evidence of the 
relevance of ward parochialism for the decision making 
process. Taking all inter-personal agreements, the mean
for all those that occurred between fellow ward aldermen
2 1 3
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was 5.4. The mean of all those that occurred between 
aldermen from different wards was 4.4. This difference, 
not very great in itself, is probably largely attributable 
to the party composition of ward members. South Ward 
contained three ALP aldermen and East Ward three non —
Labor aldermen, whilst in North Ward there were two of 
each. The greatest differences between intra and extra- 
ward agreements occurred in South and East Wards.
The relative lack of importance of ward parochialism 
was also seen in other ways. Ward aldermen were not 
equally represented on committees, not even the important 
pork barrel committees of works and parks. One reason 
can be seen in the case of the parks committee in 
particular. The committee was set up in I967 at the 
instigation of Labor aldermen in line with a programme to 
obtain greater expenditure on parks and recreational 
and sporting facilities. In particular, it was Labor 
policy to concentrate on servicing the new Green Valley 
housing estate situated in the North Ward and the new 
residential areas in the South Ward. Thus, the agreed 
poLicy in the Labor group — five of whose six members 
were from these two wards — overrode pressures for an 
equal consideration for all wards. In fact, East Ward 
aldermen did not just sit back inactive. In L971 they 
gained representation on the works and parks committees, 
the deputy mayor for 1971» Alderman Gard - whose Catholicism 
in agreeing with fellow aldermen in co-sponsoring motions 
is seen in Figure Vll — 5 — w^ as from the East Ward and he and 
a fellow ward alderman voted for Bradshaw, the Labor mayor
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in 197-1-• Winning consideration for the interests of 
their ward involved making arrangements with the Labor 
majority. This was an indication of the absence of 
arrangements such as those found in Bankstown and 
Leichhardt that recognised the ward as an autonomous 
political unit for some purposes through such devices 
as the division of funds and the delegation of authority 
to ward aldermen to deal with ’ward matters*. The 
partisan division of the council cut across ward divisions. 
6. NORTH SIDNEY
During the three years 1968—'71 the issues surrounding 
flat development in the municipality came to completely 
dominate council politics. In 1969 the mayor was one 
of those who was least sympathetic to the demands of local 
residents' groups, but as these demands became more 
persistent and the council more polarised his position 
as a minority bloc member became more difficult. The 
mayor elected for two terms in 1970—71 was more closely 
identified with the group of aldermen sympathetic towards 
demands to curb flat development, and the deputy mayors 
in these two years were amongst those most sympathetic 
to the residents' groups; one was subsequently mayor in 
1972 and the other deputy mayor, both having been elected 
as Resident Action candidates. The mayor of 1970—71 had 
promised to use his casting vote in favour of the status 
quo. However, on this issue of flat development, the 
council was so divided that mediation was generally om,
of the question
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Although the council operated with committees, these 
met in public and consisted of the whole council. There 
had been moves to form a committee system in the traditional 
mould on several occasions, moves that were supported by 
the staff and recommended by the department of local 
government. They were defeated on the grounds that 
decisions should not be made ’behind closed doors’.
This was evidence of the influence of local groups upon 
the decision making process, for it was clearly implied 
in the argument that these decisions ’behind closed doors’ 
would be ones that could be more easily influenced by 
developers than residents. The openness of the council 
decision making process itself was an important feature. 
Decisions about flat applications were reached on the 
floor of the council chamber, often after numerous 
amendments moved by various aldermen. On most occasions 
it was quite apparent that informal compromises or 
agreements had not been worked out to completely resolve 
a particular issue. The public arena of the council 
meeting was where this process of confrontation and 
compromise occurred. Over a particular flat development 
the council would vote on several amendments, relating 
to the intensity of development or the height of the 
building and other such details, as well as whether or not 
to permit any redevelopment at all, until a majority 
decision was reached on a resolution. On many such 
occasions the council would divide formally, making this 
procedure a normal means of registering a vote. from these
divisions we can see how the council was divided into blocs
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Figure VI1—6 shows a cluster analysis using agreement 
scores on divisions taken between August 19^9 and 
November 1970 that directly concerned planning matters. 
These total 57 and include some that occurred in the 
planning committee as well as those in the council, in 
all there were bb divisions in council meetings and from 
these 47 were directly involved with planning issues.
Of the rest, the majority were related to these issues, 
particularly procedural motions such as dissent from 
mayoral rulings. These have not been included amongst 
those from which Figure Vll—6 is derived.
At the level of an agreement score of 60, the council 
did not divide itself into two clear-cut blocs. However, 
it is apparent that there was a tendency towards a 
majority and minority bloc pattern. The majority included 
those sympathetic towards the demands of residents* groups. 
There were two clear blocs occurring at the level of an 
agreement score of approximately 80. One, consisting 
of Mitchell, Hutley and Bugler was identifiable from the 
content of the issues over which the council divided as 
being favourable towards permitting flat development in 
spite of protests from local residents. The other, 
Hamilton, Tranter and Haviland took the opposing stand.
Id these we can add Woodward and perhaps Bailey. All 
of these latter aldermen, except Haviland, were endorsed 
by Hesident Action at the 1971 elections, as also were 
Brew and Wyllie. One difficulty in using these planning 
divisions is that many of them were over compromise 
proposals. I have identified the blocs as deriving from
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the positions adopted by aldermen over one general issue, 
flat development, but the actual divisions entailed taking 
stands on matters where the general issue was considerably 
blurred. The two opposed blocs identified above represent 
the most consistent pro and anti—development stands within 
these divisions. The remainder of aldermen, at least 
a third, were less consistent in this respect. There 
is also some evidence that these two blocs acted in some 
respects as groups within the council, taking pre­
considered concerted stands and promoting agreed motions. 
Certainly, the anti—development group became closely knit 
in pursuing its policies as the 1971 elections approached, 
and they themselves played an important role in forming 
the coalition of local residents’ groups that emerged as 
a local party at the elections.
As was pointed out in discussing local interest groups, 
resident groups were of the neighbourhood type. One 
might expect them to exert most influence on ward aldermen, 
particularly if the issues were defined as being in some 
degree of a distributive nature. The general bloc pattern 
would suggest that aldermen tended to take relatively 
consistent stands on the broader regulative issues involved — 
that is pro or anti—flat development. However, we do see 
that these stands were by no means entirely consistent for 
individual aldermen. One factor that needs to be considered 
is the extent to which aldermen's voting behaviour on 
flat development issues was influenced by ward pressures.
The majority of flat development occurred in two wards, 
East Ward and Tunks Ward, during this period. Of the
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57 divisions 37 involved development applications or 
planning proposals in these wards. In the other three 
wards there were insufficient divisions to make any 
analysis of the voting behaviour of ward aldermen 
worthwhile. Table VI1—5 compares agreement scores for 
ward aldermen in Tunks and East Wards on ward matters, 
with scores on the remaining planning divisions.
Table Vll—5 Agreement Scores on Ward Matters (Planning)
Agreement Scores
Tunks Ward Ward Matters Non—Ward Matters
Brunton—Cook 82 68
Brunton—Fitzpatrick 69 42
Cook—Fitzpatrick 92 36
Mean: 81 Mean: 49
(N = 18) o\11
East Ward
Mitehe11—Tranter 6 37
Mi t ehe 11—Wy H i e 43 65
Tranter—Wyllie 56 65
Mean: 35 Mean: 55
(N = 19) 00r\11
Source: Council Minutes, 57 planning divisions.
In Tunks Ward the difference in agreement scores does 
seem to indicate that aldermen were acting in response to 
commonly perceived ward interests when these were relevant 
in making decisions about planning matters. The greatest 
increase in agreement scores occurred between Fitzpatrick 
and the remaining two. Fitzpatrick was identified in 
Figure Vll—6 as one of those identifiable with the anti- 
development bloc. Cook was more closely identified 
with the pro—development bloc, whilst Brunton fell between 
the two. However, Brunton’s mean agreement score with 
the three aldermen in the anti—development bloc was only
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36, whilst with Mitchell, Bugler and Hutley, his mean 
score was 53» It can be said, then, that Cook and 
Brunton - but particularly Cook — were persuaded to 
oppose flat development in their own wards more often 
than in other wards. In other wards they tended to 
support applications for flat development.
In East Ward, the position is very different, 
Mitchell and Tranter were in the opposing blocs and it 
seems clear that on ward matters their stands were even 
firmer in opposition than for other development issues, 
it is possible that they were both influenced by ward 
pressures, but that they viewed them differently.
Mitchell was attentive to pro—development interests, 
Tranter to anti—development interests. The third 
alderman, whose stand was extremely unpredictable on 
the broad issue, seems to have been equally so on ward 
matters.
The influence of local groups and residents who 
opposed flat development applications certainly was 
important in the decision making process. For most 
aldermen though, their stands on the flat issue revealed 
in these divisions were taken without the direct pressure 
of ward interests on them. It is important to note, in 
fact, that most of the groups concerned consistently 
contacted those aldermen they knew to be sympathetic to 
their aims, rather than just their ward aldermen. This, 
of course, was in direct contrast to the approaches made 
by progress associations over parochial issues. In 
other words, as we have seen, the flat issue was not just
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a parochial one, even though there seems evidence of local 
ward pressures playing a role in altering stands generally 
taken by some aldermen on this issue.
FOOTNOTES
1. For a description of the method see D, B. Truman,
The Congressional Party, (New York, Knopf, 1959)
pp. 320—26
2. The matrix is constructed by first entering in the 
top left corner the two aldermen with the highest 
agreement score. The remaining list of pairs is 
searched for the next highest agreement score between 
a pair that includes a member already in the matrix. 
Subsequent entries are made in the same way until 
all pairs are exhausted. The shape of the matrix 
depends on the level of agreement taken as a cut­
off point. If a council is polarised, it may be 
that at some point there will be no score above the 
cut-off point between an alderman already entered 
and those not entered, and this will indicate where 
one bloc ends and the other begins in the matrix.
In this situation, the next entry is the highest 
remaining agreement score between any two aldermen. 
However, if there are ’independents’, as well as 
blocs, it may be more sensible to enter them before 
commencing with members of the next bloc, even 
though this entails entering a score below that 
chosen as a cut-off point. (A true 'independent* 
in a two party system will have an agreement score 
of 50 with members of both blocs).
In the present case, there is an ’independent’ and 
this is revealed in the construction of the matrix 
using a cut-off point of 60 when he gets entered 
between the two blocs.
3. Bowman’s score of 100 with Lockwood occurred with a 
high rate of absenteeism on Bowman’s part. He was 
elected at a by-election in 1969 and missed the first 
ten divisions. The alderman he replaced is not 
included in the calculations.
4. I use the two terms 'groups* and 'blocs' to distinguish 
between aldermen who show some evidence of cohesion, 
unity of purpose and selectivity of membership and 
aldermen who share some common attribute, such as
an attitude, common ward membership, and so on.
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We thus need evidence additional to that provided 
by cluster analysis to identify a group rather than 
just a bloc or category. In the case of the 
Progressive Independents, they were characterised 
as a local party with identifiable aims and policies. 
They maintained close personal relationships and 
frequently acted in concert. These characteristics 
distinguished them from the remaining aldermen, 
although the latters high cohesion in voting behaviour 
might indicate they also acted as a group. It is 
probably more appropriate to describe them as a 
faction, in the sense F. G. Bailey uses the term, 
that is an alliance without an overriding purpose, 
composed of transactional links rather than moral 
ones. [See F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils, 
(Oxford, Blackwell 1969) pp^ 51—5 J• The Progressive
Independents on the other hand were more than a 
faction, as the group pursued consistent aims apart 
from the pragmatic one of political success for 
each of its separate members. For a discussion 
of 'groups’ and 'categories' in relation to cluster 
analysis see Peter Loveday, 'Grouping M. P.'s:
The Use of Cluster Analysis', Politics, November 1970» 
pp. 180—194
5. Personal Interview conducted September 1970
6. Personal Interview conducted September 1970
7. The matrix in Figure Vll—4 was constructed so as to 
place MacMillan, the majority bloc member, with
the lowest intra—bloc and the highest extra—bloc 
agreement scores in between the two blocs. Of 
the 35 inter—bloc agreement scores, 19 were less 
than 10.
8. Personal Interview conducted May 1971
9. Personal Interview conducted April 1971
10. This occurred during the dispute over which the 
Balmain aldermen Wyner, Origlass and Graham were 
expelled from the Labor Party for defying a caucus 
decision. In the first instance, Origlass did 
in fact move a motion to which he and his fellow 
Balmain ward aldermen were opposed. When the same 
issue was revived later, the rest of the caucus 
used this as evidence of their 'opportunism', when 
in fact they had not at that stage gone so far as to 
defy the discipline of caucus. It was when they 
finally followed local sentiment (including resolutions 
passed by the Balmain branch of the party) and 
voted in the council against the caucus decision 
that disciplinary action was instigated, and the 
branch disbanded and reformed. These events occurred 
prior to 1968.
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Chapter VI11 CASE STUDIES IN PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
The aim of preceding chapters has been to identify 
differences in the politics of each local area to help 
explain why one type of decision was made rather than 
another in resolving local issues. A description of some 
issues and decisions in each of the councils will make 
explicit some of the relationships between the local political 
environment in which decision makers operated and the way 
they actually made decisions.
The issues and decisions that will be described are 
intended to be representative of politics in each of the 
areas. They are examples of distributive, regulative or 
redistributive decisions, according to the type of issue 
commonly found in each of the areas. Two broad areas of 
council decision making — development control and budgetary 
decision making — were chosen to provide case study material. 
The former involved all matters related to the preparation of 
a planning scheme and the administration of statutory 
planning controls and the latter involved decisions on 
raising and spending money or financing and providing council 
services. The ways in which issues were commonly defined 
and resolved were noted from a general inspection of the 
local press and council and committee minutes, and from 
interview data. Individual issues were chosen not so much 
because they were the ’most important' by some actors' or 
observers' criteria, or that they aroused the most public 
controversy, but rather because they represented some of 
the normal features of council decision making. In fact,
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many of these issues would also have been chosen had these
other criteria been adopted. For instance, some illustrated
changes in an existing pattern of council decision making
and were major controversies.
Planning is generally viewed from the point of view of
the special characteristics of planning decisions. They
involve a conscious effort to attain specified goals by
taking courses of action whose effects are predictable.
Planning decisions are forward-looking and purposive and
based on analysis and calculation. But it has often been
pointed out that town planning is not in fact isolated from.
those political influences which are accepted as normal for
other types of governmental decisions. As Parker puts it:
...of all the areas of social control, urban 
planning is perhaps the most peculiarly subject 
to political complexities and resistances, both 
in the setting of goals and the implementation 
of plans. 1
Local statutory land use planning has its own distinctive 
technical, political and administrative problems. Councils 
are involved in the formulation and administration of 
planning schemes for their areas that place restrictions 
and controls on the use of land by property owners.
Probably the most crucial stage in the process is the 
administration and enforcement of the regulations in 
individual cases. Council planners spend most of their 
time and energy processing development applications and 
attempting to enforce conformity with the existing regulations, 
rather than producing original ideas or grand solutions to 
problems of urban development. An appendix to this chapter
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discusses in greater detail the nature of statutory planning 
controls and the special problems raised by their 
administration.
The appendix points out that planning regulations are 
mostly not of a very specific nature, but leave room for 
the exercise of considerable discretionary powers. Most 
government regulations leave scope for interpretation at 
the point of case by case administration. Planning 
regulations offer an extreme example of this. In most 
cases, a considerable amount of judgment has to be 
exercised. There is an important distinction between 
legitimate interpretations of a rule and those that are 
made on irrelevant grounds. But it is often difficult to 
distinguish in practice, not only because the regulations 
themselves are so vague and the criteria to be used in 
exercising judgment so generalised, but also because there 
can be considerable scope for technical debate and 
disagreement over what is and what is not ’good planning’ 
or what measures will or will not achieve a particular end 
once agreed upon as desirable. It is difficult to 
distinguish between an exercise of discretionary powers 
that has been undertaken ’in good faith' in an attempt to 
achieve the purposes underlying the regulations, and a 
particularistic or distributive decision made on irrelevant 
grounds, such as doing a favour for a friend, or even 
granting a dispensation in exchange for a bribe. It is 
often important to know something of the motives of those 
making the decisions in such cases.
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The amount of discretion granted local councils in 
administering planning regulations offers encouragement to 
some to seek distributive decisions. Developers often 
argue the special merits of their case to try and justify 
an exemption from a rule or a particular interpretation of 
a regulation, on grounds that in fact have nothing to do 
with the purpose of the regulations themselves. This is 
usually easier and less costly than trying to alter the 
regulation itself to remove a prohibition. Similarly 
occupants or owners of property who see themselves adversely 
affected by neighbouring developments seek to prevent them 
by obtaining a favourable decision in a particular case.
But the regulations in fact offer the opportunity for 
councils to take account of special pleadings by neighbours 
of a proposed development. Councils are obliged to give 
notice to neighbours of development applications for flat 
buildings and to take account of their objections if they 
make any. One of the criteria to be taken into account 
in all decisions on permissible uses (i.e. where the council 
has power to refuse or approve) refers to ’the existing and 
future amenity of the neighbourhood’. Thus, councils can 
refuse flat applications in the face of residents* protests 
in some cases and grant £hem in others, possibly simply on 
the basis of the strength of protest in each case. Planners 
and developers - frequently grow wrathful over the 
’inconsistency' of councils in this regard. But the 
regulations do leave room for decisions of this type. Many 
would be distributive decisions prompted in part at least by 
requests to aldermen for exemptions, favours or special
considerations
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In some circumstances residents and developers — 
the most frequent protaganists in planning issues - do seek 
to raise regulative issues. This occurs often when 
planning schemes or codes are being formulated or when the 
exercise of discretionary powers and the administration of 
an existing set of regulations act continually to the 
detriment of one group or the other. Then streets of 
residents and neighbourhoods with common interests in 
preventing flat development unite into local groups, and 
may combine as local parties at elections, while developers 
may also participate in elections, or act in concert to 
attain their ends in other arenas, such as through direct 
contact with State Ministers. Rather than seek to exert 
influence at the point of enforcement, they seek to alter 
the content of the regulations themselves.
All of the six councils resolved or were directed to
prepare a planning scheme under the 19^-7 legislation which
2introduced statutory planning in New South Wales. ~
Table VT11-1 lists the major steps taken in preparing a
local scheme and making it law, and shows when each council
took these steps. Before a local scheme is prescribed
development control is exercised under the provisions of the
County of Cumberland planning scheme of 1951 j covering the
whole metropolitan area, or under provisions of interim
development orders by which the Minister for Local
3Government varied the scheme. Prior to 19b3j the
metropolitan planning authority was the single—purpose 
Cumberland County Council, but this was disbanded in that 
year and its functions taken over by the State Planning 
Authority (SPA). ^
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A local scheme is intended to ‘fill in' and elaborate
on the County scheme. Once a council adopts its own
scheme — and this happens long before it becomes law -
it is considered under some obligation to conform to its
provisions, even though subsequently this may mean
administering provisions inserted in the draft scheme by
the State Planning Authority, against council opposition.
Some councils take advantage of an uncertain legal position
over their obligation to conform to a draft local scheme,
effectively opening a new area of discretion, particularly
as the supposedly superseded provisions of the County of
5Cumberland scheme are less specific.
The State Planning Authority exerts considerable 
influence over the content of local schemes. It will not 
permit provisions to be included that contradict any 
metropolitan policies it has evolved. In this respect 
it is backed by the authority of the Minister for Local 
Government, to whom the Authority is fully responsible.
The Minister is the final arbiter over local scheme 
provisions and he has the power to suspend the provisions 
of any planning scheme. However, local councils can and 
do bargain and argue over issues of contention with the 
Authority, often with success. Some instances will be 
seen in the case studies.
BANKSTOWN
Throughout the 1960’s the planning department was a 
comparatively large one with a staff of about fifteen of whom 
a third or more were qualified professional planners. We 
have already noted that except for Burwood, Bankstown’s
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planner exercised the most delegated authority. Apart from 
this, the department attained a status unusual for planning 
departments, for example in the extent of its participation 
in decisions normally the sole sphere of other departments. 
During the period of the administrator (1963—5) the 
department enjoyed considerable autonomy in making planning 
decisions and evolved the principles embodied in the local 
planning scheme. It also acquired the habit of making 
decisions on development control without aldermanic 
intervention that it was subsequently loth to give up.
In retaining some of this autonomy, it was aided by 
aldermen’s sensitivity on planning matters which stemmed 
from the council’s dismissal in 1963 over a bribery case 
connected with a development application. The Minister 
tended to keep a watchful eye on the council and the 
planner found it convenient to make this point when arguing 
for adherence to the rules in development control. As 
he commented —
Every time the council disagrees with me they run 
a risk of being wrong — the chances are I am 
usually right. They consider it a hurdle not to 
adopt a town planner’s recommendation. Rather 
than reject it outright they would rather refer 
it back for ’further consideration*...and they 
hope some changes will result. °
He probably under emphasised the bargaining position of
aldermen in such situations, but the point is that they did
feel constrained to bargain with, rather than ride roughshod
over, the planner. The planner's faith in his ability to
be right and his belief that there were 'right' answers
to planning matters was typical. By being 'right' he
meant 'in the public interest', based on professional
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knowledge of planning principles and experience in their 
application. The problems planners face in keeping issues 
defined in these terms were well illustrated in the case 
of disputes over Bankstown's planning scheme.
The scheme was prepared and adopted whilst the council
was under the appointed administrator. On the election
of the council in December 1965» one of its first acts
was to seek to recall the scheme from the State Planning
Authority where it had been submitted just prior to the
election. Under pressure, the Minister agreed to return
the scheme for * perusal*. The council's initial concern
was to find out what financial commitments were entailed
in the ambitious land acquisition scheme for open space
purposes, but the most contentious issues for the council
were some of the zoning provisions. The deputy mayor
suggested in a press interview that '...property owners
might find an opportunity to discuss with aldermen any
7personal grouches they hold against the plan'. From 
the number of minor amendments moved by aldermen, it was 
apparent that some property owners took advantage of this 
invitation. Most amendments sought to rezone properties 
to a higher use. Most were adopted by the council.
The planner pointed out that the council could only 
make representations on these amendments to the Authority 
at this stage. He expressed concern over the increasing 
volume of objections. In one case, a large number of 
objections had been received from landowners over the 
residential zoning of their properties along the 
Hume Highway south of Chullora. These properties had
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commercial potential as used car lots, motel sites, 
drive—in hamburger bars, and so on. Residential zon.ings 
had been applied in the name of 'ribbon development control' 
to prevent such unsightly, traffic generating uses along 
the Highway. Residents who wanted to move away and 
existing businesses that wanted to expand sought commercial 
use zonings. Individual amendments to the scheme in 
response to these objections by property owners were moved 
in the council by several aldermen and finally two motions 
were adopted that rezoned a whole two mile stretch of the 
Highway for commercial use. The Authority refused to 
accept these amendments and, although the council again 
reaffirmed its decision on rezoning during 1968, they 
agreed to await the objections stage to have the matter 
decided.
Following the exhibition of the scheme in 1969» the 
council decided that it would itself hear objections.
Some of the objections lodged against the residential 
zonings on the Highway were matters for 'early determination* 
by the Minister, as several applications for commercial 
development were outstanding. One in particular aroused 
considerable controversy. It was an application for a 
hotel, lodged by a Yagoona publican who was an alderman on 
the 1965-68 council. During that period his application 
had been rejected by the council, being opposed by 
Progressive Independent aldermen. The planner strongly 
argued against the hotel in defence of his 'ribbon 
development' control proposals.
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In March 1970 the council heard some forty objections
to these zonings. In the great majority of cases it
recommended retention of the residential zones, a reversal
of the previous position. This change appears to have
been influenced by the council's opposition to the hotel
and the wish to appear consistent in opposing it. This
opposition was practically unanimous. East Ward aldermen
were attentive to local opinion which had voiced strong
opposition to the hotel through an ad hoc group calling
itself the Committee of Community Interests. Local
residents who feared loss of amenity and churchmen who
espoused 'wowser' views were united against the hotel.
At the same time, East Ward aldermen demonstrated their
distributive approach to these matters by lending support
unsuccessfully to a number of other objectors seeking
commercial rezonings, particularly residents who wanted to
sell and move to more amenable residential areas.
The Minister permitted the hotel and expressed his
support for some of the other objections from landowners.
In the official determination communicated to the council
by the State Planning Authority, it was stated —
Whilst definitely not wishing to see the area 
completely developed for commercial purposes such 
as used car sales yards, etc., he (the Minister) 
felt there could be a case in appropriate locations 
for selective zonings other than residential... ®
Apart from this, the determination made no direct reference
to the merits or otherwise of ribbon development control.
In making this particular exception to the zonings, and
foreshadowing others, the Minister showed how the
determination of objections often took the appearance of
granting legitimacy to distributive decisions.
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Initial disputes in 1966 also involved challenges to
other policies embodied in the scheme. Several Progressive
Independent aldermen expressed concern over the strict
provisions controlling the quality of industrial development
fearing that they would discourage industrialists from
coming to Bankstown. These challenges were not effective
and the planner was able to implement his proposed controls
over such development covering various aspects of design,
9site treatment, off—street parking, and so on.
Similar arguments about ’inhibiting development’ were 
also put by Progressive Independent aldermen, and others, 
over the flat development provisions of the scheme. Flat 
zones originally accounted for only 130 acres out of a 
total 11,000 acres of residential zones. Several motions 
in 1966 sought to increase these zones, particularly around 
local shopping centres. However, the ALP group on the 
council moved that there should be no flat zones at all. 
Neither move won a majority and the planner’s provisions 
remained. During the following two or three years of 
delay over exhibiting the scheme, due to a metropolitan—wide 
dispute over discretionary powers relating to commercial 
and industrial development, the flats issue emerged as 
one of the most contentious in local politics.
In 1968 Progressive Independent aldermen sponsored a 
successful motion seeking larger flat zones, in particular 
to the north of Bankstown shopping centre. The planner 
in fact now agreed with this view, having during 1967 
expressed his opinion that the municipality should cater 
for a growth to a population of 275,000 rather than the
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200,000 originally estimated. Some 500 acres of high- 
density and also opportunities for medium—density 
development would need to be provided.
The planner argued that the pressures of metropolitan 
development and the policies of 'higher planning authorities' 
on the growth of Sydney made flats inevitable. Whilst up 
to now private flat development had not occurred, and in 
the past had been discouraged, it would be easier to 
ensure that this future development was of a high standard 
if appropriate policies were adopted immediately. He 
also argued for presenting people with the choice of 
housing types:
There is a need to aim for higher residential 
densities in the municipality in order better to 
exploit the advantageous location, its employment 
potential, its civic and commercial amenities and 
its open space. 10
These arguments were supplemented by aldermen claiming that 
rate revenues would increase and that trade and commerce 
would profit.
Support for this view came from the Bankstown Chamber 
of Commerce. In 1968 they were the first to seek rezoning 
of 300 acres to the north of the shopping centre and the 
Progressive Independent's move followed their complaint 
that the shopping centre would otherwise 'die of 
strangulation'. In February 1969* the Chamber again
sought more flat zones and expressed concern that flat 
development was so slow to begin. They sought to 'change 
the existing building code to that of our neighbouring 
councils', in other words to ease the conditions and 
standards that attempted to achieve 'quality' development.
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Subsequently, following an address by the planner they
passed a ‘motion of confidence’ in his policies»
On the council a minority were still opposed to flat
development. They received support from the council’s
building and health department and in an extraordinary
move the head of the department (’acting as a private
citizen’) wrote a widely publicised letter to the local
press opposing flats and defending the virtues of single-
dwelling living. Politically it was the local ALP that
led the opposition, in particular in the southern part of
the municipality where the issue was siezed on as one to
discredit the Progressive Independents. In the forefront
was the local MLA for East Hills, Mr Kelly, who took
every opportunity during this period to raise the matter
in Parliament. He accused the council of bowing to
developers’ pressures and creating the ’slums of the future’.
He accused them of ignoring the wishes of the residents:
...the little people, the pioneers...Are you going 
to say — ’Move over and let us put someone in with 
you’? Are we going to turn our clean air into 
smog...and destroy our foliage and turn the land 
into a concrete jungle?...Neurosis comes with flats 
making for...hell on earth, which only benefits
the developer...12
The ALP made the matter an election issue in 1968, 
but in fact lost seats. This was no discouragement to them. 
On exhibition of the scheme in June 1969 some two—thirds 
of the 1,500 objections lodged were over flat development, 
most of them from residents in Padstow and Panania. ALP 
branches and the Padstow Progress Association organised 
public meetings and circulated objection forms for 
signature by residents. In the face of these protests,
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the council passed a motion that they would support 
objections to flat zones where a majority of property 
owners lodged objections.
The whole issue was highlighted by the council’s 
approval in May 1969 of a flat development in Padstow. 
Following this approval, the council in the course of a 
few weeks received some 400 objections to the flat zoning 
in this area and this prompted the planner to resubmit 
the application, which had not yet received final formal 
approval. The planner pointed to the possibility that 
the strength of objections would lead to a rezoning. 
Progressive Independent aldermen refused to change their 
decision and the approval was confirmed. Local protest 
redoubled in its vigour and Mr Kelly appealed to the 
Minister to intervene. His appeal was successful and the 
Minister revoked the council's approval in September 1969. 
He also asked the council to refuse any other application 
until objections had been determined. By the end of the 
study period no determination had been made on these 
objections.
Throughout, the Progressive Independents argued that 
the anti—flat campaign was 'politically inspired' and thus 
not genuine. It was in fact partly organised by the local 
Labor Party and was one of Mr Kelly's favourite issues in 
his battle with the council. It is a characteristic of 
regulative issues that the individual interests involved 
are mobilised in support of the broader issue that is at 
stake. Just as the Progressive Independents supported 
interests that benefited from 'progress and development'
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in the form of flat building, so the local ALP mobilised 
local residents whom they claimed would suffer.
In this issue, the town planner — arguing as he would 
see it in the public interest — was successful because in 
the regulative arena he had ’the numbers’ in support of 
his policies. In matters of planning administration - 
dealing with separate development applications — his 
influence in resisting distributive pressures was important. 
There had been one case when the council contravened its 
own scheme, in approving a petrol station development and 
the Minister revoked the council’s consent. This was a 
reminder of the Minister’s watchful eye on the council.
We did see that in disputes over zonings on the Hume Highway 
the council was not averse to being attentive to demands 
for special consideration for individual property owners.
But on the whole, the council did not make particularistic 
decisions in the process of development control,
LIVERPOOL
Some of the major planning issues in Liverpool stemmed
from pressures to convert non—urban land to urban uses.
In general the council supported all such moves as fulfilling
the major goals of ’city development’, expansion and
progress. The council’s initial draft scheme of 1966
coloured vast areas of the map pink and purple for
residential and industrial uses. One alderman succinctly
expressed the council's idea of planning when he said
13'we planned the whole area*, meaning that the council 
proposed zoning the nine—tenths of the municipality that 
was in non—urban use for urban development. Such proposals
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were rejected by the SPA as being in conflict with the 
strategies embodied in the 1968 Sydney Region Plan. This 
proposed practically no new releases of non—urban land 
for urban use in Liverpool for about fifteen years and 
no major releases for twenty five years.
The release of land on the urban fringe was firmly 
in the hands of the Minister for Local Government and the 
SPA and the council was in the position of being just one 
of many groups interested in metropolitan fringe 
development. It argued for releases on broad planning 
grounds, by making submissions on the Outline Plan. It 
also joined forces with land developers who sought 
piecemeal releases through development applications or 
by making direct representations to the Minister and 
the SPA. The council repeatedly and unsuccessfully 
sought large areas of residential releases west of the 
Green Valley estate, first as early as 1962 and subsequently 
in 1966 and 1967. It sought changes in the Cumberland 
County Council planning scheme ordinance that restricted 
development in non-urban zones. The council sought to 
have development permitted on three acre lots, as much of 
the fringe areas had been subdivided into lots of this 
size. But the County scheme restricted development to 
five and in some areas twenty five acre lots.
In only one case can the council claim success in 
obtaining release of non—urban land beyond that included 
in the programme for releases in the Outline Plan, or in 
subsequent minor departures from that plan made by the 
Minister. In 1971 the Minister finally agreed to allow
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development of 700 acres at Chipping Norton, to the east 
of the city. The area had been considered by the SPA 
as unsuitable for urban use because of flooding. The 
initial impetus for obtaining release came from the 
Chipping Norton Development Association, formed by local 
landowners. The council’s support for their claims for 
residential zoning went as far as to commission a report 
from the University of New South Wales Water Research 
Laboratory which disputed the flood level calculations 
of the Department of Works on which the SPA’s opposition 
was based. The landowners submitted objections to the 
local planning scheme zonings and the council supported 
these in full. The Association also submitted a detailed 
general submission to the Minister. The matter took 
over a year to resolve during which time the scheme was 
held up, but finally the Minister agreed to the release 
of the land, about one half for residential and the other 
half for industrial use.
Large scale commercial development was also encouraged 
and supported by the council. From about 1968 onwards 
several commercial development companies attempted to 
build new shopping centres in and around the city centre. 
Applications were lodged for three separate major 
developments. One was on a site zoned for industrial use 
to the north of the city centre; one was on what was 
formerly the Liverpool Showground to the west of the city; 
and the third was on a site immediately adjacent to the 
existing commercial centre. All three applications 
required rezonings. Characteristically, the council
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supported them all, but not without argument. The Chamber 
of Commerce strongly opposed development that was not in 
or adjacent to the existing shopping centre. In opposing 
the first of the applications to the north of the city, the 
Chamber wrote to the council and individually to aldermen 
and circulated a petition amongst shopkeepers. Non- 
Labor members of the council — most of them also members 
of the Chamber of Commerce — opposed this application, 
but were defeated by the Labor majority. The council’s 
planner argued that no major commercial development should 
be permitted away from the existing commercial centre.
In the end, the State Planning Authority agreed with this 
argument and only permitted the one development that was 
adjacent to the city centre.
Whilst this issue and others like it that involved 
debates about permitting shopping development outside the 
existing shopping centre involved competing interests in 
the regulative arena, they also raised the question of 
whether or not the regulations as they existed should be 
valued for their own sake. The characteristic response 
of the council to a demand from some enterprising 
entrepreneur wishing to set up a drive—in shopping centre 
on the urban fringe, and seeking for this purpose a change 
in zoning, was to lend support. Development and developers 
were to be applauded. Occasionally, however, aldermen 
argued that the council ought to apply the rules rather 
than try to circumvent them. This sort of argument was 
heard in relation to flat development, where the council 
could in fact ignore the regulations as they stood if they
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wished to make 'exceptions' without having to obtain 
zoning changes sanctioned by the Minister. This was 
because the council was able to implement the provisions 
of the Cumberland scheme, rather than its own, as its 
own local scheme was not prescribed as law. The council's 
initial draft scheme was amended by the State Planning 
Authority and an area tentatively zoned Tor flat 
development around the city centre was in the process 
reduced in size from 250 to 120 acres. In the meanwhile, 
the council approved some flat applications in the larger 
area, under the discretionary powers granted in the 
original Cumberland scheme zoning that permitted flat 
development. In spite of the zoning of its draft scheme 
that prohibited flats in a large part of this area, it 
continued to grant approvals. Within the Labor caucus, 
there was often a 3—3 division on these issues, but in 
the council sufficient independent aldermen voted in favour 
for several such applications to be granted.
Every applicant had his own 'hard luck story' or his 
own 'special circumstances'. Aldermen tended to be 
sympathetic and grant the dispensation sought. As one 
put it:
You have to look at a flat application like this
on its merits. If a guy has paid for land to put
up a block how can you go and refuse him?l^
A motion to grant approval to such an application of 
November 1969, moved by two Labor aldermen, was typical in 
the reasons it mentioned for approval. The property was 
at present occupied by an 'unsightly' dwelling and was 
not suitable for a new dwelling as it was flanked by a
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YMCA hall and an existing block of flats; the area was 
previously zoned for flats; the lot was large and suitable 
for flats; and no objections had been received from
15neighbours, because there were no neighbours. The
council had in fact adopted a policy that applications
in non-flat zones should be accompanied by letters of
concurrence from neighbours in single dwellings. A
similar application considered at the same meeting exposed
the absurdity of the situation when a neighbour expressed
concurrence to the development only so long as he was
permitted to develop his land for flats too.  ^ We find
aldermen seriously arguing for approval of flats because
17•there are already flats in the vicinity*. The
existence of these can become a ground for 'hardship1 
arguments for future cases, as residents claim the amenity 
of the area has been destroyed. Aldermen opposing 
approvals pointed out that the council could be accused of 
'forcing out' homeowners by encouraging flat development.
The issue of flat development as a regulative one did 
not emerge with the same importance as in Bankstown.
There were only some four objections against flat zoning 
from residents when the scheme was exhibited. This is not 
to say that the question was not sometimes debated as a 
regulative or even a redistributive issue. Those in 
favour of flats argued for more cheap housing for the area, 
those against argued on the grounds of the advantages for 
single dwelling living. One one occasion in particular 
in 1971» a flat application was deferred despite initial 
majority support for passing it (achieved through the
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mayor’s casting vote) as there were some ten objections 
from residents. The council decided to hold a plebiscite 
of owners to get their views on a possible rezoning to 
allow flats. However, on the whole, aldermen tended to 
make particularistic decisions and accept the arguments 
of applicants on ’hardship' grounds, thus concurring 
with the applicants' definition of the issue as a 
distributive one.
The council faced similar pressures from some 
applicants for flat development in those areas zoned for 
flats, but this time over the regulations contained in 
the draft ordinance for minimum lot sizes. The council 
was prepared to approve applications that did not quite 
meet the required standards, but was forced to defer them 
under pressure from the State Planning Authority to comply 
with the standards. The dispute then became one of 
arguing over the 'fitness' of the regulations which the 
Authority itself had imposed on the council as a standard 
set of conditions for flat development in all areas.
These conditions - minimum of 60 ft. frontage and 9 ,000 sq. ft. 
area for a flat site - were considered unsuitable as most 
lots in the flat zones had 50 ft. frontages. In the end, 
a compromise solution was reached in February 1971 that 
permitted development of a lower density on these smaller 
lots .
The approval of flats in areas not zoned for flats 
in the council's draft scheme was strictly not a 
contravention of the law. The approval of a hotel—motel 
given by the council in November 1969 was a similar case.
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It was on one of the sites proposed for shopping development 
during 1969 and which had been the subject of the Minister's 
determination of objections to the existing industrial 
zoning. The shopping development was initially submitted 
to the council in conjunction with a hotel and, although 
the council at first opposed the hotel, it gave its 
approval for an amended application in July 1969» in 
October the Minister rejected the objection of the 
developers to the industrial zoning on the draft scheme 
and confirmed this zoning under which neither shops nor 
the hotel were permitted. In November, the council 
approved a further amended application for a hotel-motel 
from the same developers. This was to be built on the 
part of the site formerly proposed for the shops. The
council's approval was granted '...subject to a prior 
subdivision creating a lot more than 300 ft. from the 
County Road...'. The original application had the hotel 
fronting the Hume Highway. Any development within 300 ft. 
of a main road requires the 'concurrence' of the State 
Planning Authority. The amended application of November 
which the council approved showed the hotel sited 305 ft. 
from the Highway with access from a side street. This 
obviated the need for permission to be obtained from the 
Authority. The council approved the application after 
seeking legal advice. The planner argued against the 
application on the grounds of injury to the amenity of the 
neighbouring residential area. He also pointed out that 
the Minister had determined that the land would be zoned 
for industrial use once the scheme was prescribed. The
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application was approved with the support of Labor aldermen
and some independents, with only two independents formally
recording dissenting votes.
In July 1970 the Minister wrote to the council
threatening to revoke council’s consent for the development.
As early as February 1970 the Minister informed a Liverpool
hotel proprietor who had protested at the council’s
approval, that the matter was under investigation. In the
event the Minister confined his action to a stern warning
to the council. It was agreed that the consent was
strictly not illegal, but
...the decision...was a thoroughly bad and 
irresponsible one...
...there has been a deliberate attempt to nullify 
the normal planning requirements... and to 
circumvent my decision on the future zoning of 
the land.
...the council has a definite obligation to 
conform with the provisions of its Local Planning 
Scheme ...
...this principle must assume even greater 
significance after I have determined objections 
and, for all practical purposes fixed the 
zonings of land to be included in the scheme when 
prescribed.
The Minister gave as his reason for not revoking consent the 
injury that would be caused to ratepayers, as the developer 
would have the right to claim compensation from the council 
of some $265*000 for work completed to date, all of which 
was done during the period the matter was 'under 
investigation' by the Minister.
The decisions described so far did not involve the 
mobilisation of local residents' opinions. There was 
one major case of this sort during the 1968—171 period.
An application was lodged for a 'non-ferrous ingotting works'
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in an industrial zone in Moorebank, a newly developing 
suburb to the east of the city. The planner recommended 
approval, as did the development committee, but in 
August 1970 the council deferred the matter in the face of 
local protests. Concern was expressed over pollution 
the establishment (referred to by protesters as a foundry) 
might cause to the neighbouring residential areas.
Public meetings and petitions and the presence of 300 
irate residents at a council meeting prompted the council 
to refuse the application. On appeal by the developer 
to the State Planning Authority the application was 
approved, but a long legal dispute over a technicality 
related to Interim Development Orders, by which areas 
were rezoned under the Cumberland Scheme and by which 
process this area had gained its industrial zoning, caused 
the applicants to go elsewhere with their factory. This 
was a case in which the council made a distributive 
decision in favour of protesting residents rather than 
developers, in spite of the attempts of the applicants 
to present the issue as a routine matter of regulative 
rule application.
All councils face pressures from developers and from 
residents to make distributive decisions. In Liverpool, 
a fast developing suburb, pressures of this sort, 
particularly from developers, were more often felt than 
in most councils. We have seen that the council did 
sometimes make distributive decisions that favoured 
developers. In part this was a reflection of the council’s 
general attitude that ’development’ was ’progress’ and
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to be encouraged. Where the rules hindered development, 
they could be justifiably circumvented. To see their 
behaviour as an expression of such a general approach is 
rather belied by their decision to reject the industrial 
development in Moorebank, particularly as it had long been 
the council’s policy to encourage more jobs and industry 
for Liverpool. One reason for the council's distributive 
approach, particularly when contrasted to Bankstown's 
approach to development control, was the relative lack 
of influence and status of the planning department.
in Liverpool, the absence of a flats issue similar 
to Bankstown's was outstanding. It was partly because 
no such regulative issue emerged that the council was 
able to make distributive decisions on flat developments. 
In earlier chapters we saw some evidence of the importance 
of inter-personal relations in Liverpool politics. This 
seems to have been borne out in the distributive decisions 
described. It suited local politicians to prevent these 
issues from escalating into broader issues beyond the 
inter-personal level of granting favours. We noted that 
broad issues seemed to have little relevance for local 
elections. The flats issue, for instance, cut across 
party lines and neither the ALP nor independents could 
turn this into an issue that could be added to those that 
attempted to highlight the differences between the two 
blocs.
KU—RING—GAI
The underlying aim of much of council policy was to 
preserve the exclusive residential status and amenity of
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the municipality. The council exercised control over most 
new development through Residential District Proclamations, 
some of which had been in force since the 1920’s. These 
were a simple but effective form of zoning that permitted 
only single—dwelling residential development with certain 
specified exceptions. Commercial development was kept 
to the Pacific Highway and to small ’neighbourhood centres’ 
in the new suburbs. Only a handful of ’alien' commercial 
establishments (notably two bus depots) were established 
in what later became exclusive residential areas, and 
typically the council exerted whatever pressure it could 
to prevent their expansion and even to remove them.
With the advent of flat development, largely in the 1960's, 
the council permitted it only along the Pacific Highway 
and then only with certain doubts expressed by one
19alderman when he called flats 'essentially un—Ku—ring—gai'.
Issues concerned with residential amenity are both 
distributive and regulative. Neighbourhood groups seek 
special treatment for their local area, but in doing so 
may find themselves in opposition to developers or even 
other residents or other sorts of groups. Three prominent 
cases during the life of the 1968-71 council illustrate 
the sorts of issues that emerged. In the first, the 
council was faced with a development application for 
what some aldermen defined as a further 'un—Ku—ring-gai' 
type of development, a major shopping centre to replace the 
present so-called 'village centre' at St Ives, in the 
northern part of the municipality. The council spent 
nearly two years in bargaining and negotiation with the
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developer (David Jones, Sydney’s largest department store) 
before it finally approved an application, only for the 
newly elected council of 1971 to rescind this approval.
The first application of December 1969 was rejected.
The council objected to the site , as it was some way
removed from the existing centre and claimed the size of
the project was ’grossly excessive’. In the subsequent
six months, considerable pressure was put on the council,
David Jones conducted a vigorous publicity campaign
and commissioned a public survey that showed a large
proportion of St Ives and municipal residents as a whole
in favour. They claimed that the Department of Education
wanted an early resolution as their plans for a new school
in St Ives depended on an arrangement with David Jones
over exchange of land. The MLA for Hornsby, Liberal
Party Minister for Justice spoke in favour of the project
at a local party meeting, widely publicised in the local
press, in July 1970« He was critical of the council for
’so peremptorily’ turning down a 'first class attractive
development’, intimating that the State Government or the
State Planning Authority might ’have to buy into' the 
20is sue•
The council received support from the St Ives Progress 
Association, although their South St Ives counterpart 
supported the project. In the face of the council's 
obstinacy, David Jones withdrew in August 1970» but 
submitted a new application in December on a new site, 
occupied by an existing arcade and supermarket development. 
This entailed the company merging with the proprietors of 
this existing 'village centre'.
255
The new application was for a project including 
450,000 sq. ft. of leasable area of which about half would 
be for a David Jones Department Store. Parking spaces 
for 2,500 cars were provided for. The development would 
include two large supermarkets. It would also incorporate 
a new council library and baby health centre to replace 
those in the existing village centre and a new community 
hall, all at no initial cost to the council. The council 
did not make an immediate decision, but hired consultants 
to look at some economic aspects of the project, sought 
objections from local residents and set up a sub—committee 
of ward aldermen and council officers to deal with the 
application. Finally, some six months later in June 1971» 
the council rejected the application. The applicants 
were invited to submit a new proposal. This would avoid 
use of the Village Green (public open space) and would 
incorporate measures to minimise traffic effects on 
nearby residential streets, including road widening and 
the installation of traffic lights. These objections 
to the scheme were foremost in the submission of the local 
Cowan Road Residents Preservation Association. More 
parking would also have to be provided. The major 
objections however, were still about the size of the centre. 
The new scheme would not exceed 360,000 sq. ft. of 
leasable floor space.
On the council, the ward aldermen consistently 
opposed the schemes presented by David Jones, but they lent 
support to these proposals. The majority in favour of 
seeking to impose these conditions was only a narrow one,
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with the minority arguing for the application on the grounds
that Ku—ring—gai residents wanted better shopping facilities.
The sorts of arguments used against the David Jones
application were expressed by one ward alderman:
Ku—ring—gai people don *t want massive 
commercialisation of the municipality. They 
are here because the municipality doesn’t have 
such development. They all expect council to 
preserve this standard... The developer argued 
about the economics of the project, but we are 
not that green. Every developer that comes to us 
goes away being told we don’t accept development 
of the standard found in most of the rest of 
Sydney — and they all come back with developments 
of a high standard... We need adequate shopping 
facilities, that’s true, but not at the expense 
of the quality of living. 21
The consultants had pointed out that the size of the
development would entail considerable penetration of other
centres’ markets into a wide geographical area and aldermen
feared the ’circus style’ of promotion that would be
required and the traffic that would thus be attracted to
St Ives.
The developers did indeed submit a new application 
meeting the council’s major requirements and this was 
approved by the council just before the September 1971 
elections.
The council’s sympathy towards residents' interests 
was seen in two other cases. In the first, residents of 
Telegraph Road in Pymble voiced vigorous protests about 
the use of their street by heavy trucks on a regular 
contractor’s route. The council responded in March 1971 
by imposing a ban on the use of this street by traffic 
over three tons. The contractors were using the street 
as part of a short-cut rather than taking the main road and
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their response was to use adjacent residential streets 
instead. Predictably, residents along these new routes 
sought similar protection for their streets, and 
successively, further three ton limits were imposed.
Finally only three streets were left, but the council was 
powerless to impose a limit on these because they were 
classified as ’secondary roads’ and responsibility for 
them was shared with the Department of Main Roads. In 
June 1971 the council decided to lift the limit on 
Telegraph Road, arguing that there were more residents 
living in the other roads being used as short-cuts.
An agreement with the hauliers permitted trucks to use 
the route only on weekdays and in daylight hours, but 
this was only an ’understanding’. Telegraph Road residents 
took the council to court and sought an injunction and 
although successful in their action, the matter was the 
subject of an appeal by the council. What began as a 
highly localised distributive issue finally involved 
residents over a wide area. The council was in favour 
of restricting heavy traffic to main roads, but was 
powerless to impose a limit on the secondary roads that 
ultimately came to be used. Unable to enforce its 
policy it was compelled to make a decision about which 
locality was to bear the major burden of inconvenience, 
a distributive decision as was the initial one that it 
reversed•
A similar train of events was seen in another case.
This involved re—siting the council rubbish dump at 
Wahroonga, where it was on the fringe of recent residential
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development and set in ’natural bushland’. Vigorous 
protests from residents and ’bush lovers’ reached a peak 
in 1970 when the Minister announced his determination of 
objections to the local planning scheme. These made it 
clear that the dump was not to be rezoned and closed. At 
the ensuing outcry over this and other matters, notably 
the Minister's allowance of objections that resulted in 
more flat—building sites, he agreed to the exceptional 
procedure of re—exhibiting the scheme to hear objections 
on the determinations he had just made on previous 
objections.
The council sought to continue their use of the 
Wahroonga tip. Prompted by Wahroonga Ward aldermen and 
by the protests of the North East Wahroonga Action Committee, 
set up over this issue, the council considered several 
alternatives. At one point it decided to negotiate for 
purchase of land at St Ives for a new site, only to be 
met with cries of protest from the St Ives Progress 
Association and from ward aldermen who complained they 
had been absent when the council had adopted this proposal 
moved by a Wahroonga Ward representative. Attempts to 
find a site across the municipal boundary in Warringah met 
with no immediate success.
The Minister, following re—exhibition of the scheme 
and the hearing of objections to his decisions, decided 
that the Wahroonga tip must close and rezoned the area 
for open space. He decided to permit dumping at a site 
in North Turramurra, already in use for some minor dumping 
operations. This was to be only a temporary measure and
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required the suspension of zoning in the local scheme.
The council sought a one or two year period to transfer 
to the new site, but the Minister insisted that dumping 
at Wahroonga must cease as soon as the local scheme 
became law, in a matter of months. The council was 
far from happy with the solution, but the residents of 
North Turramurra were even more unhappy. The mayor 
commented:
This will only transfer the problem from 
one part of the municipality to another. ^2
North Turramurra residents presented a petition of 1,000
signatures and the successful North East Wahroonga Action
Committee pledged its 'full support* for residents in
the newly affected area. The new protesters were
represented by the St Ives — Bobbin Head Action Committee
and they probably had mixed feelings about these promises
of support. Wahroonga Ward aldermen opposed the new
site, just as they had opposed the previous site, but to
no avail. The mayor summed up the council's dilemma:
I have had to deal with this problem practically 
every week of the year... I am doing my utmost 
to get an area outside the municipality. ^3
Aldermen in these issues were ever ready to respond
to the local demands of residents. Ward pressures were
important in the stands of ward aldermen. However,
behind this tendency for aldermen to define these issues
as distributive ones was the general attitude that the
residential character of the municipality should be
protected
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BURWOOD
The delegation of authority to the town planner in 
the administration of development control has been noted 
in Chapter VI. The planner did, however, submit 
controversial or major developments to the council via 
the plans committee. in such cases, as will be seen 
below, the council was by no means immune from the sorts 
of local pressures that lead to distributive decisions 
and which have been in evidence in previous case studies. 
First, though, we shall see a case in which the delegation 
of authority was defended as a means of isolating 
development control from such pressures.
At a council meeting in May 1971» one West Ward 
alderman sought to have an application referred to the 
plans committee for decision by the council. It concerned 
the use of a basement as a mechanic’s workshop in his 
ward on the main Liverpool Road. The planner had 
approved the application ’in principle' subject to 
certain conditions being complied with before issuing a 
formal certificate of approval. The alderman argued 
that the site was surrounded by residential development 
and some residents had expressed concern. He wished to 
make sure the council considered their views. The 
mayor argued that it was not possible to place the matter 
on the council’s agenda, as it would entail rescinding 
the council's delegation of authority to the planner. As 
it was now the planner who had the authority, it was up 
to him to consider residents' objections and the alderman 
concerned could make representations to the planner if he
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wished. The planner agreed to discuss the matter with 
the alderman concerned. No other aldermen at the council 
meeting supported the move to put the issue on the agenda 
and there the matter rested. The development approval 
stood.
Burwood’s major planning problems concerned 
redevelopment, both residential and commercial. The 
planning scheme attempted to exert influence over this 
redevelopment, proposing significant council participation 
in redevelopment areas by land acquisition and 
consolidation of small lots, and the preparation of 
‘three-dimensional* redevelopment control plans for 
designated residential redevelopment areas. In the 
shopping centre, the plan proposed the provision of 
off-street parking and various road improvements. The 
council was active in purchasing land for these various 
purposes. One scheme for a large commercial development 
fell through when the developer withdrew because the 
council refused to make concessions on its requirements 
for parking spaces in the development.
Flat development in Burwood was less intensive than 
in neighbouring municipalities. This was in part due 
to the existence of Residential District Proclamations, 
but was also attributed, by the council at least, to 
stricter conditions and requirements imposed on developers. 
The local planning scheme zoned about 100 acres for high 
density flat development out of about 1,400 acres of 
residential zones. A number of multi—storey flat 
projects were approved by the council in the latter part
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of the I960*s in the flat zones around the district 
shopping centre, where many streets also contained flats 
from the post-war years. During 1968—71 there was one 
notable occasion on which substantial public controversy 
was aroused over a flat development. A scheme for 
three blocks, one of nineteen stories flanked by two of 
eight stories was approved 'in principle* by the council 
in December 1969 on a site to the north of the shopping 
centre facing Burwood Park. The planner recommended 
imposing a list of conditions for final approval.
The council set in motion the procedure for lifting a 
Residential District Proclamation on the site , advertising 
in the press to seek objections and applying to the 
Minister, whose decision is final in these cases. Some 
twelve existing home sites were in question. Many 
objections were lodged and about 100 immediate neighbours 
signed petitions. Letters were written to aldermen and 
the press. These argued that the area was already 
over—developed and that the new blocks would 'invade the 
privacy' of surrounding homes in what was 'once a quiet 
residential district'. Residents also feared traffic 
problems in surrounding narrow streets. The Burwood 
Ratepayers Association added their voice to the objectors 
submitting that
...further such development should cease, in
order to safeguard existing residents and future ^4
generations from...lowering of living standards...
The council again considered the application in 
September 1970» before any decision was made by the Minister. 
The public gallery was overflowing and a representative of
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the residents, as well as a consultant town planner 
briefed by the developers, addressed the council. The 
application was rejected, aldermen expressing concern 
over the possibility that the central tower would not be 
constructed as the developers were not able to purchase 
all the land. Several aldermen congratulated the 
residents' spokesmen for conducting their campaign in 
such a 'dignified' and 'sensible' fashion.
During the course of the controversy, the mayor 
replied to residents' protests, not by arguing the merits 
of the case, but by defending the council's flats policy 
in general:
In order to avoid creating a slum situation 
Burwood Council has deliberately developed 
its own planning scheme to eliminate the most 
dilapidated type of property first... around the 
Burwood District Shopping Centre, and to make the 
most intensive use of available land. Our aim 
is to replace these substandard properties with 
high quality, high value residential flat „-
buildings to meet a very real demand for this...
In spite of the Ratepayers Association's general comments
on stopping multi—storey flat development the issue at
stake was never really the council's 'policy*. No
attempt was made to alter zonings in the planning scheme
and no local groups sought to make an issue of this in
a concerted fashion. There were not the number of
protests characteristic of the issue in North Sydney
where cumulatively they led to demands for changes in
the planning regulations. The issue was not one raised
by candidates at the 1971 elections in this form. Amongst
aldermen there was some disagreement and disquiet over
the council's 'policy' as enunciated by the mayor and
formulated effectively by the council's town planner.
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But aldermen did not sieze on the flats issue and attack 
this policy as a means of outbidding fellow aldermen for 
electoral support. It is worth noting that the motion 
that rejected this particular application was passed 
’on the voices’, and those who supported the application 
did not speak in favour of it. Typically, the council 
kept disagreement in its ranks out of the public eye.
These issues revealed several important characteristics 
of council decision making in Burwood. It showed the 
role occupied by the professional staff and the mayor in 
policy formulation and the lack of major challenges to 
these policies in local political conflict. However, 
local neighbourhood pressures on the council did meet 
with a response, when aldermen made exceptions to this 
policy. The professional staff and the executive leader 
were concerned with defending policy from pressures in 
the distributive arena; most aldermen were responsive to 
these pressures.
LEICHHARDT
We have already noted the changes that occurred in 
the character of Balmain and Glebe during the latter part 
of the 1960’s. New groups became active in local politics, 
representing the new residents. The issues they brought 
up largely arose from clashes of interest between middle 
class values associated with residential amenity and the 
interests of industrial land users, or in some cases, 
flat developers.
These conflicts became apparent when objections to 
the local planning scheme were submitted in 1968. The
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Balmain Association took the opportunity to submit a 
list of objections, backed up by a general submission 
on the Balmain area. This stated as its basic assumption 
that 'Balmain is essentially a residential suburb'. 
Commenting on the scheme the report claimed 'The plan 
zonings indicate Leichhardt's acceptance of increased 
industrial activity in the area'.  ^ Of its twenty—two 
objections, fourteen were over industrial areas and 
three over areas zoned for port purposes. In all cases, 
the Association sought rezoning to residential use.
In fact, in seven cases the council itself lodged formal 
objections, as these zones had been included in the 
plan by the SPA. The Association also sought more open 
space and provisions to encourage 'residential 
regeneration' largely through restoration of the existing 
nineteenth century terraced housing.
A submission by the Balmain Industries Association
put the views of local industrialists which they summed
up when they claimed: 'There is a general inadequacy
27of area of industrial zones'. They complained about
the large number of firms whose premises would become 
'non-conforming uses' in areas zoned for residential use. 
This reflected the dominant pattern of industrial 
development along the waterfront and scattered amongst 
residential areas. They submitted that the restriction 
on development and expansion in such areas was 
'unreasonable' and that it seemed the aim of the scheme 
to 'force removal' of the industries concerned. The 
submission also complained at the lack of precision in
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the scheme over the conditions that could be imposed by 
the council in the exercise of its discretionary powers 
with regard to development applications.
Support for some of the objections put by the 
industries Association came from Trade Unions, The 
Amalgamated Engineer's Union, the Federated Ironworker's 
Union and the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union 
wrote separately to the council objecting to the inclusion 
of various factories or waterfront premises in residential 
zones, fearing this would endanger the jobs of their 
members. At a special council meeting of June 1968 
called to consider all submissions, Unionists carried 
placards into the public gallery — 'Wake up people of 
Balmain your jobs are at stake'.
In fact, none of these submissions were formally 
accepted by the council as objections to the scheme 
and none of the groups concerned were permitted to appear 
at the subsequent public inquiry. Under the Act, only 
those with a 'direct estate or interest* in affected 
land can object against provisions of the scheme that 
affect that particular land. The council claimed they 
had 'no alternative' but to refuse to consider the 
submissions as formal objections. In fact the Secretary 
of the State Planning Authority had written that it was 
'entirely within the discretion of the council* whether 
or not they heard submissions of this nature at the
9 gpublic inquiry. Relations between the Balmain
Association and the council were strained as the President
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of the Association indicated when he commented,
’...council’s arrogance and disregard for public
2 9amenities has continued as before’.
As has been pointed out, the council, adopting the 
recommendation of its planner, resolved to lodge formal 
objections in line with some of the Association's 
objections to industrial zonings. Within the Labor 
caucus, however, the views expressed by Unions and 
industrialists with regard to safeguarding industry and 
jobs on the peninsula found considerable support. At 
the 1968 elections ALP candidates in Balmain and Rozelle 
adopted a 'jobs for residents' plank and one candidate 
described himself proudly as 'a fighter to preserve the
30jobs of men employed in waterfront industries'.
It was these attitudes that help account for the 
council's past and subsequent record in dealing with 
this sort of issue. A notable case was the issue over 
which the Balmain aldermen were expelled from the party 
in 1967* when they voted contrary to a 7—4 majority 
caucus decision. This approved a 'Chemical Tank Farm' 
near White Bay in Balmain, against a wave of residents' 
protests, as well as the stand taken by the Balmain 
branch of the ALP.
A further case was highlighted by a judgment of the 
Land and Valuation Court in October 1968. A ship repair 
and engineering firm on the Balmain waterfront appealed 
against the council's refusal of an application to remove 
all restrictions on working hours that were imposed when 
the council approved the initial establishment of the
269
factory in 1965* The four acre site had been zoned for 
industrial use in the Cumberland Scheme (a 'spot zoning' 
as the Judge called it), but in the council's draft scheme 
it was zoned for residential use. The area was predominantly 
residential. Commenting on council's decision to consent 
to the application in 1965 the Judge called it a 'gross error' 
and
...a misconceived exercise of the council's 
discretion...it was opposed to its Town Planner's 
recommendations and quite wrong in point of 
planning principle...because of the clear threat 
of injury to the residential neighbourhood which 
it obviously entailed. This injury has in fact 
occurred... 31
Similar cases can be found during the life of the 
1968-71 council, in which the Labor majority tended to place 
the interests of residents second to those of industry and 
jobs. In February 1970 the council approved an application 
for use of a large property in Balmain for storage of ships 
stores. On the draft scheme the site was zoned for 
industrial use. Under the Cumberland Scheme, two-thirds 
was zoned for residential use. In June 1968 the council 
had resolved to object to the industrial zoning on the 
draft scheme and this was one of the areas subject to the 
Balmain Association's objections. On the advice of its 
town planner, the application was referred to the State 
Planning Authority for its views. The Authority advised 
the council that approval could not be granted for that 
part of the site zoned for residential use as 'existing use' 
rights ceased when the premises were vacated in 1968. The 
resumption of what was formerly permitted as a 'non—conforming 
use' could therefore not be allowed. The ALP majority
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defeated a motion from the Balmain aldermen to reject the 
application. The motion referred to the effect upon the 
residential neighbourhood of increased traffic in the 
narrow streets. The council instead referred the matter 
to its solicitors. Legal advice confirmed the view of the 
Authority on the question of ’existing use’ rights as well 
as arguing that the application as a whole was ’contrary 
to the public interest’ in view of the residential 
character of the neighbourhood. The council accepted 
this advice and reversed its former decision.
The Balmain Association also argued against some of 
the flat development that had been taking place in Balmain, 
largely on the grounds of the inability of the existing 
street pattern to deal with more traffic, but also because 
of their attachment to the existing character of residential 
areas. The Association was also critical of the council 
for permitting flats in areas zoned ’non—flat’ in its draft 
scheme. In Annandale and in Glebe flat development was the 
single largest point of contention with the council. A 
cause celebre was the protest made by the Annandale 
Association against the approval by the council during 1970 
of applications to erect multi—storey blocks of flats on 
the site of two famous architectural oddities dating from 
the nineteenth century, part of a row of houses designed 
by architect John Young and known as the ’Witches Houses’, 
perhaps because of their bizarre, even sinister, appearance. 
To the council, approval of the flat developments was a 
routine matter and no mention was made in the town planner’s
report of any architectural value of the existing buildings
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The only point of contention was the matter of 'off-street* 
parking requirements. The applications were forwarded 
for the State Planning Authority's 'concurrence', as the 
two developments were within 300 feet of a proposed 
expressway as shown on the local scheme. The Authority 
raised no objection, but imposed a requirement that the 
developer provide parking space for visitors as well as 
residents. The developers objected and met with a 
sympathetic response from the council. The town planner's 
report of April 1970 pointed out that in fact there was 
no obligation to comply with the Authority's conditions, 
as the applications were submitted to the Authority 'in 
error'. On the Cumberland scheme, under which the council 
was obliged to obtain concurrence from the Authority for 
developments within 300 feet of a main highway, the 
expressway as then planned was shown as 660 feet from 
the site of the development. Although the alignment had 
since been changed (as was recognised in the local scheme), 
the Cumberland scheme was technically the operative one.
The planner added:
As council has not adopted a policy of requiring
off-street parking for visitors...it is felt that
it would be unfair to impose it in this instance.
in fact, the council finally imposed a condition of one 
visitor's space per ten units, rather than one per two units 
'in deference to the Police Department' and their views.
The Annandale Association's objections went unheeded.
The planner argued that the responsibility for preserving 
historic buildings was not that of the council. The council
proffered similar advice to the National Trust The Trust
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asked that the council defer granting approval whilst 
they considered the classification to be given these buildings 
as to historical and architectural merit. The council said 
the Trust must argue their case with the Authority, who had 
earlier shown no objection.
The council was not entirely unmindful of local 
residents' protests. The Glebe Society claimed a victory 
when the Glebe ward aldermen persuaded the caucus to reverse 
a decision to give approval to a block of flats in 
Ferry Road, Glebe. The planner recommended granting 
approval as the project complied with scheme provisions, 
and disquiet in the caucus was expressed by one alderman who 
sought an undertaking that the residents would pay court 
costs if the developer appealed, expressing the opinion that 
the developer would win such an appeal.
The Glebe Society, along with the other residents' 
groups, not only sought to obtain favourable decisions in 
specific cases by exerting political pressure, they also 
sought to re-frame the planning regulations to obtain 
permanent safeguards for the character of the area. To 
this end, the Society submitted proposals to alter zonings 
and other provisions of the local scheme as they effected 
Glebe. Their major complaint was that the scheme, drawn 
up by the City of Sydney council, was based on the assumption 
that Glebe was a dilapidated area 'ripe for redevelopment', 
whilst the Society saw the terraced streets as areas with 
great potential for a high quality living environment, so 
long as encouragement and protection were afforded to allow 
rehabilitation. One complaint of the Society was that the
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council was tardy in considering its alternative proposals
and seemed unenthusiastic about adopting them.
One of the most publicised cases of distributive
decision making occurred over an application for a block of
flats on a site in Flood Street, Leichhardt. The
application was approved by the council in February 1971?
in spite of the fact that the area was zoned *2a' in the
draft scheme, prohibiting flats, and the lot had a 50 ft.
frontage, when the draft scheme specified a minimum of
60 ft. The council exercised discretion allowed under the
Cumberland scheme, whilst ignoring its own planning scheme.
It also rejected the protests of neighbours, lodged as
formal objections against the application, and in the form
of a petition. Some of these objectors complained that
the council had refused them permission to develop their
properties for flats, but others objected on the grounds
of supposed damage to the residential amenity of the area.
In support of its approval, the council cited statutory
declarations to the effect that it was the owner's
intention to build flats on the land, when he had purchased
it in 1963? before the council's adoption of its draft
planning scheme. 'Circumstances beyond his control' had
prevented development of the sites
...it was on this basis and the fact that the 
subject land complied with the minimum dimensions 
required by the council in 1963? that the council 
approved the Development Application. 33
Subsequently, neighbours submitted statutory declarations
disputing some of the facts contained in the declarations
submitted by the developers and one neighbour instituted
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legal proceedings to prevent the development. Finally, 
in September 19715 the Minister announced that he had 
directed the State Planning Authority to investigate the 
matter.
This issue, coming just before the 1971 elections, 
caused considerable embarrassment to the Labor majority.
It was a decision that had been left by the caucus for the 
ward aldermen to make and it was clearly a political 
misjudgment» The norms of caucus that permitted ward 
aldermen to make ’ward decisions’ facilitated distributive 
decisions of this type. The same factor was noted in the 
reversal of the caucus decision on the flat development in 
Glebe, on the insistence of the ward aldermen following 
vigorous protests from the Glebe Society.
The opposition of the residents’ groups to the council 
was based on their belief that the council consistently 
made what I have called distributive decisions in favour 
of developers and that they were not amenable to arguments 
in support of changes to planning regulations to afford 
protection to the residential character of Glebe, Balmain 
and Annandale. Whilst in each of these suburbs pressure 
was exerted to obtain favourable decisions in specific cases, 
to prevent particular flat developments or industrial 
establishments, the opposition to the council during the 
1971 elections was composed of a coalition of these groups 
united on the broader regulative issues, success in the 
distributive arena having largely eluded them.
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NORTH SYDNEY
Planning issues were concerned almost entirely with 
flat developmento The council5s prescribed planning scheme 
did not distinguish between flat and non—flat zones, but 
allowed flats anywhere in residential zones at the council’s 
discretion. The council’s flat code did, however, 
introduce a form of zoning. The code contained provisions 
on minimum area and lot sizes, minimum distances between 
flat buildings and between flats and lot boundaries, maximum 
permissible floor areas, the maximum proportion of allotments 
to be occupied, provisions for off-street parking, 
landscaping, access, and so on. The underlying principle 
of the code was that higher density development was permitted 
on higher land away from the fore shorese The residential 
zone was divided into four areas. Only low density housing 
was permitted on the foreshores, medium density on the 
lower slopes, higher density (maximum eight stories) on the 
higher slopes, and high density on the ridges along the 
peninsulas jutting into the harbour (Waverton, McMahon’s 
Point, Kirribilli, Neutral Bay and Cremorne) and on the 
plateau in Cammeray and Cremorne. The various provisions 
for site coverage, ’floorspace ratios' and lot size, were 
intended to control densities and thus differed from one 
’zone’ to the next. Most of the municipality was set aside 
for high or medium density flat development and only very 
small areas of the foreshore came into the non-flat category.
The code was evolved in the town planning department 
during the early i960’s and represented a considerable 
investment of professional skill and effort. It was
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formally adopted as council policy, and as such it formed 
the basis of the planner®s recommendations in specific flat 
development applications, being seen as a technical instrument 
adequate for development control purposes. He did, 
however, concede that 'it is up to the people's elected
34representatives to decide each application on its merits'.
Developers consistently complained that the code was 
not in fact treated as an adopted policy. The council 
would not automatically give consent to applications that 
met the code's minimum standards, although developers 
tended to treat it as a document that would be so applied.
For the council, however, development control was not a 
routine decision making procedure involving the simple 
application of these provisions. Each flat application 
brought its residents' protests and created a new political 
issue. Aldermen argued that in exercising discretion 
under the scheme, they were obliged to take into account 
the circumstances of the case, the amenity of the area 
and public protests, not just the uniform provisions of the 
code .
We have seen evidence that some ward aldermen were 
prompted in stands taken on development applications by 
ward pressures from residents. We have seen also that 
aldermen could be grouped into clear pro and anti-development 
groups, but that a number of aldermen were more unpredictable 
in the stands taken. This would be due in part to the 
nature of the issues involved. Very few votes on the 
council could be simply classified as purely pro or anti- 
development. One example from amongst a large number of
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cases was the lodging of two development applications for
separate projects in Reynolds Street, Cremorne, in April 1970,
One was for a fifteen-storey block of flats, the other for
two fourteen—storey blocks; together they took up most of
one side of the street, then still a largely single-
dwelling residential area. The town planner recommended
approval of both, as each complied with the code; the
larger project had the virtue of taking up a whole street
block. Local residents soon protested and the battle to
reject the applications was led by one of the ward aldermen
who claimed: ’...this is the sort of gross over—development
35that I was elected to prevent*. After much debate,
several rescission motions, amended applications and 
numerous council divisions, the council finally approved a 
twelve—storey block on one site and two ten—storey blocks 
on the other. However, the latter was subsequently 
rejected by a narrow majority when one of the property 
owners changed her mind about selling to the developer.
During the debate on this project, various alternatives were 
suggested. Those opposing the development outright moved 
that the council wait until redevelopment control plans 
were formulated for the whole area, but they were a minority 
of only four or five on the council. Suggestions for 
acceptable schemes moved by aldermen included two three- 
storey blocks; seven three—storey blocks; one eight—storey 
and one twelve—storey block; and ’town houses’. On the 
other site, the initial application was rejected and the 
final twelve—storey block approved in favour of an amendment 
that sought to reduce the site coverage from 13»7 per cent to
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12.5 per cent. Such attempts to find acceptable alternative 
arrangements of buildings were a regular part of all 
development applications and aldermen had no qualms about 
passing judgment on the merits of various alternatives, on 
aesthetic considerations, on the supposed impact of high 
rise blocks on existing privacy and amenity and on the 
interruption of the views from neighbouring properties.
Whilst important steps were taken during the life of 
the 1968—71 council to re—draft in a radical fashion the 
planning regulations themselves, the major issues with which 
residents* and developers’ interests were concerned involved 
separate flat development projects. Because the council 
did not consistently apply the provisions of the code, but 
rather treated each case ’on its merits’, decisions often 
took a distributive character. Their outcome depended in 
part on the pressures brought to bear by local residents. 
However, the issue was by nature a much broader one, and 
underlying the ad hoc responses of aldermen to the particular 
circumstances of separate flat development applications were 
a broader set of attitudes towards flat development per se, 
Local residents groups also defined the issue in regulative 
terms, seeking changes in the provisions of the code or 
more radical solutions. The council did in fact amend the 
code on several occasions, including extending the non—flat 
areas into larger areas of Wollstonecraft and prohibiting 
multi—storey development on the slopes. These amendments 
were opposed by developers who continued to submit 
applications conforming to the original code. The planner, 
adopting a strict interpretation of the norm that officials
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abide by policy decision of the council, made recommendations 
in line with these amendments, although it was clear that he 
preferred the provisions of the original code. As the 
residents and aldermen opposed to development saw it, the 
claim to impartiality by the planner and building inspector 
was a little hollow, for the code they had themselves 
prepared under which they made recommendations was one that 
permitted flat development. In fact, outright hostility 
towards the council officials was a feature of campaigns 
conducted against flat development by neighbourhood groups.
During 1970 the council decided to hire town planning 
consultants to draw up a redevelopment control plan for 
the municipality to replace the existing scheme and code.
At the same time they resolved to refuse all applications 
for flat development until the plan was completed. The 
only dissenting voices came from the core of pro—development 
aldermen. The great majority accepted the proposal as 
a prospective panacea to their problems, however they 
defined them. Earlier experience held out little 
encouragement that all their political problems would be 
solved. During 1969 the town planner prepared a 
redevelopment control plan for Cammeray, showing in detail 
the desirable patterns of property consolidation, siting 
of multi—storey flats and medium—density housing, new street 
patterns and new open space areas. Apart from being rather 
vague on the problem of trying to convince private developers 
and landowners to follow the plan, it also ran into 
considerable opposition from those in Cammeray who opposed 
redevelopment per se, in whatever way it was three-dimensionall}
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planned. The Cammeray Civic Group condemned the exercise 
as a miserable public relations failure and opposed the 
scheme outright. The council spent most of the time 
arguing about how the public were to be consulted and 
what attention should be paid to their views0 Whilst the 
new redevelopment plan proposed for the whole municipality 
was to be drawn up with ’consultation4 5*8 throughout the 
process, the fact remained that no amount of ingenuity or 
sophistication in devising new codes or regulations would 
remove the basic clash of interests between those opposed 
to redevelopment and those in favour of it.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER Vlll 
PLANNING SCHEMES AND REGULATIONS
A local planning scheme consists of a zoning map and an 
accompanying ordinance. A standard model is adopted by all 
councils for the ordinance, although some provisions do 
differ. There are four categories of restrictions that 
apply to various types of land use in each zone. In the 
first category fall developments that can be undertaken 
without the planning consent of the council (consisting 
solely of single—family dwelling houses in residential 
zones). In the second category come developments that 
the council cannot refuse, but upon which it may impose 
certain sorts of conditions. These are termed conforming 
uses. In the third category fall developments that the 
council may permit with or without conditions or refuse.
These are known as permissible uses. The final category 
is prohibited uses. The ordinance specifies for each 
zone which uses fall under which category. In the various 
commercial and industrial zones, most large scale development 
falls into the category of conforming uses, whilst much 
also comes under permissible use types of restrictions.
Some residential zones allow flats, which come under the 
category of permissible uses, whilst there are residential 
zones in which flats are prohibited.
Every development other than those under category one 
must receive the formal planning consent of the council and 
an application must be lodged for this purpose. It is in 
the area of conforming and permissible uses that most of the
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important decisions on development control are made and 
where the council is exercising varying sorts of discretion.
The way it does this is crucial. The ordinance specifies 
what matters 'shall be taken into consideration' for 
permissible use applications and they include the following:
a) the character of the proposed development in 
relation to the character of the development 
on the adjoining land in the locality.
b) the size and shape of the proposed parcel of 
land to which the application relates, the 
siting of the proposed development and the area 
to be occupied by the development in relation 
to the size and shape of the adjoining land and 
the development thereon.
g) the existing and future amenity of the neighbourhood.
h) the circumstances of the case and the public 
interest•
i) the provisions of the scheme/
For conforming uses, the ordinance states what sorts of 
conditions may be imposed, including those relating to 
(b) above, matters concerning 'ingress and egress' from the 
site, landscaping of the site, and once again 'the existing 
and future amenity of the neighbourhood'. While for 
conforming uses the council cannot threaten to refuse an
application, it can still impose conditions at considerable
2discretion.
Some areas of discretion are filled in by 'special 
provisions' in the ordinance. For instance there are 
provisions specifying minimum lot sizes for dwelling houses 
or flats in different zones. Even so, for residential lot 
sizes most ordinances contain a provision such as the following:
notwithstanding..•, the responsible authority may
consent to the erection of a dwelling house or a
residential flat building on an allotment of land
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the area of which the depth of which or the width 
of which is to a minor extent less than the area, 
depth or width prescribed« a «, 3
Floor space ratios may also be spelled out for various types
of development and specific provisions may be laid down
for the provision of parking spaces in flat developments«
Quite detailed restrictions may be enumerated for such
developments as petrol stations, transport terminals,
drive in theatres, hotels, and so on«
The manner in which councils ought to exercise their
discretionary powers came in for a good deal of attention
from the Land and Valuation Court, the judicial body to
which applicants whose applications have been rejected
4by a council could appeal» One of the Court's members 
has saids
»««the cardinal principle is that a power or 
discretion conferred by statute must be exercised 
bona fide for the purpose for which it was 
conferred and not for some foreign or different 
purpose 5 and the purpose for which a power is ^
conferred must be gathered from the text of the Act«
Examples are given where there was a 'neglect of the mandatory
duty* to consider matters set out in the ordinance and
where “irrelevant® criteria were used for making a decisions
councils mayo««grant»oodevelopment consent because 
of some personal hardship of the owner»««in other 
cases they may be persuaded to consent to developments 
such as licensed clubs out of motives of altruism ^
such as the worthy nature of the objects of the club,,«
There have been cases where councils have withheld or granted
consent in exchange for bribes« All these cases would be
termed “particularistic® decisions under my definition,
although community standards would view them very differently«
Whether discretion is exercised on the grounds of personal
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hardship, or on the grounds of permitting the owner to reap 
a fat profit, the principle is the same — discretion has 
been applied on ’irrelevant' grounds*
This issue is made more complicated, however, because 
of the high likelihood of 'legitimate' dispute over the 
rules and the principles they uphold (i.e. proper town 
planning). There may even be dispute about what 'proper 
town planning' ought to try to achieve, and some may include 
certain economic or social effects that others may consider 
irrelevant. In general, the principles upon which 'good 
town planning decisions' are made are matters over which 
planners as well as citizens or aldermen continually 
disagree. They cannot be specified with any certainty 
because they are very often matters of taste, personal 
standards and value judgments. It is evident from the 
generality of the matters to be taken into account in making 
planning decisions quoted from ordinances above that these 
cannot be specified in terms of actual rules and regulations 
for guidance to each case. Mr Justice Else—Mitchell has 
commented that matters such as 'the existing and future 
amenity of the area' and 'the circumstances of the case and 
the public interest' always 'entail factors of varying 
and even conflicting weight so that the exercise of
7discretion requires a series of value judgments...'. This 
stress on the 'obligation to make value judgments' contained 
in the ordinance has led the Court to question the validity 
and worth of various codes that councils evolve to specify 
minimum standards for various types of development. The 
case against these codes is often that they are technically
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inadequate, in that in specifying minimum standards they do
not adequately define the considerations to be taken into
account as laid down in the ordinance - they lead to
developments being permitted (if the code is slavishly
followed) that individually in some respect fall short of
a 'good1 planning decision on the basis of these broader
considerations. Thus, Else—Mitchell comments:
I have as a matter of law questioned whether under 
the ordinances as they are a council can devise a 
code which seeks to specify more precise standards 
of a calculable character for the qualitative and 
abstract considerations in the clauses in the 
ordinance; and to cite a comment of Hardie J.
•testing an application against a code is not a 
substitute for the exercise of the discretion 
which the ordinance grants1. ®
Planners argue that more sophisticated codes and regulations
can be evolved to achieve the desired result more by
application of a rule than by exercise of judgment, but
certainly in none of the councils studied were there such
codes which eliminated the need for making major judgments
9in most individual cases.
FOOTNOTES
1. These provisions are standard to all local scheme 
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see Dennis Winston, Sydney*s Great Experiment,
(Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1957) • Foran assessment 
of its achievements and the rather sorry tale of its 
fate, see Peter Harrison, 1 Planning the Metropolis: A
Case Study*, in Parker and Troy(op.cit. ) particularly
pp. 64-79
2. Xn seeking to impose conditions, councils do not have 
the threat of refusal for conforming uses, but the 
expense (in terms of delays particularly) of appealing 
to the Court against a council that refuses consent
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is often enough to make a developer reach agreement 
with the council; the same applies in disputes over 
permissible use applications,
3. Bankstown Council draft planning scheme ordinance,
Clause 4l subclause 6
4. The Court was replaced by Boards of Appeal for local
planning matters in November 1971
5. Mr Justice Else—Mitchell, ’Council’s Discretionary 
Powers — Their Use and Abuse in Health, Building and 
Planning Matters', The Shire and Municipal Record 
(NS¥) , vol, 6 1, January 19^9 , IT» 836
6. Ibid, p. 840
7. Mr Justice Else-Mitchell, 'Discussion on Mr Clarke's 
Paper' ('Administrative Discretion in the Urban 
Planning and Development Fields'), Public Administration 
(Sydney), March 1970, p# 137
8. Ibid, p. 138, Mr Justice Hardie was a member of the 
Land and Valuation Court with Mr Justice Else—Mitchell,
9. Many planners would argue that many if not most of the 
value judgments could be eliminated by 'better' codes
or regulations, or as they say, 'performance standards'.
A somewhat extreme position is adopted by George Clarke — 
'The problems of environmental planning and control 
will presumably only yield to the same kinds of massive 
efforts as have subdued the problems of public health 
and private medical practice over the last century or 
more. One of these efforts will be in basic and 
applied research...I suggest that we must constantly 
strive to reduce the scope of necessary discretion 
(i.e. reduce the amount of guesswork) by evolving 
more precise, more mathematical, more detailed, plans 
and codes. We must seek to codify sets of performance 
standards to more closely define such things as 
'amenity', 'privacy', and the 'public interest' in 
particular types of localities, for particular types 
of buildings, for particular sets of circumstances'.
— George Clarke, 'Administrative Discretion', op. cit. 
pp. 130-34. Mr Clarke seems to agree that this point 
in the 'science' of town planning has not yet arrived 
with regard to local planning codes, but the extent 
to which such a point can be reached by the methods 
he outlines is uncertain. I would take 
Mr Justice Else—Mitchell's argument as suggesting 
that Clarke is being over—optimistic.
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Chapter IX BUDGETS
The Department of Local Government recommends to councils 
a set of procedures for formulating and adopting an annual 
budget. These are summarised diagrammatically in 
Figure IX—1. Committees of the council play an important
role in this model in formulating programmes that form the 
basis of the calculation of the amount of revenue to be 
raised. In fact some councils do not operate with a 
committee system. Perhaps the most common departure from 
the model is recognised by the Department itself when it 
comments 'Some councils even go to the extent of building 
their estimates around the rates they propose to make1 .
Each of the six councils to some extent made decisions on 
revenue independent of, and prior to, expenditure 
decisions. The important factor was not the programme 
needs of each department, but the political calculation 
of how much the ratepayer was prepared to pay.
It is useful for some purposes to think of three types 
of decision in the budgetary process: first, decisions
on the amount of revenue to be raised and by what means; 
second, decisions on amounts to be spent on different 
services or programmes, or levels of allocations to be made 
to different departments or agencies; and third, decisions 
on what the money is to be spent on, or operating decisions. 
These decisions are not necessarily made in this order.
In a programme budget, for instance, operating decisions, 
or decisions on programme details are determinants of the 
levels of expenditure. In the Department's model, these
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last are in turn determinants of revenue decisions.
Crecine, in a study of municipal operating budgets in the
U.S.A., found that decisions were made in the order listed
above, with each stage acting as a strict constraint for 
2the next. In the six councils the position was somewhat 
similar in so far as revenue decisions did in most cases 
act as quite rigid constraints on changes in expenditure 
levels.
Crecine*s study emphasised the importance of the
'incremental strategy* in making decisions on operating
expenditure allocations. Wildavsky has described the
incremental approach as follows:
...an agency budget is never actively reviewed as 
a whole every year in the sense of reconsidering 
the value of all existing programs as compared to 
all possible alternatives. Instead, it is based 
on last year's budget with special attention given 
to a narrow range of increases or decreases. 3
In budgets presented in the 'line—item* form, decision
makers almost invariably confine themselves to marginal
changes to an existing base. This was true for most of
the councils. It will be seen that the major determinant
of operating expenditure levels was a decision on the
percentage increase to be made to an 'inviolable' level
of existing activity, to take account of wage and cost
increases.
In most cases, then, we shall see that there are two 
'givens': a 'tolerable' rate levy, and a set of 'unavoidable* 
costs. On most councils, the budgetary problem is to 
balance the budget within these givens. Two common 
strategies are employed. The first is to increase non—rate 
income, particularly fees, charges and loans. Loans can
294
only be raised with the permission of the Loan Council in 
Canberra, and this restricts borrowing for councils which 
seek to raise more than $300»000 per annum. Above this, 
the Loan Council makes special allocations. All loan 
expenditures must be approved by the Department of Local 
Government and fixed rates of interest and repayment terms 
are imposed according to the nature of the work being 
undertaken. Loans can only be used for capital works, 
not for consolidation or other purposes. This restricts 
somewhat the use of loan finance as an alternative 
revenue source. And many councils borrow as much as 
they are permitted.
Local council budgets make no direct distinction 
between capital and operating expenditures. Both are to 
be found side by side in the same set of departmental 
requests and totals. The second major strategy for 
balancing the budget within the two major givens is to 
reduce capital expenditure, pruning a works programme or 
postponing the provision of a planned new facility.
These expenditure cuts do not usually involve laying off 
employees, or cutting basic services such as garbage 
collection. Within the works programme, there is usually 
scope for pruning requests for road maintenance or 
re-sealing, as well as new construction.
Changes in priorities do, of course, sometimes occur 
through conscious political decisions. Generally speaking 
these take place through the opening up of new revenue 
opportunities or through decisions to increase rates for 
a major item of capital expenditure, or a major commitment
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of resources to a particular service. In the normal 
budget, priorities between different services are only- 
considered when pruning is undertaken. This may take the 
form of deciding between one new facility or another, or 
making comparable flat reductions to gross allocations 
for, say, roadworks, parks improvements, or library book 
replacement and new stock purchases. These last items 
cover programmes that are generally made up of a large 
number of separate items of work or assets. Pruning 
decisions of this type entail no immediate necessity for 
decisions on actual operations.
The treatment of most of the budget in terms of dollars 
and cents rather than specific programmes was a feature 
common to the councils. Money was allocated to ’kerb and 
gutter construction* as one item, not necessarily to 
particular jobs of kerb and gutter construction in 
particular streets. Operating decisions - that is which 
streets to kerb and gutter — were on some councils of 
considerable political importance. In some cases, they 
were of such importance that the adoption of a budget 
specifying expenditure allocations was only a formality.
The actual amounts spent resulted from operating decisions 
made throughout the year.
Councils face demands from ratepayers on the level of 
the rate, when the issue may be defined as a redistributive 
one. They face demands from service beneficiaries for 
more or better services that may be -defined as distributive 
issues, or which may be redistributive in seeking changes 
in priorities, in particular if the 'pork* in the barrel
296
runs out too quickly. Whilst pressures from the 
neighbourhood may emphasise the political importance of 
pork barrel distributions, the paid officials of the council 
seek to impose order and regularity on the process of work 
programming by talking of ’objective needs’ and priorities 
according to technical criteria. The purpose of the 
following case studies is to show how councils react to 
these pressures.
BA.NKSTOWN
Figure 1X-2 outlines the major features of the 
budgetary process in Bankstown. On the 1968—71 council 
there was only one increase in the rate,of 15 per cent 
in 1969* This reflected the strategy adopted by the 
Progressive Independents to avoid an increase in election 
years. A marked feature of budgetary decision making 
was the lack of open conflict in the council. Before 
1968, the town clerk’s estimates in some years would 
receive a considerable revision in the council. This 
did not occur after 1968, due largely to the ability of 
the council to reach informal agreements on which the 
clerk could base his set of estimates. The absence of 
an ALP bloc on the council facilitated these agreements.
The 15 per cent rate increase in 1970 was sufficient 
to avoid any need to prune operating costs in any of the 
three years. Budgetary decisions did not call into 
question any existing levels of departmental activity, 
although the Progressive Independents did make an issue 
of staff efficiency, particularly in the engineering 
department. The engineer claimed this led to some
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reductions in staff strength, but these were not significant. 
This is not to say changes in priorities did not occur.
New revenue opportunities were exploited to increase 
expenditure in playing field improvements and in public 
works construction (see Table 1X-1). The 1970 rate rise 
saw an increased parks vote, and a new annual grant of some 
$50,000 from the Local Government Assistance Fund went 
towards playing fields amenities. The council also 
allocated annually $75>000 from loan funds for the same 
purpose. These increases were in response to demands 
from the sporting lobby, with whom Progressive Independents, 
and some other aldermen, were closely identified. They 
did not take place amidst major controversy over the needs 
of other services that might have got some of this money.
One alderman in particular argued for more money for 
'essentials' such as kerb and gutter, but it did not become 
a major redistributive issue. Competing demands from 
council officers for library improvements and for 
construction of a new works depot were not seen as serious 
possible alternate candidates for these funds, despite a 
suggestion by the town clerk in 1971 that the council might 
divert some loan funds to these projects. The change in 
priorities that increased parks expenditure resulted from 
a distributive decision which increased the amount of pork 
in the barrel.
As at previous elections, 'more kerb and gutter' was 
an issue in 1971» The ALP, and others, contrasted the need 
to catch up with a backlog of essential works, with the 
council's decision to spend $1.5 million on a new town hall.
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The council’s defenders (notably the Progressive Independents) 
tried to point out that the issue of priorities was not 
relevant, as the method of financing the town hall (largely 
from sale of land) could not be used to construct kerb and 
gutter under the terms of the Act. At the same time they 
pointed to increases in public works construction 
expenditure made possible by their decision to enter into 
time—payment agreements with private contractors, amounting 
to $400,000 in 1970 and nearly $1 million in 1971« We saw 
how aldermen used the pork barrel aspect of ’more kerb and 
gutter' as an election issue by pledging to kerb and gutter 
particular streets. Time—payment agreements offered a
means of postponing the day of reckoning (that is rate 
increases) whilst, again, providing a means of increasing 
the amount of pork in the barrel.
Other increases in expenditure occurred in response to 
distributive pressures. New facilities were provided from 
special sources of funds, and proponents of these facilities 
had to show how funds could be raised without depriving 
other services, or burdening ratepayers. Sale of land was 
a favourite source. An important exception to this did 
occur in 1965* when it was decided to finance two new 
swimming pools from rates over a three year period. This 
led to considerable financial strain. The decision did 
illustrate the pork barrel nature of decisions about new 
facilities and services, as it was the result of a 'log­
rolling' agreement between South and East Ward aldermen. 
Neither would support the other's pool unless their*s was 
built as well and the votes of each were needed to overcome
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opposition to the use of rate funds in this way. A similar
agreement earlier in the 1960’s had resulted in decisions
to build a swimming pool in the North Ward, and a library
branch in the South. By the end of the 1960’s there were
four pools, one for each ward.
Initiatives for new facilities came from ward aldermen.
As one alderman put it —
Each ward wants their facilities — each ward 
alderman feels he should have what the rest 
have. ^
Pools, libraries, baby health centres, senior citizen 
centres were major prizes for ward aldermen. From 1968—171 
it was youth centres. First in the queue was the East Ward 
in 1969i with a scheme financing the $100,000 centre largely 
from land sales and local contributions. South Ward 
aldermen attempted to obtain a deferment, but they had to 
be content with second place in the queue, with a similarly 
financed scheme. Such an attempt to block projects came 
close to violating the norm that ward initiative and 
enterprise were to be rewarded, especially when it entailed 
local voluntary fund raising and no immediate depletion 
of common funds. By the same token, wards that didn’t 
have facilities had only themselves and their representatives 
to blame for it. North Ward aldermen began helping to 
organise fund-raising activities and local support for a 
youth centre in their part of the municipality, and West 
Ward candidates in 1971 talked of the need in their ward too.
When funds come from a common pool, pork barrel 
decision making can be highly time- and resource-consuming as 
disparate interests seek accommodations. In Bankstown,
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conflicts were minimised by the practice of dividing public
works funds into quarters, one for each ward. The
decisions on the many separate items of kerb and gutter,
drainage work, road construction, and so on, were then left
for the three ward aldermen to decide amongst themselves.
As one North Ward alderman put it -
I haven't the vaguest idea what works are done 
in the South Ward programme and I couldn't 
care. 5
Apart from time—payment finance, works construction
funds came largely from loan funds ($750,000 in 1971—2).
Ward programmes were worked out independently. The engineer
described the process —
...they don’t commit the money all at once...
Some jobs are voted in bulk together, others 
come in as a matter of urgency and we have to 
fit them in... the programme...is worked out in 
dribs and drabs. °
Information on the amount that could be borrowed in the year 
reached the council in Septmber, when the engineer would 
submit a report listing works needing to be done, indicating 
priorities but not suggesting any programme. In 1970—71 
West Ward aldermen did not reach a final decision on a 
programme until May 1971* when it was found that some works 
voted spasmodically during 1969—70 would have to be financed 
from the 1971 allocations. The North Ward aldermen, on 
the other hand, voted a full programme in November 1970, 
whilst South Ward aldermen voted only some $30,000 worth 
at that time. Priorities were decided within each ward. 
Thus, North Ward aldermen decided to curtail road 
maintenance expenditure and use the funds instead for
construction
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The lack of forward programming sometimes led to 
over-expenditure, or to post-hoc transfers of funds at the 
time of revision of the estimates in mid year. Provision 
had to be made in the 197° budget for works that had been 
voted in 1969 but for which 1969 funds were insufficient.
The 1970 allocations for this purpose amounted to $85,000 
from the loan programme and $65,180 from rate funds. 
Over-expenditure on road re-surfacing had been the subject 
of a stern warning from the Department in 1967. As for 
transfers of funds, Table IX-2 shows that the main 
sufferer was public works maintenance, as construction 
works were voted beyond the allocations during the year.
The four—fold division of funds was strictly not 
permissible under the Act, which forbade keeping separate 
ward accounts. The council in fact did not formally 
keep separate accounts. The town clerk and the engineer 
frequently argued against the propriety of existing practice. 
In 1971, the arrangement was questioned for another reason, 
when redistributive issues were raised. A scheme was 
proposed by Progressive Independent aldermen to re—draw 
ward boundaries. This included the creation of a new 
Central Ward surrounding the commercial centre of 
hankstown. One argument advanced in the debate was that 
this measure would ensure money was spent on works in the 
shopping centre. With some justification, it was claimed 
that East Ward aldermen were neglecting the commercial 
area, which Lay wholly within their ward,and spending money 
in the residential areas. The neu ward scheme was rejected 
by the Minister, having been opposed by North and East Ward
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aldermen on the grounds that it was a ’gerrymander'. It
was also argued by them that in re—adjusting the boundaries
to take account of population changes, particularly growth
in the west and south, the areas at present covered by
North and East wards would get less funds. Instead of
being covered by two wards out of four, and getting half,
they would get little more than a third between them.
As a counter to the argument over the maldistribution
of funds to the shopping centre, North and East ward
aldermen sponsored a move to set up a separate ’fund’ of
$30,000 per annum for central area works. Contributions
would come from the ward allocations, $20,000 from East
Ward, and $10,000 from each of the others. Progressive
Independent aldermen defeated the move. They argued that
the South and West wards, where service backlogs were
greatest, should not have to subsidise the East ward
works programme, just because East ward aldermen had
neglected to fulfil their responsibilities. One South Ward
alderman put the case as follows —
The East Ward is the oldest area but it gets an 
even share...In the South Ward we are still tar­
sealing roads...at the expense of kerb and gutter.
In the East Ward all their roads are sealed, it 
all goes on kerb and gutter — this makes it appear 
to the public that much more work is being done.
To take $10,000 off South Ward would lead to 
violent opposition in the ward. 7
One further redistributive issue was of some importance. 
The council in 1967 levied a local rate on properties in 
industrial zones, to finance off-street parking and special 
works in these areas. The move was opposed by Progressive 
Independent aldermen, but supported by others who saw a 
chance to do more work in their wards. A campaign against
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the rate was instituted by Progressive Independent aldermen 
and a meeting they called was attended by some 120 
industrialists. It was decided to raise funds to make a 
legal challenge to the rate. They argued that the rate 
would discourage new industrial development, industrialists 
paid enough in rates as it was, and that it was particularly 
unjust on those who had already provided off—street parking 
in complying with council standards. The rate could not 
be rescinded in 19^7 and its legality was confirmed by 
the Department of Local Government. But it was not levied 
again. In 1970, East Ward aldermen sought to re—introduce 
it, but had to bow to a Progressive Independent amendment 
to seek the opinions of industrialists first. A large
majority objected and the matter was dropped. This 
effective veto, exercised through the Progressive 
Independent group, was in contrast to the attitude of 
commercial property owners who paid local rates, most of 
whom welcomed the provision of off-street car parking 
these rates paid for. The Chamber of Commerce supported 
the rate, although a minority of property owners objected, 
as they had been forced to provide off-street parking in 
their developments under recent council planning 
regulations. But this conflict was resolved within the 
Chamber. The council accepted its majority decision.
The most important characteristic of the politics of 
spending money was the distributive or pork barrel nature 
of much of the ciecision making. This was perhaps the 
most important characteristic of local politics as a whole. 
We saw in Chapter IV how distributive issues played an
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important part in the electoral process, and we noted in 
Chapter V that many of the local groups were involved to 
a large extent in the distributive arena of politics.
In Chapter VI we saw that aldermen afforded greater status 
to parochial demands from constituents and from neighbourhood 
groups than to the advice of paid officers, and that their 
attitude towards the engineering department was particularly 
critical. All these features of local politics are 
confirmed in the way aldermen made decisions about the 
allocation of funds and the determination of programmes. 
Redistributive issues occasionally flared in the local 
polity and in the council chamber. The industrial business 
community had direct access through the Progressive 
independent group, and polarisation of the council resulted. 
The coincidence of Progressive Independent membership with 
a north—south division in the council meant that inter—ward 
conflicts also occasionally became redistributive in nature. 
Amicable arrangements broke down in the face of group or 
bloc cohesion amongst South and West Ward Progressive 
Independent aldermen, or North and East Vvard members. 
LIVERPOOL
Distributive issues were a marked feature of planning 
decision making in Liverpool. In decisions on services 
and the allocation of funds distributive issues were less 
important than in bankstown. We shall note some of the 
reasons for this below.
As indicated in figure iX—3, decisions on the level 
of the rate were taken at an informal level prior to setting 
expenditure levels, at least in so far as setting an upper
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limit went. In the ALP caucus, pressures for more 
services were strong and the most consistent pressures 
against rate increases came from a minority of non—Labor 
aldermen. Small rate increases occurred in 1969 and 1970* 
but in 1971i unlike the election year of 1968, a large 
increase occurred. in fact, at the 1971 elections, the 
level of the rate was not made a major issue by any of the 
candidate s•
In spite of the 1971 rate increase, the finance 
committee in 1971 was faced with the task of reducing 
departmental and committee requests by over $1 million to 
meet a proposed rate income of $2.73 million. The 
engineer sought a 30 per cent increase in works allocations, 
and the parks committee submitted a programme for new works 
of $650,000 compared with requests for $300,000 in 1970.
The Health Department sought nearly $300,000 for new 
provisions for garbage disposal, and a motion was adopted 
by the council to include a new baby health centre at a 
cost of $90,000 in the 1971 programme. At the same time, 
the town clerk stated that the council would have to raise 
$2.3 million just to maintain the existing level of 
services and operations.
The methods adopted to prune requests combined a set 
of standard routines that were applied to all requests 
regardless of content or priority and some questioning of 
relative priorities between capital items. The former 
entailed going through departmental estimates of operating 
costs and cutting any items that showed an above average 
increase on the allocation for the same item in the
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previous year. The public works requests suffered a 
similar process and were cut from $lc5 million to $1.2 million. 
Table IX—2 shows these reductions under the categories 
by which they were considered by the finance committee.
The exercise was an example of the application of a set 
of routines, similar to those described in Crecine's study 
of incremental budgetary decision making, by which decisions 
were made not on the basis of assessments or re-assessments 
of service needs, or priorities, but largely by theg
adoption of a simple arithmetical formula.
The major cuts in the budget, however, occurred in 
capital items other than public works. These were not 
just a matter of dollars and cents, but actual capital 
items and progr.imme s. In making cuts, the finance 
committee had to be aware of the pressures for various 
services within the council and particularly in the ATP 
caucus. Included in the category of ’dispensable' items 
were the garbage disposal schemes and the new baby health 
centre. The parks committee programme also came in for 
considerable reductions, but the final allocation was 
considerably higher than previous years; the playing 
fields programme was hailed by the parks committee chairman 
as a 'breakthrough'. Expenditure on playing field 
amenities, for instance, was increased from $10,000 to 
$40,000. The largest item in the programme uas a new 
$200,000 swimming pool in Green Valley, constructed from
loan funds
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Table IX—2 Liverpool 1971 Budget, Public Works Expenditure,
showing reductions made by finance eommittee to 
departmental requests
1970 1971 1971
(estimated) Dept • 
Request
Alterations by 
fin. comm, 
(adopted totals
Roads and Drains
Main roads 16,000 18,000
Access roads (maint,) 2,800 2,800
Other roads (maint.) 100,000 120,000
Other roads (con.) 110,285 264,570 130,000
Minor works 15,000 20,000
Gutter crossings 25,000 35,000
Gutter maintenance 15,000 15,000 10,000
Sealing/resealing 28,635 45,450 4o ,450
Drainage (con.) 80,000 160,720 100,720
Reinstatements 18,500 16,000
Rubbish dumping 1,500
78,800^C.A.R. roads construction -
Shoulder construction — 41,900 15,000
Land for road widening - - 1 ,000
Kerb and Guttering
Maintenance 3,000 4,000
Reconstruction 8 ,000 32,600 15,000
Construction 50,000 69,200 50,000
Paved Paths
Maintenance 1,100 2,000
construction 20,200 52,200 25,000
Unpaved Paths
Maintenance 20,000 25,000
Tree planting 5,000 7,000
Road signs 5,000 4,000
Bridge s
Construction 23,897 89,000 88,500*
Maintenance 1,500 2,000
Private works 30,000 25,000
Sand pumping 40,000 10,000
Miscellaneous
(includes staff salaries 
employees holiday and sick 
pay and bonuses, repair of 
tools, supervision costs, 
etc. i.e. all costs not 
allocated to particular 
works)
279,958 343,096
TOTAL 904,375 1 ,488,156 1,193,166
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Notes to Table IX—2
This amount includes $39*400 unexpended in 1970*
The allocation was Tor country roads to which special 
Commonwealtli/state grants were applied.
* The increased allocation was due to commitments
entered into to reconstruct bridges on rural roads, 
some in conjunction with neighbouring municipalities, 
jointly Tinanced.
Increased expenditure on playing fields and sporting 
amenities was a response to a very active sporting lobby.
As in Bankstown, the major beneficiary from extra revenue 
gained by the rate increase was parks expenditure, and the 
grant from the Local Government Assistance Fund was used 
for similar purposes. We noted in Chapter Vll that the 
parks committee, set up in 1967 at the instigation of 
Labor aldermen, was controlled by the Labor group, amongst 
whose members were several aldermen who had close links 
with the sporting lobby. We also noted that the Labor 
group made a firm commitments to provide Green Valley with 
amenities, and sporting facilities were the first priority. 
Each year the parks committee was chaired by a North Ward 
Labor representative. In 1971* the Labor policy was 
reflected in the allocations in the playing fields programme. 
Of thirteen separate items, ten were foi works in the 
North Ward, and Che great majority of them in Green Valley. 
Decisions on parks expenditure, within the overall vote 
determined by the finance committee and the council, were 
made by the parks committee. The ne\\ swimming pool, the 
largest single item of expenditure, was pressed for by the 
committee, and supported by the Labor caucus, although 
some non—Labor aLdermen opposed it. Lnstead they proposed
improvement of facilities at the existing pool in the city 
centre, to cater for residents of other parts of the 
municipality as well.
White within the Labor caucus, adopted policy overrode 
ward parochialism, opposition from other wards was voiced.
As early as 1964, East Ward aldermen were voicing concern 
over the burden that would be placed on the council by 
having to service the new Green Valley estate, and the 
Green Valley Progress Association — which by the time of 
the 1968-71 period had become defunct — was continually on 
the defensive. Following a 20 per cent rate increase in 
1907» the East Ward Progress Association voiced its 
opposition to rate income being used in Green Valley, 
claiming that the State Government and the Housing 
Commission ought to provide the services. During the 
life of the 1968—71 council these complaints were never 
far from the surface and during 1971 the now fast developing 
East Ward did, as we noted in Chapter V l l , win representation 
on the parks and works committees. In the election 
campaign it was a common theme amongst candidates that their 
ward was not getting enough money, and this was so 
particularly in the East Ward and from non—Labor candidates 
in the South Ward. Thus, as we concluded in Chapter Vll, 
ward parochialism was important, but was stifled because of 
the policies pursued by the Labor caucus.
Unlike Bankstown, the works programme in Liverpool was 
not determined by ward aldermen following an agreed division 
of the funds. The programme was determined largely by the 
works committee which did not have equal ward representation.
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Again, this occasionally led to complaints from some
ward aldermen that they had been ‘hard done by' in the
allocation of funds. A major reason for the lack of
arrangements to accommodate parochial ward interests in the
way they operated in liankstown was again the cross-cutting
party competition. Apart from this, the committee
tradition was weLl entrenched, and in a municipality that
until recently had been small, the pressures toward ward
separatism were not so acute. At the same time greater
attention was given to the priorities suggested by the
council engineer, due in part to his own personal standing
with aldermen, and a tradition that he helped establish in
the committee of affording his views considerable weight.
Unlike Bankstown, when a works programme was adopted by
the committee, it was not subsequently altered in the
council. if an alderman then put in a further request,
it was, as the engineer himself put it ’too bad'. It had
to wait until next yea r ’s budget. He contrasted his
position with that of the planner:
We don’t have the direct interference by aldermen 
that seems to happen on other councils. Here, 
there is generally more interference u 1 th planning 
matters. 9
It was symptomatic of the professional competence of the 
engineering department, and its self-confidence, that it 
worked out a three year capital budget which it u>od as a 
basis for recommending works programmes. Whilst it was not 
adopted by the council, and indeed the council never granted 
the engineer the funds he requested (see fable IX—2) the 
engineer attached some importance to it as a mean" of
forward planning
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In Liverpool-, the pressures for basic essential 
services such as kerb and gutter were not nearly so strong 
as in hanks town, as most of the newly settled areas - 
including Green Valley — were built after it became a 
requirement that developers or subdividers provide these 
basic services. Development in the 1930's, when 
Bankstown was largely settled, did not provide these 
services, and in the 1960's they were still catching up.
In Liverpool it was sporting amenities that were the 
subject of most political pressure, and this meant an 
increased allocation, with the parks committee dispensing 
the funds in response to local pressures. Where there is 
considerable local pressure for services of this nature 
which are highly location-specific, the policies of the 
pork barrel are likely to evolve. This was seen in 
Bankstown in relation to both sporting amenities and kerb 
and gutter, but in Liverpool the public works programme 
was more immune from these pressures.
KU —RING—GAI
Like Liverpool and Bankstown, Ku —ring—gai was an area 
in which relatively recently developed suburbs required 
services and amenities. It has already been indicated, 
however, that the Ratepayer's majority on the 1968—71 
council saw itself representing a constituency different 
from that behind demands for expansion of services. This 
was seen in the relative decline in influence of the 
progress associations. The maintenance of the 1968 rate 
level in the three following years required making sizeable 
cuts in departmental requests, and curtailing growth in
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expenditure on services. In 1969 public works and parks
requests were cut to maintain 1 9 6 8 levels of expenditure.
In 1971» the proposed works allocation was cut by $200,000
on the grounds that money voted in previous years had not
been spent, largely because of labour shortages.
Opposition to these cuts came from the departmental
heads0 'Opposition’ aldermen in 1 9 6 9  argued that the
new aldermen should not ignore the advice of professional
officers, advice such as that tendered by the engineer on
proposed reductions to public works maintenance:
I would be guilty of professional misconduct if 
1 recommended cuts which would result, in a short ^  
time, in more being spent than the cuts themselves.
They condemned the attack on the traditional council policy
that had provided residents with a high standard of
services and amenities. When the council first came under
attack from the Ratepayers Defence League over the proposed
29 per cent rate increase in 1 9 6 6 , alderman Rickard — who
was re-elected in 1 9 6 8  — described and justified this
traditional approach:
People in Ku—ring—gai have a high standard of 
living in their private lives and expert the ^  
same good standard in their public amenities,
Alderman Harris — defeated in 19b8 — suggested that any
K u —ring—gai resident who disagreed with this approach ought
to go elsewhere and live. One issue that was symbolic of
the attack upon tradition was the council's expenditure on
a wildflower garden set in several acres of bush Land. The
$40,000 allocated to this was siezed on as a major issue by
the Ratepayers Defence League, pointing out the state of
kerb and gutter in some of Ku—ring—gai's streets, and
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referring to it and other items as wasteful and extravagant 
expenditure. A major target of the new council majority- 
in pruning estimates in the 1969—71 budgets was the 
expenditure on parks and they were condemned for their 
‘miserly* approach by the opposition.
The new majority made a virtue out of parsimony in 
every aspect of council services, regardless of tradition 
and past commitments. However, they were reluctant to cut 
public works (the essentials as opposed to the extravagant 
luxuries). in the spirit of eliminating administrative 
inefficiency, the majority sought cuts in every departmental 
request in the 1969 budget, including staff numbers in all 
departments. However, major cuts in new works were avoided 
by increased external borrowing and by borrowing from 
council reserves.
An important aspect of the Ratepayers Committee 
campaign had been their claim that ratepayers were 
subsidising non—ratepayers who used council services. The 
new majority pursued a policy of increasing user fees and 
charges wherever possible as a means of easing this 
‘burden on ratepayers*. Fees for sporting ovals, council 
halls, council golf links and tennis courts, and fees for 
building and planning applications were increased along 
with many others. The 1969 budget saw the council levying 
for the first time a separate garbage charge, distinct 
from the rate. Many of these charges caused opposition 
from user’s groups. The most controversial were the fees 
and charges introduced for the library service. This service 
was seen as a prime example of previous extravagance.
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Library requests were considerably pruned in 19^9 and in 
1970, when the Wahroonga branch was closed and the 
bookmobile service withdrawn, on the grounds that they were 
’uneconomic’. A new scale of fees and charges were 
introduced under which non—ratepayer residents had to pay 
an annual fee. Charges were also imposed for borrowing 
books of ’no educational or literary merit’. These 
original proposals were eventually amended and the State 
Government amended the Library Act to close the apparent 
loophole that had allowed the council to defy the principle 
of so called ’free libraries’ embodied in the Act. In the 
meantime, opposition came from the Library Association 
NSW branch, who organised a meeting in the municipality to 
protest and collected 2,000 names on a petition. Library 
staff adopted a form of passive resistance by not 
undertaking the classification of books necessary for the 
charges to be made. Net expenditure on libraries was 
reduced from $170,000 in 1969 to a little over $120,000 
in 1971» although $20,000 of this reduction was made possible 
by an increased government subsidy.
No major proposals for new facilities were adopted 
during I968—7 1 , except for the construction of a new swimming- 
pool in West Pymble. The previous council decided to build 
a large swimming centre on this site, a decision that 
aroused conflict over the siting and over the cost.
St Ives and Roseville residents and aldermen were in favour 
of pools in their parts of the municipality, and the 
Ratepayers Defence League opposed the scheme on the grounds 
of its high cost. A referendum on the proposal was held
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by the council with the 19b8 elections and a slight 
majority opposed the centre. The only sizeable majorities 
in favour occurred in areas nearest the proposed centre.
The council subsequently in 1970 decided to proceed with 
a more modest proposal, utilising funds from a special 
reserve and loan funds. A proposal by the finance 
committee to levy local rates for pools in various parts 
of the municipality was rejected by Ratepayer’s aldermen 
on the grounds that they had been elected to oppose rate 
inc rease s .
The inter—ward conflicts that occurred during this
dispute were indicative of the pressures on ward aldermen to
look after their ward. Opposition to the Ratepayers
League came from local progress associations and from
aldermen responsive to their demands for increased local
services. This approach was epitomised by one alderman
and progress association member who defended the proposed
1966 rate increase of 29 per cent in the following terms:
I am unwilling to strike any item from the 
estimates scheduled to be done in Gordon—Killara 
ward for the sake of a rate reduction. ^
As in Bankstown, there were backlogs of kerb and
guttering and drainage works in areas developed before the
19b0 ’s; some two hundred streets were without kerb and
gutter in 1970» In the face of pressures for these works,
the distributive nature of works programming decisions was
seen in the autonomy granted to ward aldermen in deciding
the content of ward programmes and in the four—fold division
of funds. Unlike Bankstown, though, the engineer exercised
considerable influence over ward programmes Ward aldermen
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would amend a recommended programme rather than initiate
one. The engineer described the process as follows:
You have to be very diplomatic, X get a few 
variations, but not significant ones. Sometimes 
a number two priority job may go in over my 
number ones, if for instance a street of residents 
is up in arms, 14
In fact, the number of first priority works to be done was 
so large that it mattered little to the engineer which 
were included and for what reasons. The system of 
priorities (one, two and three) was based on guidelines 
and rules of thumb for the different categories of work.
These were the subject of a report by a previous engineer 
in 1966, when he was critical of the method then adopted 
in programming works. Very few of the works done as a 
result of ’requests from local residents, petitions and 
pressures...’ could be classed as ’urgent’, he claimed.
The engineer had no such complaints with regard to the 
19bö—71 council; his problem was one of cuts in 
expenditure. Finally, and again, in contrast to Bankstown, 
the adoption of a programme with the estimate was an 
authoritative allocation and implementation was left to 
the engineer without interference.
During 1968—171 distributive or pork barrel politics 
took second place to the issue of the level of the rate.
The majority of aldermen could not act as eager advocates 
of ward facilities in response to parochial ward pressures 
without negating their stand on council ’extravagance’.
They neither had the inclination nor the political incentive 
to do so, being independent of the traditional pattern of 
progress association politics, and opposed to the traditional
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ethos that advocated a high standard of service and amenities 
appropriate for a rich residential area, regardless of 
expense•
LEICHHARDT
The major determinant of budgetary decisions was the 
rating strategy adopted by the Labor caucus. This entailed 
rate increases in mid-term years, but not in election or 
post—election years. The 1967 increase was some 40 per cent 
and coincided with a revaluation, which provided some 
disguise for the council decision, and the 1970 increase 
was not a great deal less. As a rule, the immediate 
beneficiary or sufferer of rate changes was the public works 
construction programme, which as Figure 1X-5 indicates, 
was the primary balancing item in the budget. The 1967 
increase saw a 'bonus’ of an extra $100,000 for works 
construction; the 1968 programme marked time; but in 
1969 there was no works construction allocation at all.
In fact, in no year did the engineer get nearly what he 
asked for. The council did not raise any loans for works, 
despite his suggestion that they should. The council, 
advised by the town clerk, considered loan repayments were 
already at too high a level.
The 1969 budget presented exceptional problems. The 
council acquired Glebe in mid—1968, and this was the first 
year in which Glebe's services had to be financed from 
Leichhardt's rate. The Labor City of Sydney council 
provided the inner city suburbs such as Glebe with a 
relatively generous range of services, paying for them with 
revenue from the commercial city centre. Leichhardt
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inherited a kindergarten, a welfare centre, a baby health 
centre, a branch library and an old men's home, all of 
which were either subsidised or run by the council* At 
the 19b8 elections former city aldermen and Labor 
candidates for Glebe were as insistent as all’ candidates 
that the rate should not increase, particularly as Glebe 
residents would in fact be paying higher rates in 
Leichhardt than they used to pay in the city* They were 
also adamant that none of Glebe's services would be 
curtailed.
Balmain—Leichhardt Labor Pary candidates in other 
wards had claimed that the rest of the municipality would 
find itself subsidising Glebe, and contrasted Glebe's 
luxuries with the under—provision of amenities in the 
rest of the municipality. This apprehension was shared 
by some caucus members and it created considerable friction. 
When the town clerk presented the draft estimates, it was 
found that even with no provision for public works 
construction the addition of Glebe plus normal cost 
increases meant that to maintain existing levels of 
operations, a rate of 2*75 cents was required. This 
compared with the 2.315 cents of the previous year, to which 
the caucus through its election promises felt itself 
committed. $400,000 had to be cut from the estimates to 
maintain this rate level.
These cuts were made largely on operating costs.
Table IX—3 shows where they were made and also demonstrates 
that they were not in fact implemented. Part of this
would have been due to some amount of 'uncontrollable' cost
increases, but by no means all. Garbage service 
expenditure was cut from an estimated $260,000 to $176,000 
and the street cleaning from $181,500 to $130,000. Final 
costs were $280,000 and $150,000 respectively. Parks 
maintenance was reduced from $150,000 to $10G,000, whilst 
final expenditure was $145,000. Glebe retained its 
thrice weekly garbage collection and daily street watering. 
The grass was still cut and potholes were still filled.
Most important, no—one lost his job. While the council 
eventually handed over the kindergarten to the NSW 
Kindergarten Union, along with a subsidy that reduced the 
council’s commitment, this did not effect the 1969 budget. 
Table IX—3 Leichhardt Council, 1969 Expenditures
Recommended Adopted Actual
General Purposes 187,842 187,842 199,782
Public works 1 ,016,738 903,638 998,880
Health 603,800 447,000 599,627
Municipal property 365,336 338,186 356,735
Miscellaneous 107,500 104,000 101,697
Loan repayments 220,000 220,000 223,981
Capital (Reserves) 200,200 126,200 111,105
TOTAL 2,764,416 2 ,381,366 2 ,639,810
Source: Town clerk's report to council with the estimate;
adopted estimates; and final accounts for 1969*
The Glebe aldermen were not only concerned with 
maintaining the level of existing services. They had also 
made a firm promise to former city council employees that 
none would lose their jobs under the transfer. This was one 
reason why the cuts in expenditure were not realised. 
Employees were an influential pressure group in council 
politics. Through their unions they exercised influence 
through the State ALP hierarchy. Some aldermen viewed 
the improvement of conditions of employment as a major
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policy goal of a Labor council. Labor aldermen on all
councils were under considerable ’moral* pressure from
the party to give employees a ’fair deal'. More directly,
council employees in Leichhardt exercised influence through
being members of local party branches. One -Labor
alderman described this —
You get pressure to bear on aldermen from 
employees. Many of them are party members 
and this presents difficulties for aldermen 
in their branch. 1^
These pressures had shown in the past through revelations
of patronage contained in the 1953 report of the
Departmental Inspector, and similar allegations continued
to be made up to the 1971 elections, though they could not
be proved, and were made by political opponents of the 
15council. One Labor alderman did state that:
Political patronage happens to a certain extent 
on promotions...if you are Labor then maybe you 
can advance to another job. But aldermen are 
wary of being accused of this. 1^
Whether or not we look for evidence of patronage of some
description, it is certainly the case that the Labor caucus
was very attentive to staff matters. Every appointment,
dismissal, promotion and demotion, was the subject of
staff committee decisions, and in turn, caucus rulings.
It was in these circumstances that the Glebe aldermen
made their promise to employees, and kept it. As a
result of the subsequent over-expenditure in 19b9, the
council achieved a large deficit.
In 1970, and 19711 the works programme again suffered
as the balancing item in budgets where income was
insufficient to meet departmental requests. On these
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occasions, however, the council made no reductions in 
operating costs. In 1969 the engineer's list of 'essential' 
works totalled some $450,000. By 1971 it had risen to 
$1 million. The 1971 allocation was $35jOOO. Not only 
was the engineer unable to obtain higher allocations , 
his influence over programming was never great. Just as 
pressures from local branches were important in influencing 
relations with council employees, so they contributed to 
the distributive approach of aldermen in the allocation of 
funds. We noted in Chapter Vll that norms relating to 
ward autonomy were important in the caucus, and part of 
this ward parochialism was the importance aldermen 
attached to exerting complete control over works 
programming, even minor maintenance. The result of ward 
competition for funds usually meant a fairly even spread. 
Because the total allocation was so small, this had the 
effect of ruling out most of the larger items. The 
engineer commented on this:
You find yourself putting in works that aren’t
really necessary... they all agree on the smaller
jobs, to get an even share. 17
As in Bankstown, adoption of the estimates did not entail 
Che adoption of a programme of work. Separate items were 
voted throughout the year.
In Leichhardt, the major constraint in the budgetary 
process was the Lack of resources. Arguments about 
service priorities were never really important, as the 
council could afford so few. Glebe provided something of 
a spur, and the new residents of Balmain had long sought 
a municipal library service. This finally came about in
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1 9 7 1 i financed from the sale of land. Most aldermen 
adopted the view that it was better to forego these 
’luxuries' than to increase the rate burden, which (as we 
saw in Chapter 1 1 ) was already high compared with more 
fortunate municipalities.
BURWOOD
During the 1 9 5 0 ’s Burwood prided itself on being able 
to live up to the slogan ’The lowest rate in the State’. 
After i960 the position changed. This was brought about 
by an increased expenditure on public works, the provision 
of new facilities and the use of loans for land purchase 
in connection with planning policies. During the early 
1960's the council managed to avoid large rate increases 
by increasing borrowing for the public works programme, 
but in 1966 deferments of rate increases in previous years, 
coupled with rising costs, led to an increase in rates 
collected from $530*000 in 1965 to $8 3 0 ,0 0 0 . 1966 was a
year in which properties were revalued, but if the council 
hoped to disguise its decision in this way, it was mistaken. 
The public reaction was unprecedented in its vigour, and 
the result was the formation of the Ratepayers Action 
Committee. The Committee was not as effective in its 
campaign, nor as well led and supported, as that in 
Ku-ring—gai, and although it claimed that the subsequent 
defeat of the mayor of 1966 at the 1968 elections was 
attributable to his stand on the rate, no attempt was made 
to win control of the council. The major effect of the 
1966 campaign against the rate increase was not so much to 
prevent future increases, as to make the council wary of
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putting itself in a position of again having to make such 
large increases to the rates. Successive budgets saw 
rate increases of the order of five to ten per cent, all 
justified on the grounds of ’rising costs'.
Partly as a result of past parsimony, th‘e council 
faced a considerable problem of road reconstruction. In 
1967 the recently appointed engineer presented a report 
comprising a complete reassessment of works priorities 
and needs. The tone of the report was urgent and it 
sought an annual allocation for a works construction 
programme of $3 0 0 ,0 0 0 , against the 1967 programme of 
$127*000. This aim was not realised, although the works 
committee did for 1968 recommend an expenditure of $250,000 
and in subsequent years sought sums approaching this 
figure. The works programme was always used as the 
balancing item in the budget, following the decision on 
the level of the rate. The newly appointed town clerk 
in 1962 criticised this practice, recommending the council 
adopt the approach suggested by the Department of Local 
Government — that is, the use of the rate as the balancing 
item, following the adoption of a specific programme of 
works based on needs. An alderman was still able to 
describe the budgetary process in 1970 in the following 
terms:
The engineering department has been getting the 
rough end of the stick. The other departments 
get their 10 per cent rise on costs...they get 
what they ask for, and the engineer gets what’s 
left. 18
Despite the engineer’s demands, reflected in an 
increasing volume of requests from constituents and
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aldermen for work to be done, the amount allocated to public 
works only increased slowly* This increase was retarded in 
1970 when the council adopted a recommendation from the 
town clerk that they reduce the amount of money being 
borrowed for public works* The town clerk argued that 
loan repayments were escalating at a rate that made it 
cheaper in the long run to gradually increase rates to 
perform these works.
Although the works committee made recommendations to 
the council on the level of the works programme, in making 
the final allocation it was the level of the rate adopted 
that was the determining factor. However, in 1971 the 
adopted works allocation was that recommended by the 
committee and the ten per cent rate increase was partly a 
result of this commitment. It was also the result of 
the adoption of a recommendation by the engineer to 
increase expenditure on parks maintenance. Once again 
the pressure for a change in existing service commitments 
stemmed from the engineer rather than from community groups 
or aldermen.
The town clerk claimed 1971 as a year of innovation.
The adopted works programme itemised in detail the works 
to be done and for the first time was determined by the 
committee several months before. The engineer claimed 
in the previous year that doing this would mean that ' ... 
modern methods of works planning and control such as
critical path and works scheduling can be applied over the
19entire programme...’. In determining an actual programme
the engineer exercised considerable influence. Aldermen
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did not treat the programme as an exercise in pork barrel 
politics and the engineer's priorities took first place.
Thus, whilst aldermen liked to see that some measure of 
•fairness' was obtained in spreading works throughout the 
municipality, it was recognised that needs differed from 
one area to another and allocations reflected this. 
Furthermore, the engineer was given a free hand in 
implementing the programme, which as we have seen was 
decided and adopted with the estimates themselves. These 
features of the decision making process reflected the 
lack of the parochial ward pressures that were so important 
in other municipalities and illustrated the extent to 
which a style of administration that emphasised the values 
of professionalism and the status of the paid official was 
an important part of the system.
NORTH SYDNEY
The town clerk described North Sydney as a 'well 
financed municipality'. This was a reflection of the 
wealth of the area, particularly the commercial centre where 
property values had increased rapidly to the benefit of 
council rate revenue. The area was generally well provided 
with facilities and there were few pressing service needs. 
These factors combined to make the budgetary process a 
relatively routine one. The 1970 budget was adopted as 
presented by the officials without debate. Political 
pressures on aldermen were more concerned with the issue of 
flat development. Even progress associations were 
preoccupied with this issue much of the time, or with ensuring 
the upkeep and proper management of existing amenities.
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The lack of interest in provision of council services 
was amply illustrated by the fact that the public works 
programme was considered largely a matter of routine by 
aldermen and left for the engineer to determine. Aldermen 
were attentive to requests from ward constituents for 
minor maintenance work and this was one way that aldermen 
built up credit as good ward representatives. The 
importance of maintenance in the works programme was 
demonstrated by the existence of five full time maintenance 
’gangs1 , one for each ward, on tap to perform routine 
maintenance work and satisfy requests from aldermen and 
residents for such work.
FOOTNOTES
1, Department of Local Government (NSW), Local Government 
Finance and Accounts, Bulletin No, 8A, (Sydney, 
GovernmentPrinter, 1 9 6 2 ) , p . 12
2, John P, Crecine, Government Problem Solving, A Computer 
Simulation of Municipal Budgetingf (Chicago,
Rand Mcnally, 1 9 6 9 ") pp. 192*-3
3, Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 
(Boston, Little Brown, 19^), pT 15
4, Interview conducted February 1971
5, Interview conducted February 1971
6, Interview conducted September 1970
7, Alderman Duncan, council debate, 1 April 1971
8, John P, Crecine op. cit., passim
9, Personal interview conducted September 1970
1 0 . North Shore Time s , 5 March 1 9 6 9
11. North Shore Times, 5 January 1 9 6 6
12. North Shore Times, 9 February 1966
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13* Personal interview conducted September 1970
Even the aldermen elected on the issue of lowering rates 
were not entirely immune from pressures of progress 
associations. Thus, one alderman commented that they 
had tried to ’mollify’ a particularly hostile progress 
association, whose endorsed candidates they had 
defeated in 1968, by spending ’two thirds of the ward 
allocation’ in their area. The alderman remarked 
’it doesn’t seem to have had any effect’*, and that 
they still were uncompromising in their opposition.
Some of the majority aldermen, realising this, in 
fact did not bother with these pork barrel decisions 
at all,
14, Personal interview conducted May 1971
15« The Glebe, 21 July 1971 listed ten relatives of
aldermen on the council’s staff. Allegations of 
nepotism were made by the convenor of the Campaign 
for a Better Council team at the 1971 elections 
in a Sydney daily paper; Sun, 7 September 1971
16, interview conducted May 1971
17, interview conducted September 1970
18, interview conducted October 1970
19* Aeroplane Press (Burwood), 29 October 1969
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Chapter X CONCLUSION
Much of the decision making that has been described in 
this study might be characterised as ‘administration by 
politicians’. We saw in Chapter 1 that local government 
has traditionally been viewed as administration rather than 
politics. In one sense this is true, as issues of policy 
involving the clash of major interests are exceptional 
political events, rather than the norm as in legislative 
politics. Aldermen are mostly concerned with the 
administration or enforcement of regulations, with decisions 
involving relatively small amounts of expenditure on highly 
localised facilities, or with other matters of detail and 
implementation. But the view that elected representatives 
in local government are managers or administrators rather 
than politicians is far from the truth. I pointed out in 
Chapter 1 that there is some tension inherent in the theory 
of local government democracy in that the norms of elective 
office, particularly the notions of direct accessibility 
and being ‘close to the people*, provide encouragement for 
the representative to adopt a political role. The aldermen 
as members of the body solely responsible for every aspect 
of council administration are on the one hand asked to be 
apolitical, and particularly not party—political, while 
on the other hand they are encouraged to expose themselves 
to the electoral and constituency pressures. We have seen 
the effects of these pressures. The demands made upon 
aldermen are highly parochial, even individualised, and 
often seek to influence the implementation of policy rather
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than its formulation. That is, people seek to exert
political influence on the administrative process. They
ask the alderman to contravene the norms of impartial,
efficient, rule—bound administration by seeking special
favours and dispensations, the bending of rules or the
granting of indulgences. They seek to circumvent the
norms of bureaucratic universalism and the 'rule of law',
by demanding what I have called distributive decisions.
Some of these characteristics of local politics are
familiar in another political setting. A concern on the
part of politicians with enforcement and implementation
rather than issues of policy, the participation in politics
of groups and individuals for the purpose of highly specific
short-run material benefits, and the concern of office
holders with the granting of favours to satisfy these
individualised demands for personal reward or benefit,
are features of the urban political machine in the United
States. Leaving aside the characteristic political
structure of the urban machine, Wolfinger has provided a
succinct definition of machine politics:
'Machine politics' is the manipulation of certain 
incentives to political participation; favouritism 
based on political criteria in personnel decisions, 
contracting and administration of laws. ^
This definition draws on Banfield and Wilson's observation
that the machine 'depends crucially upon inducements that
2are both specific and material'.
Machine politics is invariably associated with corruption. 
Corruption in most of its forms is simply one of several 
ways of exerting political influence in the distributive 
arena of politics. Instead of seeking favours in exchange
3^3
for votes or some other form of political support, or on
the basis of kin or friendship relationships, cash or some
other material benefit is offered in the transaction.
But these distinctions between different ways of exerting
influence in the distributive arena are important in
making judgments about local government politics and
evaluating the worth of local government administration.
Moreover, they are important in practice in that these
forms of influence may be either prohibited, tolerated, or
encouraged in different political cultures. Thus, pork
barrel politics in which the ’currency* is political
support and votes is a legitimate form of political activity
in most polities. But the use of similar political
criteria when administering supposedly uniform laws is
often judged differently. Favours granted to individuals
by politicians are normally frowned upon when the motive is
personal gain, particularly if bribery is revealed, but a
different view is usually taken if help is granted on
compassionate grounds. The word 'favour* usually has
strong pejorative overtones, although I use it to cover all
types of political demand in the distributive arena. But
it is important to know when 'help* turns into 'pull*, as
Wolfinger has remarked in chastising those writers who
depict machine bosses and ward captains as benevolent
dispensers of welfare rather than self-seeking politicians
3intent on upholding a corrupt political system.
The distinction between different types of distributive 
politics is important for another reason. Favouritism to 
individuals in the form of patronage or exemption from the
344
law, or to business firms in the form of contracts or 
franchises, are a distinguishing characteristic of machine 
politics. The machine relies on these rewards and 
benefits as the main inducement to political support.
Although the machine may indulge in pork barrel politics, 
these forms of political favouritism that benefit localities 
or particular groups are also sanctioned, or at least 
tolerated, in many polities, some of them a far cry from 
the political machine. For example, pork barrel politics 
was common in the six local councils in Sydney.
Nevertheless, I shall look more closely at some of the 
attempts to explain machine politics, for they may help 
account for some aspects of distributive politics in local 
government. This approach is further justified because 
some political regimes in Sydney’s local government history 
have in fact exhibited the central characteristics of the 
American urban machine, including corruption.
Corruption is often popularly associated with local 
government in Sydney. There have been several cases of 
proven corruption in.the six councils in the past twenty 
years or so. Not all of these led to revelations of a 
political regime that was pervasively corrupt and there is 
little doubt that some were isolated cases of individual 
abuse of public office. Cases of revealed malpractice or 
corruption occurred in Liverpool in 1953 and 1963 and in 
North Sydney in 1969# Bankstown council was dismissed in 
1963 following bribery charges laid against several 
aldermen, but no further evidence of malpractice was revealed. 
But the 1954 dismissal of the council did lead to 
allegations that corruption was pervasive in local politics.
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Irregularities in tendering and in the purchase and sale 
of council materials were discovered and all were linked to 
one prominent local contractor who earned the name of 
'Mr Big*. A charge of bribery laid against him was 
dismissed in court and the broader allegations never
4proven•
There was one case of revealed corruption that uncovered
a political regime that bore a marked similarity to the
American urban machine. This involved Leichhardt council
in the period before its dismissal by the Minister in 1953*
The reports of the inspectors from the Department of Local
Government and the evidence given at the trials of the
mayor, other aldermen and some council employees, gave a
very full description of the regime and its corrupt
5practices. Aldermen solicited bribes for the approval of 
building and development applications, even when granting 
approval involved no bending or contravention of regulations; 
aldermen stole council property and used council materials 
and labour for alterations to personal property; several 
'irregularities' were revealed in the letting of contracts 
to local firms; employees were over—paid and time—sheets 
were falsified, while jobs were given to relatives of 
aldermen in preference to better qualified applicants.
The aldermen involved were members of the Labor majority.
The Labor Party was intimately involved in local politics 
through branch control over aldermen. It was alleged that 
patronage in personnel matters extended to favouritism 
being given to party members. Allegations of falsification
of party records and membership rolls in the Rozelle branch
3 46
were investigated by the ALP State Executive in 1937»
providing some clue of the means by which some of the local
party ’bosses’ exercised control over their branches«,
Allegations of double-voting, ballot-box stuffing, and
other electoral malpractices were rife, although never 
7proven. Electoral support for the Labor council was in 
fact assured by the fact that electors in the solidly 
working class area voted the same way as they did for State 
and Federal elections,and the party label was enough to 
ensure success for the Labor candidates endorsed by the 
branche s•
Although Leichhardt seems to have been a special case 
amongst the six councils, in the past some other inner-city 
working class Labor areas were similar. 8 In view of the 
incidence of corruption in local government it does raise 
the question of whether it stems from some of the conditions 
from which the corruption endemic to the urban political 
machine stems.
Wolfinger uses the notion of ’incentives to participation’ 
to distinguish characteristics of machine politics. These 
incentives are both ’tangible’ and ’intangible'. They 
can be divided into two types, which he calls 'routine' 
and 'substantive'. The rewards that provide the tangible 
incentives in machine politics are 'divisible' in the sense 
that they can be allocated piece—meal to individuals.
They result from the 'routine operations of government, not 
from particular substantive policy outcomes'. Wolfinger 
remarks that substantive issues of policy are 'irrelevant' 
to machine politics and 'more an irritant than anything
3k7
else to its practitioners'. But the other type of
tangible incentives are concerned with policy issues and
'result from a desire to influence the outcome of particular
policy decisions'. Interest groups seek to change policies
for the benefit of broad groups rather than Influence the
routine operations of government for the particularistic
9benefit of individuals. A very similar set of categories 
is outlined by James C. Scott. He talks of the material 
and non-material 'inducements' parties offer to their 
supporters. The type of material inducement offered 
depends on the loyalties of individuals in the electorate.
If individual or family loyalties are important then 
patronage and the granting of individual material favours 
are likely to be common. If local!ty—based or ethnic and 
communal ties are important, then inducements such as pork 
barrel distributions are likely to be effective. If most 
voters have evolved loyalties to broader social groups 
such as classes, beyond their family or village context, 
then sectoral inducements such as changes in tax laws, 
welfare policies and.other matters of general legislation 
are more likely to be important.
The categories employed by Wolfinger in distinguishing 
between types of political incentive and the distinctions 
Scott makes between different bases for political loyalties, 
can be adapted to fit into the three—fold distinction of 
distributive, regulative and redistributive politics. 
Tangible divisible incentives fall in the category of 
distributive politics, while substantive policy incentives 
are divided into regulative and redistributive issues in
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Lowi’s schema. Scott’s sectoral inducements are similar 
to Wolfinger's substantive policy incentives, while the 
local!ty—based and the individual or family—based loyalties 
would be characteristic of the distributive arena of 
politics. But the problem raised earlier in distinguishing 
between different types of distributive politics is apparent 
again. Machine politics for Wolfinger is characterised 
by divisible incentives which are offered to individuals.
Pork barrel politics would seem to fall somewhere in between 
his two categories of routine and substantive incentives, 
for they are directed to groups or localities. Scott 
recognises this as a distinctive category, but includes 
local!ty—based loyalties as one of the conditions in which 
machine politics may thrive, and pork barrel politics as a 
feature of machine incentives. While pork barrel 
distributions of public works do tend to be vitally 
important in the context of social and political development, 
which is when Scott says machine politics is likely to 
occur, X have suggested that pork barrel types of 
distributive arrangements and other forms of favouritism 
to particular localities or communal groups, are far more 
universal phenomena occurring in polities where machine 
politics is not found.
Scott uses a development model to account for machine 
politics. The machine thrives where ’narrow community and 
family orientations are most decisive’. ^  In American 
cities, machine politics occurred where ethnic minorities 
were attempting to ’come to terms’ with society at large. 
What was needed to bridge the gap between the community and
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family environment and the foreign norms of American 
society and government was a mediator. The machine 
politician filled this role. He provided personal favours 
in the shape of jobs, contracts, licenses and instructions 
on how to obtain welfare and other individual benefits 
from government. He was the ’fixer', the manipulator 
of strange and complex processes of administration and 
government. The machine politician for his part exploited 
these needs and employed these material inducements of a 
particularistic type to weld links in a social setting 
where loyalties were narrow and parochial. In developing 
nations a similar process can be seen as village peasant 
communities try to come to terms with modern state 
government with its strange processes of democratic 
election and bureaucratic administration. The village 
community is not fully integrated into society at large 
and a mediator or broker is required who can manipulate 
government for them. The family, the tribe and the 
village community are the social groups of importance and 
relevance to the individual, and broad party appeals to 
social classes or occupational groups that cut across 
these traditional loyalties have not yet taken hold.
But as they do, political demands come to be focussed on 
legislation to serve sectoral interests, rather than on 
administration and enforcement to serve particularistic 
short-term interests. Political parties and office holders 
in the meantime are concerned with patronage and favours, 
distributed by manipulating routine government administration, 
and voters perceive their interests not in collective terms,
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but as being best served by influencing the way legislation
is implemented as it personally affects them.
Several descriptions of politics in developing nations
or peasant societies have pointed to these characteristics.
Weingrod, in an analysis of political relations between
a Sardinian village and government institutions describes
the system of patronage that Italians refer to in speaking
12of una clientela. The term means roughly ’connection*.
Office holders distribute favours to localities or within
villages in exchange for political support. This occurs
largely in ’areas of administrative responsibility’ and
is ’based on highly personal ties rather than upon
universalistic criteria’:
...clientela, emphasising personal motives and 
greed, is contrasted with politics of an 
ideological kind or with public-spirited 
administration in which ’connexions' are made 
irrelevant. ^
Lui fa una clientela can be translated as ’he is drumming 
up support’, by means of the distribution of favours.
Mayer describes a similar electoral process in an Indian 
municipality, where candidates enlisted support in part by
l4the use of specific transactional appeals. 1 have
already referred to this analysis of electoral support in 
the discussion of local elections (see page 84). In 
Mayer’s description, candidates not only publicised their 
party's platform, but also campaigned at a private level, 
welding specific transactional links with individuals. 
Promises of jobs for a voter's relatives, or of repairs 
to the road outside his house, were given in exchange for 
promises of voting support.
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The similarity between aspects of politics in 
developing societies, the urban machine and local 
government in some of Sydney’s suburbs underlines the 
suggestion that we are dealing with some common phenomena, 
although the processes of social development and political 
integration which help account for their occurrence in the 
American urban machine or development politics are not 
directly applicable. It is useful to restate briefly 
some of the characteristics of local politics that show 
the similarities. In the six councils both individual or 
divisible incentives, and inducements that appealed to 
parochial local!ty—based interests were important. These 
dominated over substantive policy issues or sectoral 
inducements. They were important in electoral politics, 
where specific transactional appeals were noted in some 
councils, except where non—material incentives were 
dominant, or where local parties were active. The 
building up of personal followings by candidates was seen 
to bear a marked similarity to Mayer’s description of 
electoral politics in an Indian village, and Weingrod’s 
description of 'drumming up support' through clientela 
relationships in Italy. Even some of the apparently 
non—material incentives for political support important in 
candidates' personal followings are also important in 
machine politics. Banfield and Wilson refer to the 
importance of 'friendship' in the ward captain's mustering 
of votes:
A Chicago captain explained, 'I never take leaflets 
or mention issues or conduct rallies in my precinct. 
After all, this is a question of personal friendship 
between me and my neighbours'. 15
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Local politics in most of the councils offered opportunities 
for individuals to make personal representations in 
seeking favours of various types, from requests for road 
repairs to pleas for exemptions from the impact of building 
and health or planning regulations. In most councils, 
the administration of these regulations was not a routine 
process of rule application left to paid officials, but 
gave rise to distributive issues affecting the political 
fortunes of aldermen. In councils where the administration 
of these regulations gave rise to the greatest political 
interference, the status of paid officials tended to be 
lowest. In the face of distributive political demands 
aldermen retained discretion over these administrative 
decisions. These demands stemmed both from individuals 
and from localities. Locality—based demands were very
important in some councils, where pork barrel arrangements 
were important in works programming, or where ward 
parochialism was apparent in the decision making process.
The transition from traditional to modern society 
that is at the root of Scott’s account of machine politics 
is not relevant in the six councils. Nor were there the 
same social and cultural consequences of ethnic minorities 
that gave rise to machine politics in urban America.
There were immigrant minorities of quite significant 
proportions in some of the six areas (see Table 11—6), 
but local politics seems to have had little if anything 
to offer them. Other explanations of machine politics in 
Urban America stress the period of economic growth, the 
growing demand for essential services and the rise in the
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level of government activity in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. As well as stressing the
importance of ethnic minorities in machine politics, most
explanations also attach great importance to poverty as a
spur for machine politics. The patronage over which the
machine had control was particularly beneficial to the
poor. Banfield and Wilson refer to the ’culturally and
personally incapacitated’ as the mainstay of machine
support. ^  Their account stresses working class
political values and contrasts them with middle class
values and approaches to politics (see page 178):
The assimilation of lower class people into the 
middle class has, of course, entailed their 
assimilation to the political ethos of the 
Anglo—Saxon—Protestant elite, the central idea 
of which is that politics should be based on 
public rather than on private motives and, 
accordingly, should stress the virtues of 
honesty, impartiality and efficiency. 17
This is one explanation given for the decline of machine
regimes. But Wolfinger questions many of the assumptions
behind this explanation. He argues that the urban poor
have increased rather than decreased and that their
deprivation has become more acute because they are now
increasingly a black urban poor. The middle class has
systematically benefited from the patronage of machine
politics as much as the working class. Not only have
businessmen received contracts and franchises, but lawyers,
urban planning consultants and other professional groups
have been involved in receiving patronage. While urban
machines thrived in some cities where the immigrant
population was large, they also existed in areas where this
was not so, and did not exist in several cities where
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immigrants were a large proportion of the population.
Wolfinger concludes that local and regional variations in
political style and political culture might need looking
18at to explain the incidence of machine politics.
I have already offered some general reasons why local 
government politics tend to be concerned with distributive 
issues. Councils are largely concerned with administration 
and policy implementation, but these decisions are 
entrusted to elected politicians. They are elected to 
represent wards which encourages parochialism. Most of 
the services councils provide are highly divisible in 
character and the regulations that councils administer 
affect the interests of individual property owners acting 
independently in developing their properties. These 
characteristics of council functions encourage the 
disaggregation of interests and individual or parochial 
demands. These features were common to the six councils, 
but there were differences that do help account for the 
relative importance of distributive politics in each.
The size of the municipality had some effect. Parochial 
influence tended to be most important in the largest 
municipalities. This was due in part to the structure 
of local communities, which seem to be defined in areas 
much smaller than the municipality or the ward. A study 
by A. J. Sutton identified eighteen communities in Bankstown 
on the basis of asking ’...a number of aldermen, council 
employees and government officials...’, to sketch on a 
map their perception of the communities that made up the
19municipality. It was noted that the suburb or the
neighbourhood was the basis of interest group organisation
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in local politics. In Bankstown, ward parochialism was 
particularly' marked and aldermen from one ward often 
cared little about the administration of other wards. 
Locality-based loyalties created a lack of political 
integration in local politics akin to the lack of 
integration of local communities in developing societies. 
Ward aldermen reached agreements with other ward aldermen 
to act as brokers for their own areas.
The larger municipalities were also those in which 
suburbs were still developing. The larger the programme, 
the greater the political importance of parochial services 
demands. ’Underdevelopment’ led to a high level of 
parochial demands, as each suburb, neighbourhood or street 
in turn demanded the services available. Thus, the works 
programme in Bankstown or Ku—ring—gai and the parks 
programme in Liverpool were subject to these pressures, 
but in Burwood or in North Sydney they were not politically 
important in the same way. Progress associations, active 
typically in the pork barrel arena, were noted to be a 
characteristic of developing suburbs, but tended to fade 
out or move into other areas of politics or social activity 
once services were provided.
Pork barrel politics was a response to the volume of 
parochial demands for the highly divisible services that 
were on offer. In the same way, in the outer suburbs 
where the rate of private property development was highest, 
the volume of demands for exemptions or favourable treatment 
in relation to planning or building and health regulations 
was greatest. This was most notable in Liverpool. The
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same could be said perhaps for inner suburbs undergoing 
redevelopment, but there the situation is somewhat different. 
Redevelopment involves greater disruptions and affects 
more people, arousing more competing political demands 
than new development. There are no protesting local 
neighbours in non—urban land on the urban fringe to 
worry about the affect of new development in the way that 
existing residents with a vested interest in a particular 
style of life and level of amenity voice protests at 
redevelopment proposals that threaten them. These 
clashes of interest lead to regulative issues and this 
was most evident in North Sydney and Leichhardt.
The Banfield and Wilson thesis that there is a 
distinctive middle class ideal of politics and that machine 
politics stem from a working class approach deserves some 
attention. The three councils in which distributive 
politics were perhaps most prominent were Bankstown, 
Leichhardt and Liverpool and these were all areas of 
working class populations. The other three areas contained 
a higher proportion of middle class residents. In 
Chapter VT1, we saw that aldermen from professional and 
salaried occupations placed a greater emphasis on the advice 
of the professional officer than on the plea of the 
individual constituent in gathering information for making 
council decisions. For those from lower status occupations 
and for those from business backgrounds, the reverse was 
the case. Faith in the expert and the rejection of 
particularistic politics are two themes that are found in 
what Banfield and Wilson describe as the middle class
357
1 public—regarding1 ethos. They contrast this with the 
'private—regarding * approach of the working class, which 
stems in part from conditions of need, encouraging them to 
seek from government personal short-term material benefits. 
The middle class ideal of urban government is seen as a 
search for an 'objective public interest' in every 
decision; a preference for the 'expert' or the 'statesman' 
above the politician; a belief in honesty, impartiality 
and efficiency as essential public virtues and as simple 
standards by which to judge the public good; and the 
adoption of certain institutional forms and practices to 
attain these goals, including non-partisanship, the
20council—manager form, 'master planning', and so on.
Some of these beliefs find an echo in traditional ideas 
about local government administration in Australia, and 
we have seen some of them expressed by aldermen and election 
candidates in the six counoils. They are in fact 
associated more with middle class than with working class 
candidates, as many of the norms find expression in attacks 
upon the Labor Party- in local politics. Labor Party 
aldermen tend to stress other norms. The party is seen 
as the natural expression of the needs and aspirations of 
the working man and as a means by which the ordinary 
man-in-the—street can gain personal access to government.
He can approach his local party representative who will 
understand his problems and speak his own language.
Party aldermen reject the view that local politics is 
apolitical. They scoff at so-called independents and 
claim they are either Liberals 'in disguise', or that they
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are there to further their interests as businessmen or 
as friends of businessmen. I quoted an example of 
Labor Party election advertising in Liverpool, where Labor 
rule was contrasted to Liberal rule by stressing the 
devotion of the Labor Party to the ’working and family 
man’, and to its aim to give ’day—to—day assistance’
(see page 98). Labor aldermen believe their major duty 
is to help people, rather than to administer things.”'*"
The contrast in approaches was brought out in Liverpool 
when an alderman of the 1968—71 council, re-elected in 
1971» resigned during 1972. He wrote a letter to the 
local press explaining his resignation and was highly 
critical of the Labor regime. He condemned party politics 
and caucus rule, the lack of business and administrative 
skill exhibited by most aldermen from the Labor Party 
ranks, and what he termed ’abuses’ in town planning 
regulation:
Development applications are often dealt with
on the basis of ’who it is' rather than 'what
it is', or what is the correct zoning, etc. 22
It is usually argued in relating machine politics to 
the working class that the favours at the disposal of the 
urban machine were of greatest attraction to the poor and 
the deprived. In the same way, it could be said that some 
of the personal favours that lie within the power of local 
councils in Sydney are of special importance in poorer 
areas. It was noted in Liverpool that many of the 
requests for exemption from the strict letter of the law 
arising in the administration of building and health or 
town planning regulations stemmed from cases of personal
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economic hardship. They were common not only because of 
the rate of development, but because many of those involved 
encountered economic difficulties. Aldermen referred to 
them as 'battlers’ and saw them as worthy recipients of 
sympathy and help. Doing them a favour was* performing 
an act of social welfare.
Wolfinger's observations on the benefits the middle 
class receive from machine politics also apply in the 
present context. In Liverpool and elsewhere the 
pressures for exemptions from planning regulations came 
from property developers and they were recipients of 
favours as much as those suffering economic hardship.
The whole notion that the middle class are in politics for 
higher motives and more public-spirited ends must be 
treated with extreme scepticism, even though they might 
be observed to espouse the types of beliefs that Banfield 
and Wilson attribute to them. In the present context, 
in trying to account for distributive politics in local 
government, we must again make the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate types of decision and forms 
of political activity. In different polities, there 
are different norms. Beliefs expressed by groups in 
politics serve to support their interests and those that 
have the status of norms are likely to serve the interests 
of dominant groups. In Ku-ring—gai, ward parochialism 
and pork barrel politics were not proscribed, because 
the interests of residents were served by engaging in 
these forms of political activity. In North Sydney, 
there were conflicts over the norms relating to pressure
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group activity and administrative discretion. Pro- 
development aldermen argued that the council should not 
bow to parochial minority pressures, but should listen to 
the advice of the 'experts’ and be consistent in adminstering 
its adopted planning policies. Anti—development aldermen
ignored these orthodox local government norms and talked 
of ’public participation’ and the need to take account 
of peoples’ wishes. Distributive decisions in favour 
of residents were frequently made. While one can contrast 
the political style of middle class residents’ groups in 
Leichhardt with the political style of the Labor regime, 
this style was not an end in itself, or at least not the 
only end for these groups in local politics. Thus, while 
beliefs and norms of broad social groups may have some 
influence on local politics, we must also look closely at 
local political conditions to see the significance of 
these norms. As well as trying to account for the 
political behaviour of aldermen and political activists 
in a variety of local political conditions by reference to 
beliefs and ideals supposedly held in common by middle class 
or working class people, it is also important to look at 
local political cultures made up of norms, beliefs and 
attitudes which prescribe and proscribe behaviour in each 
polity. These stem from local conditions as well as from 
broader social influences.
Burwood came closest amongst the six councils to 
conforming to the norms of ’apolitical’ administration.
The delegation of authority, the avoidance of public 
controversy and party conflict, the belief in the value of 
committee debate and the advice of the professional experts,
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and the relative lack of parochial .influences were central 
features of council decision making that conformed to the 
ideal. They stemmed to a large extent from the relative 
quiescence of local politics, A stable and relatively 
exclusive process of political recruitment, continuity 
in personnel and the lack of interest group activity were 
major characteristics. The area was relatively socially 
homogeneous, the municipality was small and was not 
experiencing any major social or economic changes.
From 1968—71 a strong mayor super—imposed his own 
executive style of administration, promoting norms that 
encouraged the isolation of decision making from local 
pressures and laid emphasis on delegation of authority 
and increased status to the officials.
Some of the traditional norms of local government 
administration were also often expressed by aldermen in 
other areas, but local politics were very different in 
style and character, and forms of political activity 
proscribed by these norms were tolerated. In Ku—ring-gai, 
while some aldermen espoused a belief in ’efficient 
administration’ and condemned ’political influences’, the 
local political culture in fact encouraged and facilitated 
a high level of participation by local groups.
Consultation of local opinion and public debate of issues 
were normal procedures. Residents who had invested very 
heavily to buy the right to live in exclusive residential 
suburbs vigorously defended their investment when they 
saw it threatened. Neighbourhood protest groups and 
progress associations sought local protection or
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neighbourhood services. Demands were largely highly 
parochial, aldermen exhibited signs of ward parochialism 
and were ever willing to make distributive decisions in 
response to these pressures.
In Bankstown, the Progressive Independents publicly 
espoused the belief in apolitical council administration 
and business-like efficiency, but some of the group’s 
members were very closely involved in parochial 
distributive politics. One of the founders of the group, 
and their first choice as mayor, in fact on occasions 
expressed disapproval of this style of politics, as it 
was one of the political evils the group had promised to 
eradicate. But no serious challenge was ever made to 
the decision making procedures that facilitated ward 
parochialism and pork barrel politics in response to 
progress association and local group pressures.
In Liverpool, the council encouraged individuals and 
firms to seek favourable interventions in the administrative 
process, by allowing personal representations to be made 
and through the advocacy roles often adopted on an 
individual’s behalf by some aldermen. In an area where 
initiative and enterprise were praised in economic life, 
and where unfettered growth and expansion were major 
community goals, the council often saw no reason why 
abstract principles of town planning or building 
regulations should be allowed to inhibit such enterprise.
The Labor Party added a gloss of social welfare motives to 
distributive decision making, but Labor aldermen were as 
pliant in the face of pressures for distributive decisions 
from developers as from ’battlers’.
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Council decision making in Leichhardt was inseparable 
from local Labor Party politics, at least before the 
advent of local residents’ groups. Ward parochialism 
resulted from the branch structure of the party and 
branch influences on aldermen were largely over minor 
personal matters. Council decisions were made according 
to prescribed party procedures. The Labor Party approach 
to local politics was a major determinant of the style 
of local council administration, which contradicted many 
of the traditional norms. The new residents' groups 
adopted a different style, partly because they were 
forced to through their wish to challenge an existing 
set of policy commitments upheld by the Labor council, 
but mainly because they saw the existing style of 
administration as objectionable in itself. Labor aldermen 
were unwilling to make the change from the exclusive and 
private style of politics in which ward aldermen and 
party branches were the major actors, to the more open 
style of political conflict and public debate that the 
new residents' groups adopted.
In accounting for a particular style of local council 
administration, we cannot ignore peculiar historical 
factors, the influence of past events or of individual 
incumbents. I have already mentioned the influence of 
Burwood's mayor in this context. In Banks town, the 
influence of the town planning department was due in a 
large measure to the threat of Ministerial intervention 
and the planner's own forcefulness in argument and his 
professional ability in presenting a case. Similarly,
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the influence of the engineer in Liverpool worked toward 
the same end and his professional ability and force 
of character had its effect on the way decisions about 
works programmes were made.
I have already remarked that council deöision making 
can be characterised as ’administration by politicians’.
In Chapter 1, we saw that there were ambiguities and 
unresolved dilemmas in the theory of local government 
and these have been seen to apply in practice as well.
In the Australian context, the conflict between efficient 
administration and the political or representative 
function of the elected aldermen is particularly acute.
Local government performs fewer functions than its U.K. 
counterpart, on which the structure of local councils is 
modelled. Delegated administrative duties are a more 
important part of its assigned role and functions. A 
recurrent theme in ideas about local government in 
Australia is the notion that it is essentially an 
administrative arm of government exercising delegated 
powers and implementing parliamentary legislation as a 
matter of administrative practicality and convenience.
In fact, rather than being the apolitical style of 
administration that some of its advocates envisage, local 
government decision making, whether it involves discretionary 
powers or simple administrative acts of rule—application, 
is subject to political pressures of a quite distinctive 
kind. And these pressures, distinctive in that they 
seek to extract favours from decision makers in the 
distributive arena of politics, are perhaps the very
365
antipathy of the model of sound administration and
efficient management which I have described.
The Maud report on the management of local government
in the U.K. was centrally concerned with this conflict
between the representative role of the councillor and
the wish for more efficient management. The report
came down firmly on the side of efficient management.
It recommended less interference by councillors in
administrative detail through greater delegation and
the abolition of the traditional committee system.
Committees would no longer be 'executive or administrative
23bodies', but purely advisory.. They would report to
a board of management appointed from amongst its members
by the council and this board would be concerned with
setting the objectives of the authority and determining
priorities. This allots a firm policy role to the
elected representative. Self has questioned whether
'this allotted role correspond(s) with the intrinsic value
of local representation or with the wishes or the
24capacities of the councillors themselves'. The councillor
is a part-time politician who can not always familiarise
himself with questions of broad policy. In local politics,
it is often the case that major issues arise only when
policies are applied. Only then do some of the
implications become apparent to the councillor, and only
then does he crystallise his opinions. In administration,
marginal cases exist when rules are applied which call for
judgment and such cases 'may be considered as much the
25province of political as professional discretion'.
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Not only do councillors seem to prefer, and to be best at, 
dealing with matters of detail and the implementation of 
policies as they effect people, this seems to be what is 
expected of them.
The Maud proposals would...deprive the run-of- 
the-mill councillor of those marginal contributions 
to direct decision making which frequently accord 
with their abilities and wishes, and which can 
reasonably be claimed to accord with the expected 
role of a local representative. Moreover, the 
Maud system would make the council system 
substantially more oligarchic, thus further 
removing the leadership from those grass-roots 
influences which are the principal reason for 
maintaining a local government system at all.
Self fears that these moves toward managerial efficiency
would destroy the ’special democratic ethos of British
local government'.
These comments highlight the dilemma very effectively. 
Many of the benefits and the evil.s of local democracy have 
been illustrated in tne six councils (although there seem 
to be more of the evils than normally occur in local 
councils in the U.K.). Aldermen through their 
accessibility are highly attentive to personal problems 
and individual needs. They are usually very receptive 
to demands from community groups and through their close 
involvement in community affairs are able to respond to 
service needs and community demands. We have seen cases 
where 'political rather than professional' discretion 
was exercised in response to strongly voiced protests by 
local groups, particularly in North Sydney. Had the 
council's planning code been administered uniformly through 
delegated authority or according to the advice of the 
professional planners, these protests would have been
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ineffective. On the debit side, we have seen direct 
intervention in the administrative process by aldermen 
which was aimed at permitting developers to avoid the 
provisions of planning regulations. Somewhat more 
dubiously on the debit side, we have seen the frequent 
adoption of pork barrel arrangements in the determination 
of works programmes. These can either be seen as 
another legitimate expression of parochial demands in the 
political arena, or as an interference in what ought to 
be an objectively determined programme according to 
priorities resting on technical criteria, or other measures 
of 'real need*.
In fact, of course, there is a very large ’grey area’ 
in which one has to weigh the values associated with 
local democracy against other criteria such as uniformity 
or equity in administration, efficiency and economy, and 
the value of professional advice and objectives. Thus, 
for instance, engineers on some councils voiced some 
disquiet over the favouritism they had to show to 
individuals who contacted their aldermen to make a complaint. 
For many aldermen, helping someone put a building 
application through the council was just a matter of 
explaining the procedures, but it also might have involved 
putting an application at the top of the pile to ensure 
prompt attention, or making some compromises with some 
of the rules or policies the council was meant to be 
administering. From the point of view of a town planner, 
ignoring professional advice or planning policies and 
regulations is a bad thing whatever the motives involved,
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and regardless of the beneficiaries» Favouritism to a 
developer because he is a friend of aldermen, favouritism 
to a house builder because he is in dire financial straits, 
or favouritism to a group of protesting residents because 
they wish to protect the amenity of their neighbourhood 
as a place to live, each had the same result and is 
judged from the one standpoint} planning regulations 
are determined on the basis of technical knowledge, are 
in the public interest and ought to be applied uniformly. 
For many professional planners the term ’political decision’ 
which could be applied to each of these cases, is a 
pejorative one. Professionals such as town planners are 
concerned not only that administration should be uniform 
and fair, but that decisions should also be right from 
the point of view of professional, technical criteria.
The fallacy of this view is the belief that values and 
judgments can be excluded from the decision making process 
by adopting so-called ’technical criteria’ and the use of 
'professional standards’. Even the most 'technical' 
decisions have consequences and implications that must 
also be evaluated from non—technical and non—professional 
standpoints•
Local democracy is not only to be judged from the 
point of view of administrative decisions. Local 
government does provide a means by which local populations 
are able to express preferences and make choices in a way 
that very rarely occurs at other levels of government.
We saw in several cases in the six councils that elections
provided occasions for very real choices on policy issues
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The local election provides an almost unique opportunity 
Tor direct resolution oT broad issues, without the 
mediation oT party conflict and party organisations.
In the United Kingdom, party competition at local 
elections very largely removes any specifically local 
content from the electoral process. In the six 
councils, the electoral process was a distinctively local 
one, and in three of them at least, it was one in which 
important local issues were raised and decided on.
At the same time, though, those elections in which issues 
were not so important were decided for reasons that in 
their own way were as irrelevant for local policy making 
as the factors that determine party support in local 
elections in the U.K. I tried to show that in fact in 
some councils the electoral process reflected the 
administrative character of much of council decision 
making, for it provided a way for parochial and 
individual interests to exert influence on the administrative 
proce ss.
From the point of view of performing delegated 
administrative functions there is something to be said 
for the argument that local councils do more harm than good. 
If one values administrative uniformity and consistency, 
then local councils, accommodating pressures exerted by 
individuals at the stage of policy implementation, are 
not an ideal form of administrative structure. From the 
point of view of the expert — the planner, the public health 
authority, or the engineer — this influence at the 
enforcement stage defeats some of the objects of the
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policies and regulations that are meant to be administered. 
From both standpoints, some reduction in the amount of 
discretion that is exercised and some increase in the 
degree of administrative control, would both be desirable. 
This might be achieved by imposing central controls, or 
possibly by altering the present local council structure 
in a way that would place more authority in the hands 
of paid officials. What must be taken into account is 
that aldermen do not interfere in administration and 
details just because they feel like it, but because 
they face political pressures to do so. Instituting a 
’city manager’ structure, as >has been suggested, aimed 
at increasing the authority and independence of the 
executive or administrative arm, would need to take into 
account these facts of local political life. It would 
also entail a major reform of the committee system and 
a re—assessment of the function of aldermen of the sort 
Maud undertook.
If a Maud—type solution to the question of the 
proper role of aldermen were arrived at and applied to 
the reform of administrative structures in Sydney’s 
suburban councils, it would leave aldermen with very little 
to do. One of the arguments used in favouring reforms
4
of this type is that it will attract to local office 
people of the right 'calibre*, by which is usually meant 
those capable of exercising management skills and taking 
major policy decisions. In the six councils the process 
of recruitment into local office was intimately bound 
up with the general characteristics of local politics as
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a whole. Those who stood for office and won were those 
who were willing and able to participate in parochial and 
individual politics, for it was partly by exploiting 
these interests and loyalties that they won election.
It may be that administrative changes such as suggested 
above will help take the process of administration and 
detailed implementation of policy out of the local 
political arena, but it will not alter the fact that 
demands for favouritism of all sorts will continue to 
be made, seeking intervention by the elected representative 
in council administration. Aldermen who have strong 
links with particular neighbourhoods or with neighbourhood 
groups, who fjnd gratification in helping people in the 
•little things , or who get drawn into parochial and 
inter-personal politics through their contact with local 
people and groups, are still likely to be elected to 
office and may demand to be given authority to fulfil 
the expectations held of them. It is possible that 
these demands and expectations can be reduced in importance 
in local politics by.giving local councils broader 
functions and| more money to better perform their existing 
ones. If codicils are given more scope for making 
important policy choices about the local area, then 
local politics may be transformed, as sectoral interests 
become more Involved and distributive issues become 
secondary ti broader policy issues. Social welfare and 
public housing are two possible areas in which councils 
could be gdj^ en broader responsibilities.
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There is some value in retaining local democracy in 
order to gain representation of individual or parochial 
interests in the administrative process0 This is 
particularly so in areas of administration such as 
statutory land use control, where so much decision making 
must involve ‘political1 as well as ‘professional 
discretion1« Individuals do often need ‘help* and 
sympathy in the administrative process which may best 
be provided by an elected representative, and parochial 
interests deserve representation because so often they 
are of such direct and crucial importance for people and 
their standard of life. But there is even greater 
value in the retention and the strengthening of a system 
of government that permits people effectively to 
participate in public policy decisions about matters 
of very immediate local concern«
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APPENDIX
A questionnaire was administered to all aldermen on 
the six councils. Questionnaires were sent by post to 
aldermen in Ku-ring-gai, Burwood, North Sydney and 
Leichhardt, or were handed over personally at the 
conclusion of personal interviews. All aldermen who 
did not answer the first time were approached again with 
the questionnaire through the post. The questionnaire 
was administered personally at the end of interviews 
to aldermen in Bankstown and Liverpool, except for those 
aldermen who were not interviewed, to whom it was posted. 
The questionnaire is reproduced on the following pages. 
Question l4 received very few responses except in 
Burwood, It was not included in the questionnaire 
administered to aldermen in Leichhardt, Bankstown and 
Liverpool,
All aldermen were approached for personal interviews.
These, like the questionnaire were conducted from
September 1970 to May 1971* Table 1 below shows the
number of respondents for the questionnaire and interviews.
Table 1 Number of aldermen interviewed and 
responding to questionnaire
Total
Interview Questionnaire Aldermen
Bankstown 9 9 12
Burwood 9 10 12
Ku—ring—gai 9 9 12
Leichhardt 9 9 18
Liverpool 8 10 12
North Sydney 14 10 15
TOTAL 58 57 81
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The interviews were not structured, that is a rigid set 
of questions aimed at obtaining strictly comparable and 
perhaps quantifiable data was not administered at each 
interview« But a common set of broad topics was 
covered with each, respondent« These included general 
beliefs about role and duties, relations between 
officials and aldermen, views on representation, group 
politics and perceptions of the structure of influence 
in the community« Aldermen were encouraged to talk of 
events and issues and describe actual decisions«
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ALDERMEN QUESTIONNAIRE: LOCAL COUNCILS IN SYDNEY
1. How long, altogether, have you lived in this area? years [ ]
2. What is your occupation?
3. When you first considered you might stand for this Council, was it -
(a) your own idea [ ]
(b) were you asked to 
stand by some per­
son or organisation
OR (c) was it a combination 
of both?
Please tick the appropriate reply.
[ ]
If you have ticked (b) or (c), would you say which of the following played a 
part in influencing your decision?
(a) a political party [ ]
(b) a sitting or retir­
ing alderman [ ]
(c) a local civic group
or community organi­
sation [ .]
(d) a personal friend or 
f riends
(e) Other
(please specify)
[ ] 
[ ]
Please tick the appropriate reply, or replies. If more than one apply, 
please indicate.
4. At your last election, did you receive any help, sponsorship or support from 
any group, or political party,.or any local organisation in this area?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
If yes, would you please name the groups or organisations that gave you 
help and support.
5. Do you intend to seek re-election for another term?
Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know [ ]
6. In general, what opinion do you think most people in the area hold about the 
present Council's policies and its general conduct of Council affairs?
Favourable [ ] Neutral [ ] Unfavourable [ ] Don't know [ ]
7. Regardless of people's opinions about particular aspects of Council policy, 
do you think that aldermen get proper recognition from people in the commu­
nity for their services on t)ie Council?
Yes [ ] No [ ] Don't know [ ]
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8. In your opinion, what are the two most pressing problems facing the Coun­
cil at the present time?
( a ) _________________________________________________________________
(b)
9. What would you say the balance of opinion is within your ward about the
following aspects of public services? Would you say most people are satis­
fied, or that most are dissatisfied?'
Please tick the appropriate box. satis- Dissa- Don't
fied tisfied know
(a) Planning and control over development
(b) Street maintenance and construction
(c) The level of the rate
(d) Refuse disposal services
(e) Street lighting, and footpath paving
(f) Sewerage and drainage facilities
(g) ’Welfare' services and amenities
(h) Control of pollution
(i) Recreation and leisure facilities - 
sporting, cultural etc. amenities
10. Most people agree that Councils should have more money to spend on important 
services. However, given their present financial problems, Councils when 
deciding their budget must weigh the question of the increasing burden on 
the ratepayer against demands for better services and more expenditure.
In approaching this problem during the‘past four or five years, has the 
level of expenditure by the Council been -
much too high [ ] somewhat too high [ ] about right [ ]
somewhat too low [ ] much too low [ ]
In the past year or two, when debating the level of the rate and the level 
of expenditures, have you been in general agreement with the majority of 
Council?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
Finally, looking ahead to the next year or two, should the Council be aim­
ing to -
increase [ ] keep steady [ ] decrease [ ]
the level of expenditure, assuming that no new major sources of income are 
opened up for local government.
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11. In most areas there are a number of groups and organisations which are 
active and sometimes appear before the Council to put a case, or which 
show a direct interest in certain aspects of Council work.
(a) Which groups and organisations in this area, if any, have been 
particularly prominent in this respect in recent years?
-  3 -
(b) Which, if any, have been the most helpful to you personally in your 
Council work?
(c) Which, if any, have been the most influential, or successful?
On balance, do groups and organisations which are active in putting their 
views to Council, help or hinder the general conduct of Council business?
Help conduct of business [ ]
Hinder conduct of business [ ]
12. I would like to ask some questions about your activity in community life, 
and in political affairs in the area, not just matters connected directly 
with Council work.
(a) Have you been active in any civic organisations or local groups and 
associations (other than Council committees), which have in some way 
been concerned with matters which have come before Council?
(Consider the last five years or so.)
Very active [ ] Fairly active [ ] Not active [ ]
If you have been active, could you name which organisations these 
are, or were?
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12. (b) Are you a member of a political party, or have you been a member in 
the past five years?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
(c) If yes, which branch of which party was this, and how many years alto­
gether have you been a member?
[ ] years
(d) Have you been active in party affairs in recent years in the area 
(attending meetings or regularly campaigning, for instance)?
Very active [ ] Fairly active [ ] Not active [ ]
(e) Have you ever seriously considered, or been approached about, standing 
for State or Federal Parliament?
Yes - considered [ ] Yes - approached [ ] No [ ]
13. I would like to ask you how you keep yourself informed on Council matters. 
Would you check the following list of possible sources and say how impor­
tant each one is for you when seeking useful information. For eaoh one,
please put a tick in the appropriate column.
(a) The local press
(b) Other aldermen
(c) Your ward constituents
(d) Groups and organisations in 
the area
(e) Personal observation (e.g. 
works or site inspections)
(f) Informal contacts with people 
outside the Council
(g) Members and officers of local 
political party organisations
(h) State and Federal Members for 
the area
(i) The paid Council officers 
(through discussion and re­
ports)
(J) Other (please specify)
Very Not Not at
impor- Impor- very im- all im- 
tant tant portant portant
Would you look through the list again and say which you consider to be the 
three most important sources, in order of importance.
1. ________________________________________________________________________
2.
3.
381
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14. Some observers have suggested that an Important Influence upon the way an 
alderman arrives at a point of view Is through discussion, often outside 
the committee room and Council chamber, with his fellow aldermen, particu­
larly those he respects, or comes most into contact with.
In the following questions, you are asked to name some of your col­
leagues on the Council. This is solely to find out the kinds of patterns 
of discussion und exchange of views that exist. I emphasise again that 
neither your name nor any names you mention will be used in writing up 
the information, nor revealed in any way at all.
Please mention, for each question, as many, or as few, names as you wish.
(a) Amongst the aldermen, which ones would you say should be the most 
respected, the kind of men a new alderman could look to when he is 
learning nbout how the Council should work?
(b) Which aldermen, IF any, are the most likely to have their opinions 
accepted by the r£st of the Council?
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